...judgement, with propositional content, and to a revised view of them as expressions of feeling: 'helief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures', 'Morality ... is more properly felt than judg'd of. Seen in one aspect Hume is a constructive sceptic...

...understanding, one would have to choose the former. Compare this with his remark in Treatise I "that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (THN 183). Here Hume does not mean that belief is not an act of the cogitative part of our natures—if...

...with a feeling instead of making the feeling consequent upon the belief. lndeed Hume tells us that 'belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures'16 and that 'belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment'17. There are many other...

...friends and daily companions" (T316). This may seem strange until we recall that Hume considers belief "more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (T183), and that beliefs are distinguished from their corresponding ideas by their vivacity. Therefore,...

...matter of custom or habit rooted in sentiment or feeling. Our belief in facts or causal relationships is "more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures" (47). Hume's scepticism is even more striking in his account of our ideas about the existence of physical...

...explicable by general principles of natural functioning. They are derived from nothing but custom, and belief 'is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures' (1978:183). The idea of necessary connection The long discussion of the inference from the observed...

...influence.'2 Again, 'all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom, and belief is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures'.3 How, then, can we decide between rational and irrational beliefs? Hume does not appear to...

...belief as the assent of the understanding; for both, it was a matter of feeling. "Belief," wrote Hume "is more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures."45 In neither case is belief something the human mind could create at will. For Wesley, the...

...absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breath or feel'; for Hume, 'belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures' (Hume 1978: 183). Does this mean that belief is not governed by reason? If we like we can call the...

...hypothesis 'that all our reasonings concerning matters of fact are deriv'd from nothing but custom: and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures' (T 183). This echoes an earlier statement: Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of...