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invasion by "hostile armies." 48 It should be noted that Order No. 663 was issued in March, 1916, when the Greek Government had reasons to believe that the Bulgarian army would advance in order to occupy Fort Roupel; but as soon as it found out that the army of Tsar Ferdinand was not ready for the movement, but that, on the contrary, General Serrail was proposing to occupy the same fortress, Order No. 663 was canceled and in its stead Constantine's Minister of War issued No. 1228 forbidding the surrender of Roupel.

It is beyond doubt now that the strongholds of Greek Macedonia were surrendered by order of Constantine to the Teutonic Powers and their ally, Bulgaria, for the express purpose of strengthening their military situation. An English correspondent, commenting upon the military disadvantages suffered by the Entente Powers on account of the surrender of this stronghold, says that

The Fortress (Roupel) was almost impregnable. It allowed the Bulgarians to dominate the Struma plain, left them free to advance on Serres, and isolated the Greek army corps in Drama-Cavalla provinces from communication with Salonika. It blocked the way of advance on Sofia via the Struma valley. . . . and at once destroyed the value of the superiority which had accrued to the forces of the Allies by the arrival of the Serbian Army. The surrender of Roupel was also a direct menace to the Allies' Army. . . . It permitted the Bulgarians to shorten materially their line of defense and to bring their left wing right down to the banks of the Struma River.49

Mr. Skouloudis, the then Greek Premier, in explaining in the Boulé the circumstances under which the evacuation of Fort Roupel took place, said that the German commander warned the Greek garrison that he would use force if it was not evacuated and that therefore the fortress was not surrendered in accordance with any agreement with the Central Powers and that the abandonment of Roupel by the Greek troops did not endanger the territorial integrity of Greece. He said that he had lodged a strong protest with the Central Powers against

48 St. B. Pronotario, The Macedonian Tragedies (in Greek), pp. 10-11 et seq. Copies of these orders appeared in the Current History of the New York Times, of February, 1917, Vol. V, pp. 818-819 et seq. These documents are now published in Greek White Book, Documents Diplomatiques, Supplément, in their final shape under Nos. 14, 16, 22 and 26, along with other dispatches connected with the invasion of Greek Macedonia by the Bulgarian and German troops.

49 Crawfurd Price, Venizelos and the War, pp. 163, 164, 165, 169.

their action.50 Mr. Skouloudis in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs told the same story to the ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia who complained against the action of the Greek Government in favoring the Central Powers by the surrender of such a stronghold.51

The official documents published by the present Greek Government after the overthrow of Constantine prove conclusively, however, that the surrender of this and other fortresses to the armies of the Central Powers was due to a prearranged understanding with Constantine and at least some of his ministers.52

The surrender of the keys of Macedonia to the Central Powers and their allies, coupled with all the various incidents which preceded that event, compelled the Entente Powers to intervene energetically in Greece. They presented a series of ultimata which eventually led to the expulsion from Hellas of the German field marshal Constantine who, during his short reign, had disgraced both the Hellenic throne and betrayed the people of his adopted country.


50 Speech in the Boulé, May 23 (O. S.), 1916, Greek White Book, Doc. No. 60; for protests to Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria, referred to, see ibid., Docs. Nos. 53, 54, and 55; for denial of previous agreement for occupation of Roupel, see ibid., Doc. No. 61; all of said documents being printed in Supplement to this JOURNAL for April, 1918. See also ibid., Documents Diplomatiques, Supplément, No. 27. 51 London Times, June 1, 1916.

52 See the following documents in the Greek White Book printed in the Supplement to this JOURNAL, for April, 1918:

Telegram of Lieutenant-General Bairas to the Greek General Staff, dated April 27 (O. S.), 1916, Doc. No. 45.

Telegram of General Yanakitsas, Minister of War, to the commandant of the 4th Army Corps, dated April 28 (O. S.), 1916, Doc. No. 46.

Telegram of Mr. Skouloudis to Mr. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, dated April 29 (O. S.), 1916, Doc. No. 47.

Telegram from Greek Legation at Paris, dated May 24 (O. S.), 1916, Doc. No. 63.

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See also Greek White Book, Documents Diplomatiques, Supplément, No. 47, telegram, dated March 10, 1916, sent by Constantine to the German Government through the Greek Minister at Berlin, in which Constantine says: General Falkenhausen has made known to us the intention of the Allied (Central) Powers' fleet to occupy the Demir Hissar pass [in which Fort Roupel is situated] . . . We replied that we were waiting for the Imperial German Government to give us, through its minister here, the declaration which has already been indicated."



A distinguished English lawyer and judge once happily said that a little truth would leak out even from the most carefully prepared affidavit. Not a little, but a very great deal of truth is appearing in the carefully prepared documents which have recently seen the light, such as Lichnowsky's Memorandum and documents of a similar nature.

Viscount Haldane has wisely followed the lead of the late Imperial German Ambassador to London by issuing an account of his mission to Berlin in 1912; or rather the British Government, unlike Lichnowsky's master, has itself issued the report of its minister of peace, instead of confiscating Lord Haldane's diary, or exposing its illustrious author to charges of unpatriotic conduct and to fear of criminal prosecution.

Without attributing to the British Government impeccability or intimating that its servants are not of the race of Adam, the reason for the publication of Lord Haldane's diary, as yet only in part, is evident from the most casual inspection; for his mission was one conceived and executed in the desire for peace, and the very failure of the mission to accomplish its purpose is a tribute to the statesman who undertook it and redounds to the credit of the government permitting it, of which Lord Haldane was then a member.

For reasons which have become or are becoming common property, the relations between Great Britain and Germany were very strained for some years past, especially so since the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 by his youthful Imperial and imperious master, William II, and the death of Queen Victoria, and they were felt to be grave not merely by the inner circle of the government, but by the well-informed public as well. Indeed, the settlement of outstanding questions with France and with Russia was not due solely to the desire of the British Government to be on good terms with its neighbor across the Channel, and with its neighbor in the Far East, but to the presentiment that some day Great

Britain might find itself at war with Germany, which was more than a possibility, in view of the unfriendly disposition, to put it mildly, shown by the German people at Britain's conduct in the Transvaal, to mention but a single instance. In international conferences the opposing policies of the two countries caused not a little friction, and at the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 the smoldering distrust by each of the motives of the other leaped into flame on more than one occasion. Indeed, in a certain sense, and on vital questions, as they have turned out to be, that Conference was little more than a struggle of each for position in the conflict which the delegates of participating Powers felt to be impending between the two countries.

To recall but a single incident. In the eighth plenary session of the Conference, held on October 9, 1907, Sir Ernest Satow, on behalf of Great Britain, said, in speaking of the proposed convention relating to the use of mines, that adequate consideration had not been given to the "right of neutrals to protection, or of humanitarian sentiments which can not be neglected"; and after calling attention to the defects of the project adopted by the Conference, he declared on behalf of his government that "it will not be permissible to presume the legitimacy of an action for the mere reason that this convention has not prohibited it. This is a principle which we desire to affirm, and which it will be impossible for any state to ignore, whatever its power." Immediately Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, feeling that the shaft was directed toward him, arose, and repeating views which he had already expressed in the commission, said: "Conscience, good sense, and the sentiment of duty imposed by principles of humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors and will constitute the most effective guaranty against abuses." Amid a distressing and breathless silence on the part of his auditors, and in a voice choked with passion, and his huge frame trembling with emotion he continued: "The officers of the German navy, I loudly proclaim it, will always fulfill in the strictest fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of humanity and civilization."

Still the situation, although dangerous, was not hopeless, and responsible statesmen of Great Britain sought to postpone, if they could not wholly avert, the storm which had already become much larger than a man's hand. The diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey was successful for the time in preventing the wars of the Balkan states from spreading to and involving the larger European states, and on the eve of

the great war of 1914 he negotiated an agreement with Prince Lichnowsky conceding the rights that Germany claimed in Mesopotamia and in connection with the Bagdad Railway. During the course of the negotiations preceding the war, and indeed the very day before the fatal first of August, Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the first person to the British Ambassador at Berlin, wrote:

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences.1

And the day previous to this, Sir Edward Grey had sent this remarkable instruction to the British Ambassador at Berlin:

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe.

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And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately.2

The desire of Great Britain, however, to preserve friendly relations with Germany, although it found decided expression in times of storm and stress, was not limited to them, but was evident in all its dealings with Germany and especially so after a crisis had been passed, as in the Moroccan dispute of 1911, in order to prevent a recurrence in the future. Of this desire no more striking example can be given than that of Lord Haldane's mission, undertaken, as stated, after the Moroccan incident, before the first of the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and two years in advance of the European catastrophe.

The choice of Lord Haldane for this peaceful mission was as flattering to Germany as it was appropriate on the part of the Ministry, inasmuch as in position he was Secretary of War, by training, a student of Göttingen, and by predilection a philosopher in the German sense of the term, having to his credit, as joint translator, Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea" (3 volumes, 1883-1886). He was, there

1 British Blue Book (No. 1), Doc. No. 111.

2 Ibid.

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