Pennsylvania gave to plaintiff the power to sue, or any other corporate power. Judgment and order affirmed. We concur: Morrison, C. J., Ross, J. DEPARTMENT No. 2. [Filed November 20, 1880.] No. 6239. THE CITY OF SANTA CRUZ, APPELLANT, VS. CLAUS SPRECKELS ET AL., RESPONDENTS. PLEADING IN ACTION FOR CITY LICENSE. In an action for a city license, the complaint should recite or refer to the ordinance upon which the license depends. Appeal from the District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Santa Cruz County. W. D. Storey, for appellant. The judgment in this cause is reversed on the point decided by the Court in bank, in the case of The City of Santa Cruz vs. The Santa Cruz Railroad Company-viz., that the complaint does not recite or refer to any ordinance of the Common Council of the city of Santa Cruz, providing for the collection of licenses by an action. (See opinion filed November 6, 1880, on petition for a rehearing in the case above referred to.) The following order will be entered herein: The judgment in the above entitled case is reversed, and the cause remanded to the Superior Court of the county of Santa Cruz, with directions to strike out the demurrer to the complaint, and remand the cause to the Justice's Court, from which it was transferred to the late District Court for the county aforesaid, as it came from said Justice's Court, that the plaintiff may have an opportunity to amend the complaint in said Justice's Court, in accordance with what is said above. DICT. DEPARTMENT No. 1. [Filed January 10, 1881.] T. J. DOUGHERTY, RESPONDENT, VS. J. B. HAGGIN ET AL., APPELLANTS. WATER RIGHTS-MEANING OF "MINERS' MEASUREMENT "—UNCERTAIN VERWhere, in an action for the diversion, for irrigation purposes, of the water of a creek, the jury returned a verdict that plaintiff was "entitled to forty inches, miners' measurement," of the waters of the creek; and the complaint claimed "five hundred inches, measured under a four-inch pressure;" and there was nowhere in the complaint any reference to miners' measurement; and it further appeared that the term miners' measurement had no fixed meaning, but varied in different localities: Held, that the verdict was bad for uncertainty, and that a new trial should be awarded. Appeal from the Superior Court of Kern County. L. F. Haggin, for appellants. R. E. Arick, for respondent. Ross, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The plaintiff, claiming to be entitled to the use of certain waters of a certain creek in Kern County, called Clear Creek, brought this action for the purpose of enjoining the defendants from diverting the said waters, and to recover damages, etc. The verdict returned is in these words: "We, the jury, find that the plaintiff is entitled to forty inches, miners' measurement, of the waters of Clear Creek, described in the complaint; and we further find that he has been damaged by the defendants in the sum of $1,200." Judgment was entered for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict. The complaint avers that the plaintiff is entitled to "five hundred inches, measured under a four-inch pressure, of the waters" in controversy, but nowhere makes any reference to "miners' measurement." It was admitted, at the argument, that these latter terms have no fixed meaning, and that an inch of water according to "miners' measurement" in one locality is sometimes very different quantity from an inch according to "miners' measurement" in another locality. As already observed, the pleadings make no reference to such measurement, nor is there anything anywhere in the record to indicate what is meant by the "forty inches, miners' measurement, of the waters," awarded by the jury and the Court below to the plaintiff. For aught that the record shows, and for aught that we know, the quantity thus awarded him may exceed the "five hundred inches, measured under a four-inch pressure," claimed in his complaint. It was suggested by counsel for the respondent that the words "miners' measurement " used by the jury in its verdict, and by the Court in its decree, might be treated as surplusage, and disregarded, and the verdict and decree read as giving to the plaintiff "forty inches, measured under a four-inch pressure." It is clear that we cannot thus alter the language and intent of the Court and jury. The judgment and order must be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Court below for a new trial, with leave to the plaintiff to amend his complaint if he shall be so advised. Ordered accordingly. We concur: McKinstry, J., McKee, J. IN BANK. [Filed January 5, 1881.] JOHN SCHUMACHER, RESPONDENT, VS. J. R. TOBERMAN, MAYOR ETC. OF LOS ANGELES, APPELLANT. STREET ASSESSMENTS WHAT IS A "CROSS STREET." Where a statute for opening a new street provided that "real estate, fronting a cross street or street forming a junction with such street improved and within 100 feet of such street proposed or improved," should be assessed according to the frontage on such cross street or street forming such junction; and such new street started from the north line of an existing street: Held, that the real estate fronting on the north line of such existing street could not be assessed. WHO MAY OBJECT TO VOID STREET ASSESSMENT. It is not a sufficient answer to a person who objects to a street assessment on the ground that the assessment is void on account of covering property not liable to assessment, to say that his own assessment will be thereby less. POWER OF ASSESSMENT DEPENDS UPON THEORY OF BENEFITS. The power of assessment can only be employed upon the theory of benefits received by the party assessed; and though the legislature may empower a city to determine that a particular result will be a public benefit, no assessment can be valid, unless that which the political power has declared to be a public benefit is secured to the public and to those who are taxed for it, upon the supposition that it will be of peculiar benefit to them. LEGISLATURE CANNOT BY DIRECT ACT MAKE AN ASSESSMENT IN A CITY. The Legislature cannot legalize a void assessment, nor can it by direct act make an assessment within an incorporated city. PROCEEDINGS TO ENJOIN UNWARRANTABLE ADDITION TO BURDENS OF TAXATION. Any taxpayer of a city may commence a proceeding to enjoin the City Council from doing an act which will result in an unwarrantable addition to the burdens of taxation. Appeal from the District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, Los Angeles County. J. F. Godfrey, Glassell, Chapman & Smith, and Brosseau & Howard, for appellant. Thom & Ross, and Bicknell & White, for respondent. MCKINSTRY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: Section 8 of article VI of "An Act to revise an Act entitled an Act to amend the charter of the city of Los Angeles," etc., (Stats. of 1875-6, p. 709), provides that damages incurred in extending a street, shall be paid by the real estate fronting either side of the extension, and of the original street from the commencement of the extension to a point on the original street, to be fixed by the Common Council. The section closes: "Provided, that in all cases mentioned in this section, the real estate fronting a crossstreet, or street fronting [forming?] a junction with such street improved, and within one-hundred feet of such street proposed, or improved, shall also be assessed according to the frontage on such cross-street, or street forming the junction as aforesaid." In the case before us the point fixed by the Council in the original street is the north line of Requena Street. I agree with the City Council that there was no authority for assessing the property fronting on the north line of Requena Street. Requena Street cannot properly be said to cross or front upon Los Angeles Street, between the terminal of the lines of property declared to be benefited by the extension. The language of the proviso does not contemplate the assessment of any street upon one side alone. The first assessment was therefore void. It will not do to say that plaintiff's assessment is less, if too much property has been assessed. The power of assessment can only be employed upon the theory of benefit received by the party assessed. It may be admitted that the Legislature may empower the city to determine that a particular result will be a public benefit, and that such determination is conclusive; but it is certain that no assessment can be valid unless that which the political power has declared to be a public benefit is secured to the public and to those who are taxed for it, upon the supposition that it will be of peculiar benefit to them. The assessment, without doubt, is invalid in so far as it is an attempt to affect property which cannot legally be made subject to it. It is capable of mathematical demonstration, that if the 100 feet on Requena Street cannot be made to pay the sum as sessed upon them, sufficient money will not be raised to pay for the property sought to be condemned; and such property cannot be taken for the street. The Act of 1878, which is the sole authority for issuing the bonds, the issuing of which is sought to be enjoined, adopts the assessment which was entered of record January 12, 1878, which assessment is, in my opinion, void. It provides for the issuing of bonds, bearing interest, to be redeemed by assessments upon all the property included in such void assessment. The Legislature cannot legalize a void assessment, nor can the Legislature by direct Act make an assessment within an incorporated city. (Taylor vs. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; People vs. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15.) The Act of 1878 not only attempted to give certain effects to the void assessment, but also provided for new assessments, to be levied annually, to meet the interest upon the bonds and for the creation of a sinking fund to pay the principal. The Act of 1878 does not require that the bonds shall refer to the statute under which they are issued. By several other statutes the city of Los Angeles has been authorized to issue bonds. I am not prepared to say that bonds issued under the Act of 1878 may not pass into the hands of innocent persons, or that the purchaser-knowing that bonds have been legally issued is bound to inquire and know that the particular bond offered for sale to him, was in fact issued under an unconstitutional law. I am inclined to the belief that the assessment of January 17, 1878, was a valid assessment. Assuming it to be valid, it may be said that plaintiff may, by paying it, avoid any evil consequences to him from the bonds issued under the Act of 1878. But the plaintiff is an owner of real estate and a taxpayer. The City of Los Angeles must-if the law of 1878 is valid-pay the full amount of the bonds, principal and interest. If the assessment of January seventeenth is valid, and (as to plaintiff's property) is paid, that property is relieved from the lien of the assessment. But the statute does not authorize the collection from the rest of the property within the district, of the difference between the sum paid by plaintiff and the amount to be collected from his property for the payment of the bonds, principal and interest, according to the law of 1878. This difference must be collected by taxation of the property-owners of the city-of whom plaintiff is one. Every taxpayer is interested, and may properly commence a proceeding to enjoin the City |