duly accepted by the defendant. Counsel for plaintiffs then offered to prove by one of the plaintiffs that "during the progress of the work under the contract, he was ordered by the engineer to remove, and did remove, certain earth that had caved in upon the work, and that the engineer of the road told him that he would be paid for it as he was paid for similar work under the contract; that afterwards the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Donahue, the president of the road, and that Mr. Donahue agreed to it." The offer having been objected to by the defendant, the Court sustained the objection, and the plaintiffs reserved an exception. This ruling seems to have been the ground of the order granting a new trial. In our opinion the ruling was right, and the exception not well taken. Admitting that evidence tending to show that the estimates of the engineer were grossly erroneous was material upon the question of fraud, there was nothing in the offer tending to show that the estimates were in any respect erroneous. On the contrary, it seems to have proceeded upon the theory that the work referred to was independent of the contract, and was performed by the plaintiffs on the statement of the engineer that it would be paid for "as similar work under the contract" was paid for-in other words, upon the theory that it was extru work. Indeed, in that portion of the testimony of the plaintiffs found in the bill of exceptions, each of them speaks of the work as "extra work." If it be treated as such, it is enough to say that the plaintiffs have not sued for the value of any extra work. It is therefore not necessary to inquire whether the president of the defendant corporation could bind it by his promise to pay. Not only is there nothing in the "offer" already noticed tending to show that the estimates of the engineer were erroneous or fraudulent or false in any respect, but there is nothing in any of the evidence embodied in the bill of exceptions tending to show any one of these things. On the contrary, the bill recites that at the trial the defendant gave evidence purporting to explain the nature and extent of the work in question, "purporting to show that said work had been fully estimated by the engineer and paid for by the defendant, and the engineer so testified.' The bill of exceptions does not contain the contract under which the work was done, nor does it present any evidence upon the points to which the instructions complained of relate. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that there was any error in the rulings of the Court below respect ing the instructions before us. (People vs. Whitney, 53 Cal. 421; People vs. Best, 39 Cal. 691.) Nor was there any error in the ruling in respect to the attempted impeachment of the witness Lewis. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 449.) The motion of the plaintiffs being based entirely on alleged errors in law occurring at the trial, and it being incumbent on them to show error, and the record failing to disclose any, we feel constrained to reverse the order granting a new trial. Order reversed. We concur: McKinstry, J., McKee, J. IN BANK. [Filed September 30, 1880.] JACOB COHN, RESPONDENT, VS. JOEL A. HARVEY, COUNTY CLERK OF SOLANO COUNTY, APPELLANT. REGISTRATION. A naturalized citizen who has been properly registered, and his registration uncanceled, is not required, as a condition precedent to his right of re-registration under Section 1094 of the Political Code, to make an affidavit as to his nativity, and the time, place, and country of his naturalization, etc. Appeal from the Superior Court of Solano County. ments: That the defendant is, and was, on the 29th day of July, 1880, the duly elected and acting Clerk of the County of Solano; and, as such, has charge of the registration of voters in and for said county. That on the 6th day of April, 1880, the Board of Supervisors of said County of Solano made an order in pursuance of Section 1094 of the Political Code, authorizing a re-registration of the voters of that county. That at the time the said order of re-registration was made, and for a long time prior thereto that is to say, from the 17th day of June, 1876, and up to and including the day said order was made-plaintiff was duly enrolled as an elector and voter of the County of Solano on the great register of that county. That the following is a copy of such registration: "Voting No.-624. Registered No.-63. Name Jacob Cohn. Age 31. Country of nativity-Poland. Occupation-merchant. Local residence-Suisun. NaturalizedDate - Place-Sacramento. By what Court-County. Date of registration-June 17, 1876.' That at the date of said order, his name (Jacob Cohn) was uncanceled on said great register. That at the time plaintiff was so registeredto-wit, on the 17th day of June, 1876-he was, and ever since has been, and now is, a qualified elector of the said County of Solano. That on the 30th day of July, 1880, the plaintiff demanded that his name be enrolled on the new great register of said county-that is to say, that he be re-registered by the defendant as an elector and voter of said countybut that the defendant then and there refused to register him on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to furnish him the date of his naturalization. To the complaint a demurrer was interposed on behalf of the defendant, the ground therein stated being that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled by the Court, and the defendant failing to answer, final judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. From such judgment this appeal is taken. It is claimed, on behalf of the defendant, that the plaintiff was not entitled to re-registration, for the reason that he failed to furnish the County Clerk the date of his naturalization. The question presented in the case must be determined by the statute of March 30, 1878, as amended April 16, 1880. The appellant contends that the case comes within the provisions of Section 1097 of the Political Code, as amended April 16, 1880; and if it does, it is very apparent that the judgment of the Court below was erroneous. That section is as follows: "No person's name must be entered by the Clerk unless"1. Úpon a certificate of registration in another county, showing that such registration has been canceled, and upo proof by the affidavit of the party that he is an elector of the county in which he seeks to be registered. "2. Upon the returns of the Assessor of the county. "3. If a naturalized citizen, upon the production of his certificate of naturalization, which certificate must be issued ninety days prior to the succeeding election, or upon his own affidavit that it is lost or out of his possession, which affidavit must state the place of his nativity, and the time and place and Court of his naturalization, together with his affidavit that he has resided in the United States for five years, and in this State for one year next preceding the time of application, and that he would be an elector of the county at the next succeeding election," etc. It is very obvious, from the language of the above section, that it applies to two classes of applicants, the first of whom are voters who have been registered in another county, and whose registration has been canceled, and the second being a class of persons who have never been registered at all. But the applicant in this case does not come within either of the classes referred to in Section 1097. He had been registered in the County of Solano, and, but for the order of the Board of Supervisors requiring a re-registration, would have been entitled to exercise the rights of an elector in that county without any further or additional act of registration on his part. The respondent claims that his case comes within the letter and spirit of Section 1094 of the Political Code. (See Hittell's Codes and Statutes of 1877-8 and 1880, p. 74.) That section is as follows: "SEC. 1094. There must be kept in the office of the County Clerk of each county a great register. Whenever deemed necessary, the Board of Supervisors of any county may, by order, require a re-registration of the voters of said county, which said order shall be published in at least one newspaper published in said county for not less than six months preceding the next ensuing general election. Such re-registration shall conform in all respects to the provisions of this code concerning original registration, except that any person applying for re-registration shall be entitled thereto upon showing that his name was enrolled and uncanceled on the former great register." The facts show that Jacob Cohn was registered on the 17th day of June, 1876, and that his name was enrolled on the great register, and uncanceled at the time he made application to the Clerk of Solano County to be re-registered. In our opinion the case comes clearly within the letter and spirit of Section 1094 of the Political Code referred to above, and the applicant was not required, as a condition precedent to his right of re-registration, to make an affidavit stating the facts set forth in subdivision 3 of Section 1097 of the Political Code. Judgment affirmed. We concur: Thornton, J., McKinstry, J., Ross, J., Sharpstein, J., McKee, J. DEPARTMENT No. 1. [Filed October 1, 1880.] B. F. LANGFORD, RESPONDENT, VS. BERNARD POPPE, APPELLANT. TITLE ACQUIRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. A party who has been in adverse possession of land for five years thereby acquires a title, which he may maintain against the party holding the paper title. Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, San Joaquin County. Terry & McKinne, for respondent. J. H. Budd, for appellant. MCKINSTRY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: The only question to be considered is whether the plaintiff can recover upon a title acquired through or by means of the Statute of Limitations. It is not necessary to determine whether the effect of possession under the statute is to transfer to the actual occupant the title of one previously the real owner, or to create a new title in the possessor-the title of the previous owner, and his right to assert it, becoming extinguished at the expiration of the period of adverse possession. It was said by Sawyer, C. J., in Cannon vs. Stockman, 36 Cal. 540: "When a party has been in adverse possession for five years, he thereby acquires a title; and if, after he has thus become vested with a right, he is ousted, even by the party holding the paper title, he can recover on his title acquired by his adverse possession." In the same case the learned Chief Justice quoted the language of the Supreme Court of Maine, in Winthrop vs. Benson, 31 Me. 834, where it was said: "An open, notorious, exclusive adverse possession of twenty years would operate to convey a complete title to the plaintiffs, as much so as any written conveyance. And the Supreme Court of the United State has declared: "The lapse of time limited by such statute not only bars the remedy, but extinguishes the right, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder." (Leffingwell vs. Warren, 2 Black, 605. See also the numerous cases cited in Cannon vs. Stockmon, and in Arrington vs. Liscom, 34 Cal. 381.) Even if the adjudications left the matter in doubt, Section 1007 of the Civil Code provides: "Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to |