needs, we have greatly improved what was already a good intelligence system. For example, we set up a standing board comprised of senior intelligence officials from all intelligence organizations to determine program priorities and coordinate support for military operations.

We established a Joint Intelligence Center just as Gen. (Norman) Schwarzkopf had — for all our CinCs. We established the National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon. This center serves as a focal point for support to the commands and to joint task forces by acting as a national clearing house for intelligence requests and by coordinating support from the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) and NSA (National Security Agency).

We established a Central Imagery Office to coordinate the timely provision of imagery productsmaps, target photos, intel photos — to the warfighters. We also established an Office of Military Affairs within the CIA to correct a deficiency in national intelligence availability identified by our commanders during the gulf war. Finally, we eliminated a shortfall in human intelligence -- the information gathered by people — by giving tasking authority for all HUMINT to DIA.

Infrastructure Changes

The drawdown to the base force requires a commensurate reduction in our infrastructure. More than 170 activities have been identified by the services for elimination, consolidation or realignment. For example, the commissary functions of all services have been combined into a single Defense Commissary Agency. We have assigned executive agents to oversee common functions such as cleanup of former DoD-owned hazardous waste sites, operation of common-user ocean terminals and support for medical materiel, military postal service and domestic disaster relief. We have reduced and reorganized service staffs.

Goldwater-Nichols, the dramatic changes we were designing for the armed forces demanded such a review.

Beginning in the summer of 1992, a comprehensive, "top-tobottom" review of roles and missions was undertaken. This review, led by the Joint Staff, involved the services and the CinCs at every step. Areas selected for examination were those in which two or more services perform similar tasks, where restructuring might generate significant cost savings or where changes in strategy and force structure made a comprehensive review appropriate. One of the primary goals was the identification and elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort between the services, recognizing that redundancy can be a good thing, especially in an emergency

and that emergencies are less predictable today than at the height of the Cold War,

The 1993 report on roles, missions and functions thus examines the U.S. armed forces from a perspective entirely different from that of the 1989 report. It addresses many of the difficult questions being asked by Congress and the American people about their armed forces. In a number of areas, significant changes in the assignment of roles, missions and functions are recommended. In others, the current division of labor makes the most sense. In still others, further study is needed before final recommendations can be made. The issues addressed and the resulting recommendations are highlighted below ....

What We're Doing Now

The foundation for the current assignment of service roles and functions -- the Key West Agreement- was the product of a meeting convened by the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, to work out disagreements among the services sparked by the National Security Act of 1947. Many argue that the agreement reached at Key West is flawed, that it failed to resolve redundancy and duplication among the services. In fact, what was recognized in 1947 and has been supported by Congress ever since is that there are advantages in having complementary capabilities among the services. At the national command level, such flexibility provides additional options to senior decision-makers in a crisis. At the theater level, CinCs can more effectively tailor a military response to any contingency, regardless of location.

Despite the enduring wisdom of the Key West Agreement, we recognized the need to review the underlying division of responsibilities. In addition to the mandate of

Doctrine and Training

We have made great strides in developing and training under joint doctrine. Foremost among our new publications is Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces: Joint Warfare is Team Warfare. It serves as the focal point for further refinement. Ocean Venture 92 and Tandem Thrust 92— conducted off the Carolina coast and in California and the midPacific, respectively - saw thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines training together on joint wartime tasks.

Clearly indicative of our new joint doctrine and training emphasis was the use of the joint force air component commander concept in the gulf war. The JFACC oversaw and synchronized all air component operations for Gen. Schwarzkopf. This was a historic first. The overwhelming success of the concept was dramatically apparent in the results obtained.

Unified Command Plan

A detailed review of roles, missions and functions necessarily involves a review of the unified command plan because missions are assigned to CinCs, not to services,

and the UCP is the document that defines the CinCs' responsibilities. As mentioned, U.S. Strategic Command already represents a major change to the UCP; nonetheless, we recommend one more major change and further review of another.

U.S.-Based Forces

During World War II, forces from all services were assigned to theater CinCs who waged the war. We learned it was the best way to fight. The National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent congressional action in 1958 made this successful organization permanent. The Goldwater-Nichols Act put the finishing touches to this arrangement

except for one major contingent of troops, those assigned to units in CONUS. By 1992, this exception had become all the more glaring because of the changes in our strategy, in our forward deployments and in the structure of our forces.

With troop strength overseas reduced, our regionally oriented strategy depends more on forces based in CONUS — forces that must be trained to operate jointly as a way of life. Yet there is no CONUSbased CinC charged with this mission.

The lack of an appropriate joint headquarters to oversee service forces based in CONUS has always been considered a problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tried twice to fix it.

U.S. Strike Command was activated in 1961 to provide unified control over CONUS-based Army and Air Force units. Initially, Strike Command was given no regional responsibilities, but was assigned functional responsibilities to provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other unified commands, to train assigned forces, to develop joint

doctrine and to plan for and execute contingency operations as ordered. In attempting to fulfill its responsibilities as a trainer and provider of forces, Strike Command frequently collided with the services' authority under Title X to organize, train and equip forces.

In 1971, Strike Command was replaced by U.S. Readiness Command. It was given functional responsibility for training and providing forces, with no geographic area of responsibility. Readiness Command experienced some of the same service resistance as its predecessor in fulfilling its assigned training responsibilities.

Over time, Readiness Command was given additional functional responsibilities, including a requirement to plan for and provide joint task force headquarters and forces for contingency operations in areas not assigned to overseas CinCs. One of the joint task force headquarters - the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force — eventually grew into a new combatant command, U.S. Central Command. Readiness Command was subsequently disestablished as a result of a combination of factors, not least of which was the fact that our strategy depended more on forward deployment and basing to contain Soviet expansion than on CONUS-based forces.

Today our strategy has changed, and we have reached a level of joint maturity that makes it possible to address once more the need for unified command over CONUSbased forces. Unified command would facilitate the training, preparation and rapid response of CONUS-based forces currently under the Army's Forces Command, the Navy's Atlantic Fleet, the Air Force's Air Combat Command and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic.

The time has come to merge these forces under a single Cinc whose principal purpose will be to ensure their joint training and joint readiness. Units that are already accustomed to operating jointly will be easier to deploy. Overseas CinCs will be able to focus more on in-theater operations and less on deployment and readiness concerns.

This CinC could also be assigned certain other functional responsibilities, including:

Undertaking principal responsibility for support to United Nations peacekeeping operations and training units for that purpose;

Assisting with the response to natural disasters in the United States and other requirements for military support to civil authorities, when requested by state governors and as directed by the president;

o Improving joint tactics, techniques and procedures;

o Recommending and testing joint doctrine.

After examining several approaches to setting up the joint headquarters, we found U.S. Atlantic Command particularly well suited to assume this new mission:

It is an existing CONUS-based joint headquarters.

It already has a working relationship with the four commands that would become its permanent components.

Its Cold War mission, to defend the Atlantic sea lanes and undertake offensive naval operations against the Soviet Union, has fundamentally changed. While continuing to perform a vital NATO mission, it has the capacity to undertake this additional responsibility in keeping with the revised military strategy.

Its geographic area of responsibility, although large, presents only a modest warfighting challenge, given the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

It can continue to perform its vital NATO mission.

Under this arrangement, the present command in Norfolk, Va., would shift from its predominately maritime orientation to a more balanced combatant command headquarters. We would probably rename the command so as to reflect more accurately its new focus. Its CinC would become a

nominative position, which could be filled by any service.

The Army's Forces Command would no longer require "specified" status as a single-service command reporting directly to the president and secretary of defense. With this change, the term "specified" would be retired, and all forces would belong to a joint team. While the services would retain their Title X responsibilities, the training and deploying of CONUS-based forces as a joint team would be a new mission for this expanded CinC. Unification of the armed forces, which began in 1947, would at last be complete.

Organizationally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed in 1991 to "dual hat" CinNCSPACE as commander, Air Force Space Command. This led to a reduction in personnel and support costs. But these changes don't go far enough; it is time for an even bolder change to be examined.

The proposal we are evaluating would assign the space mission to the commander in chief of U.S. Strategic Command and eliminate U.S. Space Command.

Under this proposal, after appropriate consultation with the Canadians, the commander of AFSPACECOM would assume command of NORAD in Colorado Springs. AFSPACECOM would also operate all space systems under CinCSTRAT's command. Small Army and Navy components would be assigned to CinCSTRAT to ensure space systems support for all services' needs. All services would also be represented in appropriate planning and requirements offices. The Air Force would be

responsible for development of future military space systems. These actions would ensure service-unique requirements for and uses of space are properly represented and that services and Cincs have trained personnel with the knowledge to exploit capabilities of space systems.

Other changes envisioned would include designating the Air Force as the lead service to coordinate with NASA regarding LANDSAT remote earth sensing operations and consolidating DoD's functions at NASA into a single organization under Air Force Space Command. To streamline military satellite communications operations, all operational responsibilities for the Defense Satellite Communications System would transfer from the Defense Information Systems Agency to the Air Force. Responsibilities for the Navy's Fleet Satellite

Communications system would also transfer to the Air Force. Both systems would remain under the combatant command of CinCSTRAT.

Under this proposed arrangement, requirements for space systems would continue to be submitted by Cincs, services or agencies to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for validation. Day-to-day requirements for operational space system support would be submitted to CinCSTRAT.

Such a consolidation would conserve scarce resources and eliminate a substantial number of positions. It is envisioned that this would improve warfighting support from space, allowing an increase in operational effectiveness, efficiency and interoperability, while maintaining joint service expertise and joint operational focus.

More analysis is needed before we assign the space mission to STRATCOM. This analysis will be done in the near future.

Space and Strategic Commands

The United States has developed a robust, highly capable and complex framework for the launch and control of space vehicles and systems. Although the majority of space functions today reside within the Air Force, all the services, plus U.S. Space Command and several defense agencies and organizations, are involved in space activities.

The commander in chief of U.S. Space Command, headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colo., is assigned combatant command of U.S. forces providing warning and assessment of a bomber or missile attack on the United States. In addition, CinCSPACE supports other CinCs by ensuring that space operations and warning requirements are supported.

CinCSPACE is also commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, the U.S. command that provides air defense of the North American continent. CinCSPACE carries out his mission through three service component commands: Air Force Space Command at Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colo.; Naval Space Command at Dahlgren, Va.; and Army Space Command at Colorado Springs, Colo.

Even with the end of the Cold War, our national security depends on a robust space capability. But we can no longer afford to allow multiple organizations to be involved in similar, independent or duplicative space roles and functions.

A number of improvements are under way to streamline our space organization and systems and eliminate unnecessary overlap.

Depot Maintenance

Another change of significant proportions that does not involve the UCP is the proposal to consolidate all depot-level maintenance under a new joint command.

Over the years, all four services established their own depot maintenance systems to perform complex mechanical and electronic work that includes overhauls, component rebuilds and other operations beyond the technical ability of maintenance units in the field. These four service maintenance networks, each independent of other services' capabilities and sized to support a global war, can be reduced and restructured to reduce excess capacity and eliminate nolonger-needed facilities.

A study group chartered by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recommended closure of seven or eight of the military depots in order to reduce excess capacity. Savings of $400 million to $600 million per year are achievable when all these depots are closed. The group also recommended establishment of a Joint Depot Maintenance Command to oversee and administer all depot-level maintenance.

This recommendation is still under review in the Department of Defense. Meanwhile, the services have been directed to identify and recommend depot closures and consolidations prior to the next deliberations of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

tion, Marine Corps tactical air is a unique capability, essential to our military strategy. The number of aircraft types in the Marine Corps inventory will be reduced from nine to four, and Marine Corps squadrons will deploy more frequently aboard aircraft carriers.

Flight Training. To take advantage of the commonality of purpose and training programs among the services for the primary phase of flight training, all Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard flight students will begin training using a common fixed-wing training aircraft under joint development. Following primary flight training, student pilots will be selected for advanced training in one of four specific follow-on specialties, or "tracks": Navy Fighter/Attack, Air Force Fighter/Bomber, Navy and Air Force Tanker/Transport/Maritime Patrol, or Helicopter.

Tanker/Transport/Maritime Patrol training consolidation is expected to begin in 1994, when the Navy plans to introduce advanced maritime training at Reese Air Force Base, Texas. A study will determine if it is cost-effective to move Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard helicopter training - currently conducted at Pensacola, Fla. — to Fort Rucker, Ala., where Army and Air Force training is conducted.

Aircraft Requirements and Inventory Management. Each service uses a different formula to determine how many aircraft needs to buy and different rules to account for aircraft once they're in the inventory. To ensure procurement and maintenance funds are not spent on unnecessary aircraft, standardized terminology and procedures will be developed to govern aircraft requirements and inventory management.

Common Aircraft. The 1993 review of roles, missions and functions included a careful examination of aircraft common to more than one service, looking for ways to do business more effectively or efficiently while preserving each service's ability to perform required functions.

The resulting recommendations are summarized below:

O Consolidate the two types of airplanes used for airborne command and control of strategic forces.

more resources than might be available. Many issues associated with air power roles, missions and functions were therefore examined, and a number of opportunities were identified to make the structure and systems that support and sustain America's air power more efficient. For example:

Continental Air Defense. Significant savings in manpower and operating costs can be achieved by eliminating or sharply reducing the 12 Air National Guard interceptor squadrons dedicated solely to this mission. General purpose and training forces from the active and reserve components of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps can absorb this post-Cold War mission, perhaps in its entirety.

Theater Air Interdiction. Operations deep behind enemy lines are essential to any military campaign. The contributions of both bombers and attack aircraft should be considered when the total number of aircraft required for theater air interdiction is determined.

Close Air Support. The Key West Agreement has always been interpreted as limiting this support to fixed-wing aircraft. But this essential battlefield task can and should be performed routinely by attack helicopters as well. Service functions are being realigned to reflect this expanded definition. To ensure uniformity of execution by all services that request and provide fixed- and rotary-wing close air support, standardized joint procedures are being developed.

Marine Corps Tactical Air. U.S. Marines train and fight as a combined arms air-ground team, supported by organic aircraft that can operate from carrier decks and austere expeditionary sites ashore. Despite calls by some for its elimina

America's Air Power

The claim that America has "four air forces," implying it has three more than it needs, makes a wonderful sound bite but distorts the facts. In fact, America has only one air force, the United States Air Force, whose role is prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The other services have aviation arms essential to their specific roles and functions but which also work jointly to project America's air power.

It would make no more sense to assign all aircraft to the Air Force, as some would suggest, than it would to assign all items of any other militarily useful technology – radios or trucks, for example -- to a single service. The airplane and helicopter capabilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are unique, complementary and necessary. Together they constitute America's air power, an indispensable ingredient in any situation where American lives are at risk.

That said, it was recognized that the acquisition plan for major aviation programs would require