mittee believes that the adoption of this bill and the effective execution of its provisions will be the first step towards a sound civil-service reform, which will secure a larger wisdom in the adoption of policies, and a better system in their execution. GEO. H. PENDLETON. W. B. ALLISON. D. W. VOORHEES. J. G. BLAINE. M. C. BUTLER. O. H. PLATT. Story on the Constitution, section 869 et seq. :· The heads of the departments are, in fact, thus precluded from proposing or vindicating their own measures in the face of the nation in the course of debate, and are compelled to submit them to other men who are either imperfectly acquainted with the measures or are indifferent to their success or failure. Thus that open and public responsibility for measures which properly belongs to the executive in all governments, and especially in a republican government, as its greatest security and strength, is completely done away. The Executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influences, to private interviews, and private arrangements to accomplish its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face of its representatives. One consequence of this state of things is, that there never can be traced home to the Executive any responsibility for the measures which are planned and carried at its suggestion. Another consequence will be (if it has not yet been) that measures will be adopted or defeated by private intrigues, political combinations, irresponsible recommendations, and all the blandishments of office, and all the deadening weight of silent patronage. The Executive will never be compelled to avow or support any opinions. His ministers may conceal or evade any expression of their opinions. He will seem to follow, when, in fact, he directs the opinions of Congress. He will assume the air of a dependent, when, in fact, his spirit and his wishes pervade the whole system of legislation. If corruption ever eats its way silently into the vitals of this republic it will be because the people are unable to bring responsibility home to the Executive through his chosen ministers. They will be betrayed when their suspicions are most lulled by the Executive under the disguise of an obedience to the will of Congress. If it would not have been safe to trust the heads of departments, as representatives, to the choice of the people as their constituents, it would have been at least some gain to have allowed them seats, like territorial delegates in the House of Representatives, where they might freely debate without a title to vote. In such an event their influence, whatever it would be, would be seen and felt and understood, and on that account would have involved little danger and more searching jealousy and opposition; whereas it is now secret and silent, and from that very cause may become overwhelming. One other reason in favor of such a right is that it would compel the Executive to make appoint ments for the high departments of government, not from personal or party favorites, but from statesmen of high public character, talent, experience, and elevated services; from statesmen who had earned public favor and could command public confidence.. At present gross incapacity may be concealed under official forms, and ignorance silently escape by shifting the labors upon more intelligent subordinates in office. The nation would be, on the other plan, better served, and the Executive sustained by more masculine eloquence as well as more liberal learning. There can be no danger that a free people will not be sufficiently wakeful over their rulers and their acts and opinions when they are known and avowed, or that they will not find representatives in Congress ready to oppose improper measures or sound the alarm upon arbitrary encroachments. The real danger is when the influence of the rulers is at work in secret and assumes no definite shape; when it guides with silent and irresistible sway, and yet covers itself under the forms of popular opinion or independent legislation; when it does. nothing, yet accomplishes everything. INDEX ACHESON, Representative, cited, Alabama, 116. n. 252. Adams, Charles Francis, cited, 379. Adams, John Quincy, elected Pres- Adams, Samuel, organizes com- Allen, Senator, cited, n. 233. Anti-Masonic party, 201. Bagehot, Walter, on the English Benton, Thomas H., on removals Blackstone's Commentaries, 29. Boston, a revolutionary centre, 10. Addison, Joseph, 108. Addison, Judge, 113. Akenside, Mark, 341. Burke, Edmund, on political torpor in England, 14; on balanced Cabinet, development of, 79; ap- Calhoun, on Jefferson's shortcom- Calvin, John, ideal of a Christian Cameron, J. Donald, mentioned, n. 223. Cannon, Representative, cited, 248. Carteret, 341, 342. 165; tended towards the conven- Chase, Samuel, becomes Federal- Chastellux, Marquis de, 11. Colonial society, 3. |