conflicting evidence at the trial, and it is doubtful whether the publication was brought home to the defendant; and the jury seemed to have so considered it: " and the rule was refused.

But this matter was carefully reviewed by the Court of Exchequer in the subsequent case of Stephens v. Hill, 10 Mee. & W. 28, where motion was made against an attorney who had conspired with others to induce a witness for the opposite party to absent himself from a trial, giving him money, &c. It was objected that the application to strike from the roll could not be heard on these charges without a conviction, inasmuch as a conspiracy is an indictable offence. Lord Abinger took a distinction between a rule to show cause why an attorney should not be struck off the roll, and a rule calling on him to answer the matters of an affidavit with a view to strike him off the roll. The latter course he conceded would be improper, if the offence was indictable, because it would compel the attorney to criminate himself; but not so the former, for he might clear himself without answering under oath; and that this was all that Lord Denman meant in the case before him. Lord Abinger said that as long as he had known Westminster Hall, he had never heard of such a rule as that an attorney might not be struck off the roll for misconduct in a cause merely because the offence imputed to him was of such a nature that he might have been indicted for it; but he said that in the case of applications calling upon an attorney to answer the matters of an affidavit, he had known Lord Kenyon and Lord Ellenborough frequently say, You cannot have a rule for this purpose, because the misconduct you impute to the man is indictable; but you may have one to strike him off the roll. After noticing and explaining the language attributed to Lord Denman, as before stated, Lord Abinger adds: If, indeed, a case should occur where an attorney has been guilty of some professional misconduct for which the court by its summary jurisdiction might compel him to do justice, and at the same time has been guilty of something indictable in itself, but not arising out of the cause, the court will not inquire into that with a view of striking him off the roll, but would leave the party aggrieved to his remedy by a criminal prosecution."

6.

This expression, about leaving the party aggrieved to his

remedy by a criminal prosecution, is frequently found in the English cases, and has reference to the practice in that country of regarding the party injured by the perpetration of a crime. as the proper person to prosecute the offender; and one, indeed, upon whom a duty, in some sort, rested to institute such prosecution. The court would, therefore, hesitate to take any summary action against the offender which might remove the inducements the injured party would otherwise have for proceeding criminally against him, and thus interfere with the course of justice. In this country, the prosecution of criminal offences is generally committed to the charge of a public officer, and sufficient emolument is attached to the duty of prosecution to secure its faithful performance. The same reason, therefore, does not exist here, as in England, for leaving it to the injured party to prosecute for the criminal offence. So far as the offender himself is concerned, it is true, the reason is equally strong against compelling him to answer under oath charges preferred against him, and in favor of giving him a trial by jury in all cases of doubt or of conflicting evidence. That a reluctance to interfere with the incentive to prosecute criminally in these cases operated strongly upon the judicial mind in England, is manifest from the fact, that after a prosecution had been made, and the duty of the injured party had been performed, the courts never hesitated to strike the accused from the roll, if found guilty by a jury, even though judgment against him had been arrested, or reversed, or the offence had been pardoned or condoned, Rex v. Southerton, 6 East, 126; In the Matter of King, 8 Q. B. 129; In re Garbett, 18 C. B. 403; thus showing that it is not a technical conviction which is required, but a fair effort on the part of the prosecutor to bring the offender to justice; coupled also with the fact that a jury is the most suitable tribunal for passing upon a question of fact depending upon conflicting evidence.

Some expressions in the cases cited, including the remarks. made by Lord Abinger in Stephens v. Hill, seem to imply that the summary jurisdiction will not be exercised where the charges made against an attorney affect only his general character as such, and do not amount to malpractice in a particular

cause.

But subsequent decisions are to the effect that it is

properly extended to cases affecting his general character also. Thus, in Re Blake, 3 El. & El. 34, an attorney was struck from the roll for having improperly collected the money due on a mortgage which he had pledged as collateral security for a loan, and which he borrowed from the pledgee on some false pretence. On a rule to show cause and reference to the master, the facts were found to be truly charged; and although he was not acting as attorney in the matter, the court suspended his certificate for two years, on the general ground, as stated by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, that where an attorney is shown to have been guilty of gross fraud, although not such as to render him liable to an indictment, nor committed by him while the relation of attorney and client was subsisting between him and the person defrauded, or in his character as an attorney, the court will not allow suitors to be exposed to gross fraud and dishonesty at the hands of one of its officers. And in a subsequent case, Re Hill, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 543, where an attorney acting, not as such, but as clerk to a firmn of attorneys, appropriated to his own use money which came to his hands on the sale of an estate; on a motion to strike his name from the roll, it was objected that, as his offence was indictable, a conviction was necessary before this proceeding could be had. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn said: "No case has, so far as I am aware, come before the court under the precise circumstances under which this case presents itself, namely, of an act of delinquency committed by an attorney's clerk, who at the same time is an attorney, though at that time not act ing as such; but still I think, on every principle of justice, we ought not the less to entertain the application. . If the delinquent had been proceeded against criminally upon the facts admitted by him, it is plain that he would have been convicted of embezzlement; and, upon that conviction being brought before us, we should have been bound to act. If there had been a conflict of evidence upon the affidavits, that might be a very sufficient reason why the court should not interfere until the conviction had taken place; but here we have the person against whom the application is made admitting the facts." Mr. Justice Blackburn, in the same case, said: "I think when we are called upon, in the exercise of our equitable

jurisdiction, to order an attorney to perform a contract, to pay money, or to fulfil an undertaking, there we have jurisdiction only if the undertaking or the contract is made in his character of attorney, or so connected with his character of attorney as to bring it within the power of the court to require that their officer should behave well as an officer. But where there is a matter which would subject the person in question to a criminal proceeding, in my opinion, a different principle must be applied. We are to see that the officers of the court are proper persons to be trusted by the court with regard to the interests of suitors, and we are to look to the character and position of the persons, and judge of the acts committed by them, upon the same principle as if we were considering whether or not a person is fit to become an attorney. . . . It should be considered whether the particular wrong done is connected with the character of an attorney. The offence morally may not be greater, but still, if done in the character of an attorney, it is more dangerous to suitors, and should be more severely marked. I agree that where it is denied that a criminal offence has been committed, the court ought not to decide on affidavits a question which ought to be tried before a jury."

This case is important as showing the latest consideration of the question by the English courts, and by the most eminent judges of those courts.

The rule to be deduced from all the English authorities seems to be this: that an attorney will be struck off the roll if convicted of felony, or if convicted of a misdemeanor involving want of integrity, even though the judgment be arrested or reversed for error; and also (without a previous conviction) if he is guilty of gross misconduct in his profession, or of acts which, though not done in his professional capacity, gravely affect his character as an attorney: but in the latter case, if the acts charged are indictable, and are fairly denied, the court will not proceed against him until he has been convicted by a jury; and will in no case compel him to answer under oath to a charge for which he may be indicted.

This rule has, in the main, been adopted by the courts of this country; though special proceedings are provided for by

statute in some of the States, requiring a formal information under oath to be filed, with regular proceedings and a trial by jury. The cases are quite numerous in which attorneys, for malpractice or other misconduct in their official character, and for other acts which showed them to be unfit persons to practise as attorneys, have been struck from the roll upon a summary proceeding without any previous conviction of a criminal charge. See, amongst others, the case of Niven, 1 Wheeler, Crim. Cas. 337, note; Ex parte Burr, id. 503; s. c. 2 Cranch C. C. 379; In the Matter of Peterson, 3 Paige (N. Y.), 510; Ex parte Brown, 1 How. (Miss.) 303; In the Matter of Mills, 1 Mich. 392; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9; In re John Percy, 36 N. Y. 651; Dickens's Case, 67 Pa. St. 169; In re Hirst and Ingersoll, 9 Phil. (Pa.) 216; Baker v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush (Ky.), 592; Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140; Matter of George W. Wool, 36 Mich. 299; People v. Goodrich, 79 Ill. 148; Delano's Case, 58 N. II. 5; Ex parte Walls, 64 Ind. 461; In the Matter of Eldridge, 82 N. Y. 161.

But where the acts charged against an attorney are not done in his official character, and are indictable, and not confessed, there has been a diversity of practice on the subject: in some cases it being laid down that there must be a regular indictment and conviction before the court will proceed to strike him from the roll; in others, such previous conviction being deemed unnecessary.

The former view is taken, or seems to be assumed, in the cases we will now cite.

In an anonymous case, reported in 2 Halst. (N. J.) 162 (1824), where the charge was larceny, the court refused the rule to strike off the roll, because the offence was indictable, and there had been no conviction.

In The State v. Foreman, 3 Mo. 412, the court refused to disbar an attorney for passing counterfeit money, knowing it to be counterfeit, and escaping from prison before being convicted therefor; the ground of refusal being that it was not a case within the Missouri statute, which required a conviction. Of course, being governed by the statute, this case is not in point.

In Ex parte Fisher, 6 Leigh (Va.), 619 (1835), Fisher commented to a jury in a manner which the judge deemed grossly