 | Lisa Rasmussen - 2005 - 300 páginas
..."that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (Hume, 1973, p. 183). This dichotomy, Hume believed, between reason and passion, and between a radically... | |
 | Brian Draper, Pamela S. Melding, Henry Brodaty - 2005 - 388 páginas
...custom. 'All our reasonings concerning matters of fact are deriv'd from nothing but custom: and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures', and he and most subsequent philosophers have accepted that the search for empirical proof is illusory.... | |
 | James Fieser - 2005 - 454 páginas
...the last step in this progress, and crowned the system by what he calls his hypothesis, to wit, That belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our nature. Beyond this I think no man can go in this track; sensation or feeling is all, and what is left... | |
 | Forrest Clark, A.B. Lorenzoni - 2005 - 896 páginas
...matter of custom or habit rooted in sentiment or feeling. Our belief in facts or causal relationships is "more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures."54 Hume's skepticism is even more striking in his account of our ideas about the existence... | |
 | John Shand - 2005 - 250 páginas
...belief. Whatever the merits of this argument, Hume's stated intention in exploiting it is to show that "belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our natures" (T 1.4.1.8; SBN 183). So he does not recommend the sceptical conclusion,... | |
 | David Copp - 2005 - 680 páginas
...while desire belongs on the side of feelings. For in part I of the Treatise, Hume has concluded that "belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (Treatise, I.iv.i). This is so even in the case of beliefs of the kind found in mathematics or empirical,... | |
 | Peter Orebech, Fred Bosselman, Jes Bjarup, David Callies, Martin Chanock, Hanne Petersen - 2005 - 440 páginas
...183, "all our reasoning's concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom, and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures." 21. Hume, Enquiries, I, Sec. IX p. 108, Sec. V, Part I, pp. 44 f., Sec. VII, Part I, p. 66. 22. Hume,... | |
 | Knud Haakonssen - 2006 - 668 páginas
...causes and principles, of which we are not masters' (App 2, SBN 624). 'Belief, as he writes in Book i , 'is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures' (1.4.1.8, SBN 183). Does it follow that Hume's account of inductive judgements (or the similar account... | |
 | Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka - 2007 - 556 páginas
...that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our nature."34 Therefore, in systematizing knowledge of living beings as they live, in common life, for... | |
 | Ian Duncan - 2007 - 420 páginas
..."[All] our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom," Hume insists; "belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (234). Custom alone — repetition and habituation — produces the effects of continuity and consistency... | |
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... all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom, and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures. 
