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States, 12 Peters, 524; Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 539.

In the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wallace, 36, the same rules were laid down and illustrated with great force by reference to the history of the times and condition of things which brought about the recent amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Judge COOLEY, in his great work on Constitutional Limitations, on page 54, says:

"A cardinal rule in dealing with written instruments is that they are to receive an unvarying interpretation, and that their practical construction is to be uniform. A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is with special reference to the varying moods of public opinion, and with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond their control, that these instruments are framed; and there can be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as inberes in the principles of the common law. Those beneficent maxims of the common law which guard person and property have grown and expanded until they mean vastly more to us than they did to our ancestors, and are more minute, particular, and pervading in their protections; and we may confidently look forward in the future to still further modifications in the direction of improvement. Public sentiment and action effect such changes, and the courts recognize them; but a court or legislature which should allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving construction to a written constitution not warranted by the intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and public duty; and if its course could become a precedent, these instruments would be of little avail. The violence of public passion is quite as

likely to be in the direction of oppression as in any other; and the necessity for bills of rights in our fundamental laws lies mainly in the danger that the legislature will be influenced by temporary excitements and passions among the people to adopt oppressive enactments. What a court is to do, therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may require. The meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon it."

Again, the learned author says:

"The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In the case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced."

Another cardinal rule of construction laid down by this author is, that the whole instrument is to be examined in placing a construction upon any portion or clause thereof. He says:

"Nor is it lightly to be inferred that any portion of a written law is so ambiguous as to require extrinsic aid in its construction. Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which, standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be made plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the same law. It is therefore a rule of construction, that the whole is to be examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part; and this Sir Edward Coke regards the most natural and genuine method of expounding a statute. If any section [of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its truc meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of another.' And in making this comparison it is not to be supposed that any words have been employed without occasion, or without intent that they should have effect as part of the law. The rule applicable here is, that effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to every sec

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tion and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable, and lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some idle and nugatory.

"This rule is especially applicable to written constitutions, in which the people will be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication. It is scarcely conceivable that a case can arise where a court would be justifiable in declaring any portion of a written constitution nugatory because of ambiguity. One part may qualify another, so as to restrict its operation, or apply it otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together."

In support of the above propositions, reference is made in the notes to the following authorities:

The People v. Morrell, 21 Wend. 563; Newell v. The People, 7 N. Y. 109; McKoan v. Devries, 3 Barb. 196; The People v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 138; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 399; Bosley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon. 89; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202; Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 7 Cranch, 60; Ogden y: Strong, 2 Paine C. C. 584; United States v. Ragsdale, Hemp. 497; Southwark Bank v. The Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 446; Ingalls v. Cole, 47 Me. 530; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Furman v. City of New York, 5 Sandf. 16; The People v. The New York Central R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 492; Bidwell v. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 479; Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471; Cantwell v. Owens, 14 Md. 215; Case v. Wildridge, 4 Ind. 51; Pitman v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504; Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; District Township v. The City of Dubuque,7 Iowa, 262; Pattison v. Board, etc., 13 Cal. 175; Spencer v. The State, 5 Ind. 41; Denn v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524; Greencastle Township, etc., v. Black, 5 Ind. 569; Stowell v. Lord Zouch, Plow. 365; Broom Leg. Max. (5th Am. ed.) 551; Co. Lit.

381, a.; Attorney General v. Detroit, etc., Plank Road Co., 2 Mich. 138; The People v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114; Manly v. The State, 7 Md. 135; Parkinson v. The State, 14 Md. 184; The Belleville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 746; Brooks v. Mobile School Comm'rs, 31 Ala. 229; Den v. Dubois, 1 Harrison, 285; Den v. Schenck, 3 Halst. 34; Wolcott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44; The People v. Purdy, 2 Hill N. Y.36; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650; Warren v. Shuman, 5 Texas, 441; Quick v. White Water Township, 7 Ind. 570; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188; Smith Const. Construc., secs. 502, 503; Sedgw. Stat. Law, 229, 233, 251, and 252.

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An examination of the above authorities shows that they are in point, and fully support the doctrines announced.

It is essential to a correct interpretation of the above provisions of our constitution, in the light of the above rules of construction, that we should look to the history of the times and examine the condition of things existing prior to, and at the time of, the adoption and ratification of our present state constitution, and compare the sections in question with other portions and clauses of such constitution.

We will limit our inquiry into the political condition of the negroes in this State from the organization of our state government in 1816 down to the ratification of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and incidentally to their status in other states of the Union.

Prior to the act of May 13th, 1869, making taxation for common school purposes uniform, and providing for the education of the colored children of the State, 3 Ind. Stat. 472, no provision was made for their education in this State. As a race, their condition was one of marked and settled inferiority before the law, being reduced strictly to the enjoyment of the three primary rights only, and for a large portion of time legally precluded from their full exercise, viz., the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property. But the power of exercising these rights was practically limited in degree as compared with the exercise and

enjoyment of the same rights by the white race. This was their most favorable condition in several states of the Union, they being admitted to the equal exercise of civil and political rights and privileges with the whites in but one state of the Union. In nearly one-half of the states of the Union, as a race, they lived in a state of life-long servitude, having no control of their time or actions, no right to acquire property, no lawful power to follow the promptings of their own thoughts and judgments, their lives and limbs, their minds and strength, the property and subject to the will of their masters; and notwithstanding the proclamation of emancipation, this continued to be their condition, practically and in a large degree, until after the ratification of the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, December 18th, 1865. 2 Kent Com., 7th ed., pp. 252, 258, and note b to p. 258; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299; Rev. Stat. 1831, p. 375; Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 418.

By sec. 7 of article 11 of the constitution of 1816, it is provided that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 50.

Sec. 2 of article 3 provided for an enumeration of all the white male inhabitants above the age of twenty-one years. Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 38.

Sec. 1 of article 6 limited the right of suffrage to the white male citizens of the United States of the age of twenty-one, and who had resided in the State one year immediately preceding the election. Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 46.

By the act of February 10th, 1831, every such person, coming into or being brought into this State, was prohibited from residing therein, unless bond with good and sufficient security, to be approved by the overseers of the poor of some township, was given on behalf of such person, payable to the State of Indiana, in the penal sum of five hundred dollars, conditioned that such person should not, at any time, become

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