The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.

If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will surely come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race. We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done.

The result of the whole matter is, that while this court has frequently adjudged, and at the present term has recognized the doctrine, that a State cannot, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, prevent white and black citizens, having the required qualifications for jury service, from sitting in the same jury box, it is now solemnly held that a State may prohibit white and black citizens from sitting in the same passenger coach on a public highway, or may require that they be separated by a "partition," when in the same passenger coach. May it not now be reasonably expected that astute men of the dominant race, who affect to be disturbed at the possibility that the integrity of the white race may be corrupted, or that its supremacy will be imperilled, by contact on public highways with black people, will endeavor to procure statutes requiring white and black jurors to be separated in the jury box by a "partition," and that, upon retiring from the court room to consult as to their verdict, such partition, if it be a moveable one, shall be taken to their consultation room, and set up in such way as to prevent black jurors from coming too close to their brother jurors of the white race. the "partition" used in the court room happens to be stationary, provision could be made for screens with openings through

If

which jurors of the two races could confer as to their verdict without coming into personal contact with each other. I cannot see but that, according to the principles this day announced, such state legislation, although conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose of humiliating citizens of the United States of a particular race, would be held to be consistent with the Constitution.

I do not deem it necessary to review the decisions of state courts to which reference was made in argument. Some, and the most important, of them are wholly inapplicable, because rendered prior to the adoption of the last amendments of the Constitution, when colored people had very few rights which the dominant race felt obliged to respect. Others were made at a time when public opinion, in many localities, was dominated by the institution of slavery; when it would not have been safe to do justice to the black man; and when, so far as the rights of blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practically, the supreme law of the land. Those decisions cannot be guides in the era introduced by the recent amendments of the supreme law, which established universal civil freedom, gave citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United States and residing here, obliterated the race line from our systems of governments, National and State, and placed our free institutions upon the broad and sure foundation of the equality of all men before the law.

I am of opinion that the statute of Louisiana is inconsistenţ with the personal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that State, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United States. If laws of like character should be enacted in the several States of the Union, the effect would be in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law would, it is true, have disappeared from our country, but there would remain a power in the States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings of freedom; to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race; and to place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of American citizens, now constituting a part of the political community called the

People of the United States, for whom, and by whom through representatives, our government is administered. Such a system is inconsistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down by Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

For the reasons stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent from the opinion and judgment of the majority.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not hear the argument or participate in the decision of this case.

CUMMING v. RICHMOND COUNTY BOARD OF

EDUCATION.

(175 U.S. 528 (1899))

ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA.

No. 164. Argued October 80, 1899.- Decided December 18, 1899.

The plaintiffs in error complained that the Board of Education used the funds in its hands to assist in maintaining a high school for white children, without providing a similar school for colored children. The substantial relief asked for was an injunction. The state court did not deem the action of the Board of Education in suspending temporarily and for economic reasons the high school for colored children a sufficient reason why the defendant should be restrained by injunction from maintaining an existing high school for white children. It rejected the suggestion that the Board proceeded in bad faith or had abused the discretion with which it was invested by the statute under which it proceeded, or had acted in hostility to the colored race. Held that under the circumstances disclosed, this court could not say that this action of the state court was, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the State to the plaintiffs and to those associated with them, of the equal protection of the laws, or of any privileges belonging to them as citizens, of the United States.

While all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination against any class on account of their race, the education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part of Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justifled except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.

THE plaintiffs in error, Cumming, Harper and Ladeveze, citizens of Georgia and persons of color suing on behalf of themselves and all others in like case joining with them, brought this action against the Board of Education of Richmond County and Charles S. Bohler, tax collector.

In the petition filed by them it was alleged

That the plaintiffs were residents, property owners and taxpayers of Richmond County, the defendant Board being a corporation created under an act of the General Assembly of Georgia of August 23, 1872, regulating public instruction in that county, empowering the Board to annually levy such tax as it deemed necessary for public school purposes;

That on the 10th of July, 1897, the Board levied for that year for the support of primary, intermediate, grammar and high schools in the county, a tax of $45,000, which was then due and being collected;

That the petitioners interposed no objections to so much of the tax as was for primary, intermediate and grammar schools, but the tax for the support of the system of high schools was illegal and void for the reason that that system was for the use and benefit of the white population exclusively;

That the Board was not authorized by law to levy any tax for the support of a system of high schools in which the colored school population of the county were not given the same educational facilities as were furnished the white school population;

That at least $4500 of the tax of $45,000 was being col

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lected and when collected would be used for the support of such system of high schools;

That the Board had on hand the sum of $20,000 or other large sum, the proceeds of prior tax levies, in trust to disburse solely for legal educational purposes in the county, and would receive from the tax levy of 1897 and from other sources large sums in like trust, and that it was the owner and had the custody and control of school fixtures, furniture, educational equipments and appliances generally, holding the same in like trust; and,

That although the Board was not authorized by law to use any part of such funds or property for the support and maintenance of a system of high schools in which the colored school population were not given the same educational facilities as were furnished for the white school population, it was using such funds and property in the support and maintenance of its existing high school system, the educational advantages of which were restricted wholly to the benefit of the white school population of Richmond County to the entire exclusion of the colored school population, and that by such use of those funds and property a deficiency for educational purposes would inevitably result, to make which good additional taxation would be required.

The petitioners also alleged that they were persons of color and parents of children of school age lawfully entitled to the full benefit of any system of high schools organized or maintained by the Board; that up to the time of the said tax levy and for many years continuously prior thereto, the Board maintained a system of high schools in Richmond County in which the colored school population had the same educational advantages as the white school population, but on July 10, 1897, it withdrew from and denied to the colored school population any participation in the educational facilities of a high school system in the county and had voted to continue to deny to that population any admission to or participation in such educational facilities; and that at the time of such withdrawal and denial the petitioners respectively had children attending the colored high school then existing, but who were