acquiescence, has shown no access of strength. It is complicated with the ordinary activities of Congress, and the operation of the presidential office in this respect has been obscure. Nevertheless, the fact is clear that the basis of administrative control is not Congress but the President. Possession of that office is the great object of party struggles. It is impossible for a party to carry out even a purely legislative programme unless it embodies a policy accepted by the President and sustained by the influence of his office.

The agency of the presidential office has been such a master force in shaping public policy that to give a detailed account of it would be equivalent to writing the political history of the United States. From Jackson's time to the present day it may be said that political issues have been decided by executive policy. The independent treasury system introduced during Van Buren's administration was a measure formulated by the President and forced upon Congress. Tyler, although his congressional following was so weak that it was known as "the corporal's guard," prostrated Whig plans for the reëstablishment of the Bank of the United States and controlled the tariff policy of Congress. The annexation of Texas, which was the issue of the election of 1844, originated as an executive proposal, and was consummated by Tyler before he retired from office. Polk's administration is associated

with tariff reform and the Mexican War, both measures originating in executive policy. The slavery agitation, whose growing intensity was the chief feature of the administrations of Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan, presented issues which the executive department was, above all things, anxious to avoid, so that presidential influence strongly supported a policy of adjustment and compromise by negotiation among the congressional factions; but nevertheless the issues which arose were shaped by executive policy, as the inevitable result of its trenchant nature. In the presence of emergency it is necessary to do one thing or another, and the decision stands out for condemnation or approval, thus furnishing a dividing line for party formation. The election of 1860 turned on issues raised by executive policy in Kansas. The administration of President Lincoln saw the opening of a new arsenal of presidential authority in the war powers, whose extent is still quite unmeasured. The President levied an army without authority of Congress, and before Congress had met. He assumed and exercised the right of suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The crowning event of his administration - the emancipation of the slaves-did not take place in pursuance of any act of Congress, but was done on his own authority as President, and was as absolute an exercise of power as the ukase of the Czar which freed the serfs of Russia. Presi

dent Lincoln was able to do these things by the direct support of public opinion, irrespective of the volition of Congress. Although in the case of his accidental successor, Congress was strong enough to enforce its own programme of reconstruction, it instinctively recognized the fact that it was not able to do so from its inherent authority. Senator Sherman put the case exactly when he said, "The recent acts of Congress, those acts upon which the President and Congress separated, were submitted to the people, and after a very full canvass and a very able one, in which great numbers of speeches were made on both sides, and documents were circulated, the people, who are the common masters of President and Congress, decided in favor of Congress." That is to say, Congress prevailed not by virtue of its ordinary representative capacity, but by express delegation for that special purpose.

1

While all that a President can certainly accomplish is to force a submission of an issue to the people, yet such is the strength of the office that, if he makes a sincere and resolute use of its resources, at the same time cherishing his party connection, he can as a rule carry his party with him, because of the powerful interests which impel it to occupy ground taken for it by the administration. Many instances of this tendency may be

1 Congressional Globe, January 8, 1867.

found in our political history. A noted case in our own times is the result of General Grant's veto in 1874 of the bill providing for an additional issue of legal tender notes. Later on, the same Congress passed an act providing for the redemption in coin of the outstanding issues.

On the other hand, unless a measure is made an administrative issue, Congress is unable to make it a party issue. Colonel W. R. Morrison, when the Democratic leader of the House, was unable to accomplish the passage of a tariff bill although there was a party majority. His explanation of his failure is that "my bills all lacked the influence of administration and party support and patronage." Colonel Morrison's successor, Mr. Mills, was more fortunate in his leadership of the House, because "when Mr. Cleveland took decided ground in favor of revision and reduction he rep resented the patronage of the administration, in consequence of which he was enabled to enforce party discipline, so that a man could no longer be a good Democrat and favor anything but the reform of the tariff." 1

If, in default of a definite administrative policy vigorously asserted, Congress is left to its own devices, issues are compromised and emergencies are dealt with by makeshift expedients. The complex entanglements of the currency situation were brought about in this way. But even then, the 1 New York Sun interview, September 12, 1893.

presidential authority, however passive its condition, continues to be a factor of great importance. The passage of the silver bullion purchase act of 1890, according to its framer, Senator Sherman, was thus the result of the President's attitude, although the President had nothing directly to do with it. Senator Sherman says: "A large majority of the Senate favored free silver; and it was feared that the small majority against it in the other House might yield and agree to it. The silence of the President in the matter gave rise to an apprehension that if a free coinage bill should pass both Houses, he would not feel at liberty to veto it. Some action had to be taken to prevent a return to free silver coinage, and the measure evolved was the best obtainable." The repeal of this law in November, 1893, after a memorable struggle in the Senate, affords a conspicuous example of the efficiency of the presidential office in influencing legislation when in earnest about the discharge of that duty.

1

The evidence which our history affords seems conclusive of the fact that the only power which can end party duplicity and define issues in such a way that public opinion can pass upon them decisively, is that which emanates from presidential authority. It is the rule of our politics that no vexed question is settled except by executive policy. Whatever may be the feeling of Congress 1 Sherman's Memoirs, p. 1070.