 | Isabel Rivers - 2000 - 407 páginas
...that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'dfrom nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.™ Hume's arguments concerning cause and effect, experience, custom, and belief are set out at length... | |
 | Terrence Merrigan, Ian Turnbull Ker - 2000 - 274 páginas
...declares that "all reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our nature." Along this line, Williams maintains, Newman emphasizes a human being's nature as active and... | |
 | Christina Petsoulas - 2001 - 220 páginas
...the mind', for it refers to the manner in which we conceive an idea. Hume aptly concludes that '... belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures '.42 Belief is a propensity of human nature, a 'species of natural instinct' which 'no reasoning or... | |
 | Michael Huemer - 2002 - 636 páginas
...that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures. I have here prov'd, that the very same principles, which make us form a decision upon any subject,... | |
 | Louis E. Loeb - 2002 - 302 páginas
...otherwise have, in "But here, perhaps, it may be demanded, how it happens, even upon my hypothesis [that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures], that these arguments above-explain'd produce not a total suspense of judgment" (T 184). Second, at... | |
 | Robert J. Fogelin - 2010 - 128 páginas
...that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects, are derm 'd from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures. (THN, 1.4.1.8) This passage comes from a section of the Treatise titled "Of scepticism with regard... | |
 | Frederick Copleston - 2003 - 452 páginas
...influence.'2 Again, 'all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom, and belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures'.3 How, then, can we decide between rational and irrational beliefs? Hume does not appear to... | |
 | Daniel Garber, Steven M. Nadler - 2005 - 286 páginas
...often subordinated to sentiment and the passions. Belief, they would have read, is a feeling and (' more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures' (THN 1.4.1.8), while much of what we take to be reason is said to be a calm passion capable, as reason... | |
 | Beth L. Rodgers - 2005 - 262 páginas
..."that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures (Bk. I, part I, sect. 4, p. 183). Quantity, however, involves precise standards, making it possible... | |
 | Philip Woods - 2005 - 194 páginas
...emotional embrace of the validity of certain assertions and claims to truth. As Hume observed, ' ... belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures' (Hume 1969: 234). The point is, however, that the believing of a claim as true is not the end-point.... | |
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... all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom, and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures. 
