relief asked for by the petitioners is civil in its nature and should be sought in the civil courts of the conquered, which have been continued and are permitted to exercise their formerly conferred civil jurisdiction in all matters not involving arrests of persons and criminal prosecution, and therefore the case does not concern the military administration, specially constituted for other purposes; that the case involves a question of United States revenue, since the petitioners demand a return to them as Spanish subjects of the public property of Spain as declared by its authorities to which the United States has succeeded and which it has the legal right to receive and enjoy, for I ascertain by reference to the Spanish military code that the effect of the declared embargo of the property of the petitioners and the proceedings taken under it was to vest the uses and profits of the embargoed estates in the Spanish Government while the embargo continuedtitle to the same remaining in the individual owners from whom possession was taken.

The active continuance of the embargo was made to depend upon pardon or the result of trial by the Spanish courts upon the charge of treason, rebe lion, or sedition, confiscation attending conviction and sentence and restoration following acquittal. During the existence of the embargo the real property affected was apparently held in trust by the Spanish Government for its sole use and benefit, with remainder vested in parties formerly holding the unqualified fee, and dependent upon a contingency involving due conviction of the crime of disloyalty to that government. These conclusions are supported by explanatory provisions contained in a decree issued by the governor-general on January 19, 1897, wherein it was declared that in the case of an absent culprit presenting himself and being acquitted by the court, he will only have a right to claim a return of the property not alienated and to the rents and profits which have not been applied.' Finally, it is concluded that the United States Government during its occupancy under its truce with Spain, which provides only for a temporary cessation of hostilities, would be recreant to its trust should it knowingly divert, without just cause arising under the laws of war, properties the uses of which would again inure to the dominion of Spain upon a return of Spanish sovereignty. Declared permanent possession by the United States would modify conditions and present the entire question in a different aspect, for then the rights of all concerned, whether dependent upon treaty obligations or otherwise, would be defined or become easy of interpretation.

It was therefore ordered that the provost-marshal-general seize all funds of the Cortez estate on deposit in the local banks, take forcible possession of all the real properties belonging to that estate which were situated in the city of Manila, and administer the same for the use and benefit of the United States Government. These conclusions arrived at, which were fully justified by the facts, enabled the United States authorities to take legal possession, temporarily at least, of not only the realty but also the personalty of the estate which Spain held, and which belonged to the public properties she had promised to surrender under the articles of capitulation. The provost-marshal-general took possession of the estate as directed, accounted for the proceeds received while he held possession, and finally, under the instructions of the War Department, turned estate, with all proceeds, over to the owners. This case served as a precedent for future proceedings upon questions of embargo, although in cases of minor importance embargoed property was at once turned over to the claimant upon due proof of right to receive it.

Until October 14 the United States troops in the Philippines remained stationed at Manila and Cavite, as provided in General Merritt's orders of August 23, with very slight exceptions, Major-General Anderson retaining supervision of the district of Cavite and MajorGeneral MacArthur of the troops stationed in Manila, the three organizations composing the provost guard continuing, however, under the control of Brigadier-General Hughes.

They were most bountifully supplied with subsistence and medicines, but light clothing suited to the climate and facilities necessary

for occupying and messing in barracks were needed. These were soon obtained through contract and purchase from the merchants of Hongkong and Manila and by shipment from the United States. The troops received tactical instructions daily, but the weather was too hot for much physical exertion, and time hung heavily upon them. They entertained the impression that the Spanish war had terminated, and the volunteers appeared to believe that they should be recalled to the United States at once and regular troops sent out to perform the monotonous garrison duties which were about to follow the victory of Manila. Many became ill from too free indulgence in the fruits and manufactured drinks of the country, and indifference to that care and attention of person which a tropical climate makes necessary. Homesickness alone produced illness in numerous cases, so that early in September the hospitals began to be rapidly filled. This led to the adoption of judicious precautionary measures. Aguinaldo was faithfully executing his agreement made with General Merritt with regard to water privileges and the city waterworks, which was to permit us to use the pumping station situated 8 miles from the walled city, provided we would pay the men of his selection for running it and defray all the necessary expenditures. This we were faithfully doing, but the water secured was not of desired quality and boiling and distilling were resorted to. Circular instructions prepared by the Medical Department, warning men of the results of injudicious action, were issued from headquarters, and all sanitary measures possible were adopted.

As

The sick rate, however, increased. On September 4 one hundred and thirteen sick soldiers were shipped to the United States, as their restoration to health in this climate was extremely improbable, and more followed. The percent of sickness to numerical strength in some organizations rose to 20, and in two or three organizations to 30, while in others it did not exceed 6 or 8, although the latter were no better housed nor provided for than the former; but the men of the latter were, without doubt, better supervised and watched over by their officers and were measurably contented with conditions. long as the practice of sending sick men home continued there was no improvement in the sick rate, but as soon as the convalescent hospital was established on Corregidor Island (an island at the entrance of Manila Bay) and the sick sent there for treatment a marked change for the better was apparent. In November improvement was noticeable, and in January the health of this army would compare favorably with those of any concentrated army of like proportions in existence. To be sure the men had become by this time fairly acclimatized, and new troops arriving here will be obliged to pass through this period of acclimatization before they become properly efficient for prolonged service in the field.

During my first weeks of duty here I was impressed with the spirit. of suspicion and the partially concealed unfriendly feeling manifested by the Tagalos toward the American forces. That they either had very little confidence in our promises or were then forming conclusions to oppose any establishment of United States authority in Luzon was apparent, however loudly they might disclaim hostile intent or declare as an excuse for their attitude fear of the return of Spain. I saw, however, with satisfaction, their ablest men by education and mental equipment taking part in their authorative deliberations, and I had considerable confidence in the efficacy of their suggestions and advice. Still, after carefully weighing conditions, I was unable to

arrive at any satisfactory conclusions. To a cable received on September 16, I replied on the next day as follows:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL ARMY, Washington:

Referring to telegram yesterday, now think prudence dictates increased forcethis after deliberation on situation appearing to-day and possible developments. Force sufficient for present purposes, but contingencies may arise difficult to meet. Parties plotting constantly to convey erroneous impressions and excite insurgents. Demands of city government and sick list draw heavily on armed organizations. An additional 5,000 men could be used to supply losses and give greater confidence. Battalions of Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, still in San Francisco, should join at once.

Measures were being applied constantly to improve the sanitary condition of the city, to increase the efficiency of the troops, and to meet any emergency which might develop from an uprising of the inhabitants, or from hasty action by any portion of our or the insurgent forces, which, though maintaining amicable intercourse, were, in fact, in an attitude of resistance and hostility upon all questions involving the right of armed occupation of the suburbs and defenses of Manila. The insurgent soldiers had looted extensively the portions of the city to which they gained access, and were greatly disappointed that this privilege over other parts of the same was not accorded them. Their enforced withdrawal to outer lines was the cause of discontent, and augmented any desire which they may have formerly entertained to resist or attack the American troops. This growing discontent was observable among the lower classes of the city's inhabitants, from whom a considerable share of Aguinaldo's army was drawn, and was undoubtedly increased by the reprehensible conduct and illegal actions of some of our own men, who were severely punished for their misdeeds when detected. Outwardly, however, relations of the most friendly character were maintained. The officers and enlisted men of the two armies mingled in friendly social intercourse. To the casual observer the only discordant element in this dense complex population, made up of every nation and tongue in existence, were the hated Spanish prisoners, whom the Filipinos still longed to persecute and kill, and who were obliged to keep within the walls of Old Manila for safety.

Repeated conferences were held with influential insurgents, whose chief aim appeared to be to obtain some authoritative expression on the intent of the United States with regard to the Philippines, and complained that they were unable to discover anyone who could speak ex cathedra. They asserted that their Malolos arrangement was a government de facto, which had the right to ask an expression of intent from the United States Government.

To increase and better organize the force in Manila, the following orders were issued on October 14:

The troops comprising this command, with the exception of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Thirteenth Minnesota, and Second Oregon Regiments of volunteer infantry, which will continue to constitute the guard and police force of the provost-marshal-general of the city, the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, and the detachment of California Volunteer Heavy Artillery, which will compose the permanent garrison of Cavite, are organized into two divisions, designated as First and Second Divisions of the Eighth Army Corps, each to consist of two brigades.

The following designated troops, now quartered and to be quartered in the city south of the Pasig River, will form the First Division:

Six troops of the Fourth U. S. Cavalry.

Light Batteries D and G, Sixth U. S. Artillery.

The Astor Battery.

Fourteenth U. S. Infantry.

First California Volunteer Infantry.

First Idaho Volunteer Infantry.

First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Battalion First Wyoming Volunteer Infantry.

The following organizations north of the Pasig River will compose the Second Division:

Company A, Battalion of Engineers.

Four batteries Third U. S. Artillery.

Batteries A and B, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery.
First Colorado Volunteer Infantry.

First Montana Volunteer Infantry.

First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry.

Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.
First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry.

Troops expected to arrive from San Francisco soon will be assigned to these divisions when numerical strength and facilities for quartering will be considered.

For the purpose of enforcing discipline through general court-martial proceedings, together with appropriate action to be taken to that end, the First and Eighteenth Companies, Volunteer Signal Corps, are attached to the First, and the Hospital Corps, U. S. A., to the Second Division.

Maj. Gen. T. M. Anderson, U. S. V., is assigned to the command of the First Division, and Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, U. S. V., to the command of the Second. They will submit as soon as practicable the proposed organization of brigades of their commands.

Brig. Gen. Charles King and Samuel Ovenshine, U. S. V., are assigned for duty with the First Division, and Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis and Irving Hale, U. S. V., to the Second Division. They will report in person to the commanding generals of their respective divisions for assignment to brigade commands (General King, expected to arrive soon, so reporting upon arrival).

Officers now serving on the staff's of general officers under proper orders will continue on such service. The chief quartermaster and chief commissary of the command will nominate officers of their respective departments for assignment as division and brigade quartermasters and commissaries, being mindful of assignments in those capacities which have already been made. The chief surgeon of the command will nominate officers of the Medical Department for assignment as chief surgeons of divisions.

The organized divisions had little exacting duty to perform, as the provost-marshal-general with his guard of three regiments was held responsible for the preservation of order within the more thickly populated portions of the city. Division commanders looked carefully after the health, practical instruction and personal conduct of their men, prescribed drills and practiced ceremonies, and watched by means of small outposts the armed insurgents to the number of six or eight thousand, who maintained a warlike attitude on the outer lines. The Army Regulations, appropriate to peace conditions, were enforced in matters. of examinations, courts, boards, returns, reports, and correspondence. Barracks, quarters, messing facilities, and sanitary surroundings were improved, and in so far as strictly military operations were concerned the passing period was devoid of excitement or apparent importance. In answer to request to make a statement in regard to the welfare of the troops, I remarked, on November 19, that since August none had arrived except absent members of and recruits for organizations which had preceded them; that the fifth expedition left San Francisco between the 19th of October and the 8th of November and its advance was expected daily, and continued as follows:

The medical department of the corps has always been well supplied with medical stores. There has been a shortage of medical officers which has been fairly well met through contract physicians. Now we are abundantly supplied with medical stores and hospital buildings, though medical officers have been overworked. The sick report to-day is about 12 per cent of the command; that of the British army in this latitude is about 10 per cent. The most of our sickness is of a mild type, and the health of the troops is now markedly improved. The total number of deaths of the command since leaving San Francisco is 161, or a little more than 1 per cent. Of these deaths 54 were due to typhoid fever. 25 to wounds received in battle, 7 to accident, 13 to dysentery, and 13 to smallpox. This number of deaths among 15,000 men, covering a period of several months, is surprisingly light.

In the matter of subsistence the troops have never suffered. They have been supplied with abundant rations, better even than any body of men I ever had association with. There is to-day well stored in this city subsistence for 17,000 men for

four months. Also large supplies for sale to officers and men, all of which are in excellent condition. In addition to the regular issues 30 cents per day is given to each organization for every man reported ill with which to buy delicacies needed by the sick. Doubtless troops have suffered somewhat because of their lack of knowledge to properly prepare their food, but all with former experience such as our Regular regiments are acquiring additional regimental funds. The command is now fairly well supplied with all needful quartermaster's articles excepting wagon transportation. The volunteers are still armed with the old Springfield rifle, but steps have been taken to supply the most reliable of them with the Krag-Jorgensen and smokeless ammunition.

No one can tell what duties these troops may be called upon to perform. It is more than probable, should the islands be retained by the United States, that they will be kept exceedingly busy establishing United States authority and maintaining a fair degree of order. In casting over all the difficulties which have been met in transporting these soldiers, composed mostly of raw material, over 7,000 miles of water and placing them here in good condition and well supplied, results must be considered as quite satisfactory. Nothing of the kind had ever before been attempted and no previous preparation had been made.

On November 21 and 25 the absent battalions of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry arrived.

Throughout that month, and a good portion of December, the troops remained quiet, their health steadily improving. On December 2 I cabled the Adjutant-General of the Army that the percentage of sick of the command, as reported on November 30, was 101 as against 12 for October 31; that the number of deaths was 26 as against 45 for October; that the sick rate was about the same as that among troops of other governments serving in tropical climates; that one-third of the sick were suffering from typhoid and malarial fevers; one-sixth from intestinal troubles, and that the remaining half of all ailments were slight in character. The only matters in which troops took special interest grew out of their speculations on the attitude and probable intentions of the insurgents.

On December 1 the United States transport Indiana, with headquar ters and 2 battalions of the Kansas Volunteers arrived, followed on the 7th of that month by the transports Newport and Pennsylvania with other volunteer organizations. The volunteers, however, had grown weary of their service and many applied for their discharge on the plea that the Spanish war had terminated. They were firmly impressed with the belief that the future occupation of the United States Army in the islands would be confined to garrison duty, a belief that was shared by the older European residents and the abler natives of Manila, and they considered that such duty should be performed by regulars. My own confidence at this time in a satisfactory solution of the difficulties which confronted us may be gathered from a dispatch sent to Washington on December 7, wherein I stated that conditions were improving and that there were signs of revolutionary disintegration; that I had conferred with a number of the members of the revolutionary government and thought that the most of them would favor peaceful submission to United States authority. I had strong reasons for this expressed confidence from assurances made to me by some of the ablest Filipinos who had occupied positions of importance in the insurgent government and had signified their intention to withdraw from it. Had the volunteers then supposed that their services would soon be demanded to maintain the honor and integrity of their country they would willingly have awaited the emergency. But all official proceedings tended to give them the contrary impression. Returning transports were carrying back to San Francisco numbers of specially discharged men. On December 13 the Astor Battery was relieved from duty and directed to proceed to New York City. Its departure on the