them, disentangles (as he will with little effort) what he handles, if he advances steadily onward, not flinching out of excess either of self-confidence, or of self-distrust, from the object of his pursuit, will find that he is journeying in the first of these two tracks; and if he can endure to suspend his judgment, and to mount gradually, and to climb by regular succession the height of things, like so many tops of mountains, with persevering and indefatigable patience, he will in due time attain the very uppermost elevations of nature [" ad summitates et vertices naturæ "], where his station will be serene, his prospect delightful, and his descent to all the practical arts by a gentle slope perfectly easy."

"1

The patience and resolution here required may remind us, again, of the saying of Plato, that "the whole of nature being of one kindred, and the soul having before known all things [i. e. the Divine Soul, or Mind of Nature], there is nothing to prevent a person [i. e. a human soul], who remembers — what men call learning-only one thing, from again discovering all the rest; if he has but courage, and seeking faints not."2 In short, it must be borne in mind, that the Philosophia Prima, as it were, in advance, dealt with the whole state of knowledge previously existing, in which was included both the metaphysical philosophy of Plato, which, proceeding by the dialectic method of pure scientific thinking, learning all things from one, and arriving at a philosophy of the universe by that way, and also the philosophy of Democritus, Leucippus, and Aristotle, which rather from the beginning turned round and confronted nature face to face, and began to search out a philosophy of the universe, in that direction, by pursuing the paths and methods of physical inquiry. And so, Bacon having for himself arrived, in the first instance, at a philosophy of the universe, in his own mind, by the Platonic method, and,

1 Scaling Ladder, Ib. XIV. 426; Spedd., V. 180.

2 Meno, Works of Plato, (Bohn), III. 20.

after the example of Plato's great disciple, Aristotle, seeing that the best way for the advancement of knowledge, the invention of new sciences, arts, and instruments, for the instruction, benefit, and uses of mankind in general, was, to follow that example, to begin where Democritus left off, and pursue the same direction and course of investigation, confronting Nature face to face, as it were, diligently set himself to work in good earnest to revive, correct, purify, renew, instaurate, and re-invigorate, both the degenerated and perverted Platonism, and the degenerated and perverted Aristotelianism of his own time and all the later ages next preceding. But now, having in the second and third parts plunged into and traversed the woodlands of mere physical nature, amidst foliage, thorns, and briers, and having begun to advance from the woods to the foot of the mountains and that same hill of the Muses, he would, in this Fourth Part, begin to ascend by the double road of active and actual human life, and climbing with scaling ladders of the intellect, and threading the labyrinth of the civil, social, and moral fabric, would endeavor, at last, to reach the uppermost elevations and highest tops of things, in the magnificent temple, palace, city, and hill of the fabled descendants of Neptune, the vertex of Pan's Pyramid, and the cliff of Plato; from which height, no man should any further leading need.

So much we learn from himself concerning this curious Fourth Part. It is difficult to conceive what else was meant than something of this kind, by these examples or types and models; and considering what the entire scope of his philosophical scheme was, the nature of the whole discussion in these particular fragments, and the express declaration that true art was always capable of advancing, the conclusion would seem to be well warranted, that at the date at which the Scaling Ladder was written, something of this kind was running in his mind, and that we actually have in these plays what he had himself done towards this

important part of the Great Instauration of all philosophy.

At the same time, it is not necessarily to be inferred that the plays, when written, were designed actually to form this Fourth Part. It may be, that, in his original plan, this part of the systematic Instauration was to have been written in prose with something of the same rigid investigation and scientific precision as the other parts, but upon the same general subject of the passions and affections, the mental powers and faculties, human character, civil and social affairs, and man and humanity in general; but that for want of time to complete it in that form, he had, later in life, concluded to publish this Folio of 1623, together with the Essays and other writings of a civil and moral nature, and leave them to fill up this gap in the Great Instauration, in such manner and with such effect as they could. The Instauration was indeed the work of his whole life; but the finished parts of it rather belong to his later years. The Advancement was in some measure a preliminary work, and it took the form of the De Augmentis before becoming a part of the Great Instauration in 1623, and all the other parts were wholly, or chiefly, written after the period of the plays, and towards the close of his career. So, while the plays may have been written, as they doubtless were, under a natural and genuine poetic feeling and impulse, and even with a design to rival the ancient poets in the field of dramatic art, and with the general purpose of veiling his braver instruction to mankind under the poetic form of delivery, after the manner of all great poets, they are, in fact, at the same time, found to be pervaded with the whole spirit and scope of his philosophy; and they may be safely taken as actual models and true illustrative examples of his method in that kind.

This view may find some special confirmation in the following passages from the De Augmentis, which are deserving of careful study in reference to certain prominent

features in the character of these plays; for in their general nature and scope they more especially concern the regimen, discipline, culture, and cure of the mind in respect of individual, social, moral, and civil or public good; and truth to human nature and human character has always been noted as a peculiar excellence in them. Upon "the different characters of natures and dispositions," this work proceeds thus:

"And we are not here speaking of the common inclinations either to virtues or vices, but of those which are more profound and radical. And in truth I cannot sometimes but wonder that this part of knowledge should for the most part be omitted both in Morality and Polity, considering it might shed such a ray of light on both sciences. In the traditions of astrology men's natures and dispositions are not unaptly distinguished according to the predominances of the planets;

--

['a breath thou art,

Servile to all the skyey influences

That dost this habitation where thou keep'st

Hourly inflict.'-. - Meas. for M., Act III. Sc. 1.]

For some are naturally formed for contemplation, others for business, others for war, others for advancement of fortune, others for love, others for the arts, others for a varied kind of life; so among the poets (heroic, satiric, tragic, comic) are everywhere interspersed representations of characters, though generally exaggerated and surpassing the truth.

...

"Not however that I would have these characters presented in ethics (as we find them in history or poetry or even in common discourse), in the shape of complete individual portraits, but rather the several features and simple lineaments of which they are composed, and by the various combinations and arrangements of which all characters whatever are made up, showing how many, and of what nature these are, and how connected and subordinate one

to another; that so we may have a scientific and accurate dissection of minds and characters, and the secret dispositions of particular men may be revealed; and that from the knowledge thereof better rules may be framed for the treatment of the mind.

"And not only should the characters of dispositions which are impressed by nature be received into this treatise, but those also which are imposed on the mind by sex, by age, by region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like; and again, those which are caused by fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privacy, prosperity, adversity, and the like. For we see that Plautus makest it a wonder to see an old man beneficent: His beneficence is that of a young man."

66

And so, in the Measure for Measure," in which these ideas and doctrines are in part and very admirably exemplified, the Duke says:

Angelo had never the purpose to corrupt her; only he hath made an assay of her virtue, to practise his judgment with the disposition of natures. . . The assault that Angelo hath made to you, fortune hath conveyed to my understanding; and, but that frailty hath examples for his falling, I should wonder at Angelo." — Act III. Sc. 1.

He next proceeds to those "affections and perturbations of the mind, which are, as I have said, the diseases of the mind":

"Claud. Has he affections in him,

That thus can make him bite the law by th' nose,

When he would force it?"

Act III. Sc. 1.

"But to speak the real truth," he continues, "the poets and writers of history are the best doctors of this knowledge, where we may find painted forth with great life and dissected, how affections are kindled and excited, and how pacified and restrained, and how again contained from act and further degree: —

["Isab. Ay! just: perpetual durance: a restraintThough all the world's vastidity you had

To a determin'd scope." - Ib. Act III. Sc. 1.]