Assemblymen chosen. 261. SEC: 3. The members of the Assembly shall be chosen biennially by the qualified electors of their respective districts, on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, and their term of Office shall be two years from the day next after their election. T. C. C. pp. 82, 466. Cited, State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 416 (4 P. 735). Senators chosen. 262. SEC: 4. Senators shall be chosen at the same time and places as members of the Assembly, by the qualified electors of their respective districts, and their term of office shall be four years from the day next after their election. T. C. C. pp. 82, 467. C'ited, State ex rel. Perry v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 416 (4 P. 735). Who eligible. 263. SEC: 5. Senators and members of the Assembly, shall be duly qualified electors in the respective counties and districts which they represent, and the number of Senators shall not be less than one third, nor more than one half of that of the members of the Assembly. T. C. C. pp. 82, 467. Powers of each. 264. SEC: 6. Each House shall judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its own members, choose its own officers, (except the President of the Senate, determine the rules of its proceedings and may punish its members for disorderly conduct, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected, expel a member. T. C. C. pp. 86, 87, 468. May punish for contempt. 265. SEC: 7. Either House, during the session, may punish, by imprisonment, any person not a member, who shall have been guilty of disrespect to the House by disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence; but such imprisonment shall not extend beyond the final adjournment of the session. Members not to be beneficiaries. 266. SEC: 8. No Senator or member of Assembly shall, during the term for which he shall have been elected, nor for one year thereafter, be appointed to any civil office of profit under this State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term, except such office as may be filled by elections by the people. T. C. C. pp. 95, 470. Persons not eligible, when. 267. SEC: 9. No person holding any lucrative Office under the Government of the United States or any other power, shall be eligible to any civil office of profit under this State; Provided, that Post-Masters whose compensation does not exceed Five Hundred dollars per Annum, or Commissioners of Deeds, shall not be deemed as holding a lucrative Office. T. C. C. pp. 96, 471. It was held that this was not intended to be confined in its effect to officers connected with the legislative department of the government. State ex rel. Nourse v. Clarke, 3 Nev. 569. A person holding the office of United States district attorney, on the day of election, is incapable of being chosen to the office of attorney-general of the state. This section is not confined to members of the legislature, but A person is applicable to all officers of state. The office of notary public is a civil office of profit under this state, within the meaning of this section, and the receiver of public money in a United States land office is ineligible to the office of notary. This section applies to appointive as well as to elective officers. State ex rel. Summerfield v. Clarke, 21 Nev. 333. 335, 338 (37 A. S. 517, 18 L. R. Á. 313, 31 P. 545). Under this section a state senator, by acceptDisqualified from office holding. ing appointment as paymaster in the army, became incapable of legally holding the office of state senator, and such acceptance operated as a resignation of the state ofhce and created a vacancy therein. State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 25 Nev. 132, 173 (83 A. S. 573, 58 P. 284). 268. SEC: 10. Any person who shall be convicted of the Embezzlement or defalcation of the public funds of this State or who may be convicted of having given or offered a bribe to procure his election or appointment to Office, or received a bribe to aid in the procurement of Office for any other person, shall be disqualified from holding any Office of profit or trust in this State; and the Legislature shall, as soon as practicable, provide by law for the punishment of such defalcation, bribery, or Embezzlement as a felony. T. C. C. pp. 97, 136, 406, 471, 502. Section 37. act of March 12, 1873, p. 197, authorizes a contest of election "when the person whose right to the office is contested was not at the time of his election eligible to such office." Held, under above section, that a complaint to contest the election of a district attorney which alleged that the contestee offered before election to make a bond conditioned that, if elected, he would return to the county treasury each month a portion of his salary, but does not allege that the contestee had been "convicted" of offering such bribe, does not show that the contestee was disqualified to hold the office, and is fatally defective on demurrer. Egan v. Jones, 21 Nev. 433, 435, 436 (32 P. 929). Members exempt from civil process during session of legislature. 269. SEC: 11. SEC: 11. Members of the Legislature shall be privileged from arrest on civil process during the Session of the Legislature, and for fifteen days next before the commencement of each Session. T. C. C. pp. 88, 468. Vacancies, how filled. 270. SEC: 12. When vacancies occur in either House, the Governor shall issue writs of Election to fill such vacancy. 271. SEC: 13. A majority of all the members elected to each House shall constitute a quorum to transact business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner, and under such penalties as each house may prescribe. T. C. C. pp. 86, 468. Journal, yeas and nays. 272. SEC: 14. Each House shall keep a journal of its own proceedings which shall be published, and the yeas and nays of the members of either house, on any question shall, at the desire of any three members present, be entered on the journal. T. C. C. pp. 88, 468. Meetings public, exception. 273. SEC: 15. The doors of each House shall be kept open during its session, except the Senate while sitting in executive session, and neither shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days nor to any other place than that in which they may be holding their sessions. T. C. C. pp. 89, 469. Bills originate in either house. 274. SEC: 16. Any bill may originate in either House of the Legislature, and all bills passed by one may be amended in the other. T. C. C. pp. 90, 469. Embrace but one subject. 275. SEC: 17. Each law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only; but, in such case, the act as revised, or section as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length. T. C. C. pp. 101, 472. Cited and held inapplicable in Bowers v. Beck. 2 Nev. 158. The second section of the amendatory act of 1869, concerning counties, providing for the payment of $3,000 a year for five years by Churchill County to Humboldt County (Stats. 1869, 88), does not conflict with this section. Humboldt County v. County Commissioners of Churchill County, 6 Nev. 30, 35. It is only necessary to express in the title the principal subject embodied in the law, while the matters properly connected therewith are not required to be mentioned. Humboldt County v. County Commissioners of Churchill County, 6 Nev. 31, 35. The design of this provision is to prevent improper combinations to secure passage of laws containing subjects having no necessary o: proper relation and which as independent measures could not be carried; also to prevent the legislature and the public from being misled by the title. The details of a statute need not be specifically stated in the title; but matters germain to the subject and adapted to the accomplishment of the object in view may properly be included. The provision in relation to the unlawful killing of stock making it a felony, contained in the statute regulating marks and brands (Stats. 1873, p. 99, sec. 10) bears no proper relation to the subject of the statute expressed in the title, and is therefore unconstitutional. as Section 143 of the crimes act, making the malicious killing of cattle a misdemeanor, is naffected by the provision in the act regulating marks and brands, making it a felony (Stats. 1873, p. 99, sec. 10)-the latter provision being unconstitutional. State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 227, 231. This court has recognized and enforced this section as being mandatory (State v. Silver, 9 Nev. 230), and we see no valid reason for adopting a different rule in this case. State ex rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 253 (21 A. R. 728). Cited State v. California Mining Company, 13 Nev. 219. The act supplementary to an act entitled "An act concerning crimes and punishments, approved November 26, 1861," does, in its title. express the subject embraced therein. required by this section. State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 442, 443 (33 A. R. 563). as The "Opium Act" (Stats. 1879, p. 121) embraces but one subject, and its title is not too restrictive to cover the provisions of section 6 of said act. This constitutional provision is mandatory, but should be liberally construed. State v. Ah Sam, 15 Nev. 27, 29, 30, 31. 32 (37 A. R. 454). Held, that the general purpose of this section is accomplished when a law has but one general object which is fairly indicated by its title. The "act to provide for the taking care of the insane of Nevada," provides for the construction of an asylum; that the money appropriated for that purpose shall be taken from the state school fund, and in its place there shall be deposited state bonds, bearing interest, etc., and provides for the levy and collection of a tax to meet the payment of said bond: Held, that the act embraces but one subject, the care of the insane, which is fairly expressed in its title. The different steps by which the result is to be accomplished are not different subjects. but minor parts of the same general subject. Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194, 201, 204. Held, that the statute authorizing county commissioners to transfer certain funds (Stats. 1879, p. 45) embraced but one subject-the transfer of surplus moneys from one fund to another--and that it does not violate the provisions of this section. State ex rel. Board of School Trustees v. County Commissioners of Storey County, 17 Nev. 96, 101, 102 (28 P. 122). Section 23 of the salary law (Stats. 1879, p. 133), is not in conflict with this section. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 290, 308 (30 P. 896). The act to redistrict the state (Stats. 1885, p. 60), so as to make but one judicial district, is constitutional. The title of the act, "An act to redistrict the State of Nevada, prescribe the number and salaries of district judges, and fix the places of holding courts, does not contravene this section. State ex. rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 332, 344. 345 (10 P. 901). The "Act to amend an act reducing and regulating the salaries and compensation of certain state officers, justices of the supreme court and attaches of the state government," (Stat. 1885, p. 99) is in violation of the provisions of this section, and is absolutely null and void. State ex rel. Drury v. Hallock, 19 Nev. 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390 (12 P. 832). The act entitled "An act fixing the time for the opening and closing of saloons and gaminghouses" (Stats. 1889, p. 71), is not repugnant to this section. The word "saloon" clearly refers only to places where intoxicating liquors are kept, and is not misleading. Ex Parte Livingston, 20 Nev. 282, 284, 289 (4 L. R. A. 732, 21 P. 322). In construing the provisions of the "act defining the duties of the state controller" which imposes penalties upon other officers for delinquencies in making settlements with the controller: Held, (1) that the title of the act is misleading; (2) that the act contains two subjects--one relating to the duties of the controller and the other to the imposition of penalties against other officers-and that it. in both respects, conflicts with the provisions of this section, and that the act, in so far as it undertakes to impose a penalty upon other officers, is unconstitutional. State v. Hoadley, 20 Nev. 317, 318, 319, 320 (22 P. 99), Hawley, C. J., dissenting. The act of February 23, 1887, entitled "An act relating to and consolidating certain county offices in the State of Nevada," provided that after the first Monday in January, 1889, district attorneys shall be ex officio superintendents of schools in their counties without additional compensation. The act of March 11, 1885, fixing the compensation of officers of Elko county, was amended by the act of March 5, 1887, so far as it fixed the compensation of sheriff, so as to give him a salary of $4,000 per annum in lieu of fees, and that portion of the act fixing the salary of the district attorney at $2,000 per annum and the superintendent of schools at $600 per annum, was reenacted. Held, that the amendatory act was passed for the sole purpose of changing the compensation of the sheriff, and did not repeal the act of February 23, 1887. State ex rel. Love v. County Commissioners, 21 Nev. 19, 22 (23 P. 935). An act does not embrace more than one subject, because while fixing the salaries and compensation of the officers of a county, it also provides for the consolidation of the offices of superintendent of schools and district attorney, and provides that the latter officer shall, for the salary provided, also discharge the duties formerly appertaining to the superintendent's office. The act of March 9, 1891 (Stats. 1891, p. 30), embraces but one subject and matter properly connected therewith. Where a portion of a statute is complete in itself and capable of being executed wholly independent of that which may be rejected, and there is no reason to suppose that the legislature would not have passed the act except as a whole: Held, that' the courts will affirm the validity of such independent part, without considering whether the other is or is not unconstitutional. State ex. rel. Dunn v. County Commissioners of Humboldt County, 21 Nev. 235, 237, 240 (29 P. 974). The statutes of 1887, page 81. is entitled "An act to further define and punish embezzlement." Section one defines embezzlement, and section two fixes the penalty for a violation of section one. Held, that as the act is complete within itself, and does not flict with the other existing statutes relating to embezzlement and its punishment, it does not amend such statutes, and therefore does not violate this section. State v. Trolson, 21 Nev. 419, 428, 432 (32 P. 930). con Where the title states that the subject of an act is to amend one section of a former statute, the act cannot be extended to the amendment of other sections. Where the sections of an act are so separate and independent that one section can be made to operate in accordance with the intention of the legislature without the aid of the others, and the invalid section could not have constituted any inducement for the first, the courts will sustain that section, although the other sections are unconstitutional. Ex Parte Hewlett, 22 Nev. 333, 334 (40 P. 96). The act of March 16, 1895 (Stats. 1895, p. 107), to amend an act concerning the purchase and preservation of newspapers, in so far as it attempts to regulate the matter of legal advertising and printing, is in conflict with the provisions of this section. The purpose of this provision was to prevent the combination in one act of incongruous and distinct subjects, and also imposition upon the members of the legislature and the public, by covering up, under innocent titles, vicious and harmful provisions. Where, by the title, the subject of an act is restricted to a certain purpose, the purview of the act cannot be extended to other purposes not indicated in the title. The act can be no broader than the subject expressed in the title. State ex rel. Norcross v. Commissioners of Washoe County, 22 Nev. 399. While this section should be liberally construed, to the end that there may be no unneces sary hampering of legislation, this liberal construction should not go to the extent of nullifying the constitution. Where an act clearly embraces two distinct and independent subjects, or the real subject of the act is not expressed in the title, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act void. State ex rel. Norcross v. Commissioners of Washoe County, 22 Nev. 399, 409, 415 (41 P. 145). The act incorporating the town of Reno (Stats. 1897, p. 50) is not in violation of this section. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 258 (52 P. 274). The act of 1897, making the payment of the annual poll tax a condition to the right of vot ing, is unconstitutional, as its title. "An act to require the payment of poll tax by all legal voters under sixty years of age," does not comply with this section. State ex rel. Wilson v. Stone, 24 Nev. 308, 310 (53 P. 497). Where a certain section of an act is complete and independent in itself, its validity is not affected on account of the subject of other sections of the act not being expressed in the title. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 81 (56 P. 1008). Cited, Ex Parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 352, 353 (65 L. R. A. 47, 75 P. 1). Act of March 12, 1873, p. 209, c. 121, sec. 59-62, is entitled "An act relating to elec tions," but provides that, in case any officer shall be guilty of malfeasance, he may be removed by summary proceedings on complaint of a private prosecutor, whereupon his successor shall be appointed, and, in case an appeal shall be taken, the officer removed shall not exercise the rights of his office pending the appeal. Held, that since the trial of an officer after his election 'for malfeasance in office, his removal, and the appointment of his successor, has no proper connection with the subject of elections, such sections were in violation of the provisions of this section. Bell v. First Judicial District Court, 28 Nev. 280, 296 (163 A. S. 854, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, 81 P. 875. The title of the act of March 4, 1907 (Stats. 1907, p. 59, c. 32), entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of stenographers on the hearing of preliminary examinations, before committing inagistrates, and to regulate the compensation therefor," is not sufficiently broad to include a provision for the subsequent use of the testimony on the trial. The above act, providing in section 2 that the report of the stenographer shall be admissible in evidence on the trial of the case, as prescribed by Crim. Prac. Act, sec. 151, providing that, by consent of the parties, the testimony may be reduced to writing, and used by either party when the witness is sick, out of the state, dead, or when his personal attendance cannot be had in court, is repugnant to this section. State v. Gibson, 30 Nev. 333, 356, 357, 360 (96 P. 1057). The act of March 26, 1907 (Stats. 1907. P. 229, c. 119), entitled "An act creating a board of bank commissioners, defining their duties. providing for the appointment of a bank examiner, prescribing his duties, fixing his compen sation, providing penalties for the violation of the provisions of this act, and other matters relating thereto," though providing by section 10 for action by the attorney-general against a banking corporation, on the decision by the bank examiner and commissioners that it is unsafe for it to continue business, and that if the court shall find it unsafe, it shall appoint a receiver, does not contravene this section. State ex rel. Sparks v. State Bank and Trust Co.. 31 Nev. 456, 465, 472, 473, 474 (103 P. 407). Act of February 27, 1883. entitled "An act to regulate fees and compensation for official and other services in the state, and to repeal all other acts in relation thereto," and regulating the fees of officers in the state, including sheriffs and constables, contains but one gen Bills, reading and passage. eral subject and matter properly connected therewith, and is not in conflict with this section. Russell v. Esmeralda County, 32 Nev. 304 (107 P. 890, 891). 276. SEC: 18. Every bill shall be read by sections on three several days, in each House, unless in case of emergency, two-thirds of the House where such bill may be pending, shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule; but the reading of a bill by sections, on its final passage, shall in no case be dispensed with, and the vote on the final passage of every bill or joint resolution shall be taken by yeas and nays, to be entered on the journals of each House; and a majority of all the members elected to each House, shall be necessary to pass every bill or joint resolution, and all bills or joint resolutions so passed, shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective Houses, and by the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the Assembly. T. C. C. p. 90. Where an act has been passed by the legislature, signed by the proper officers of each house, approved by the governor, and filed in the office of the secretary of state, it constitutes a record which is conclusive evidence of the passage of the act as enrolled. Neither the journals kept by the legislature, nor the bill as originally introduced, nor the amendments attached to it, nor parol evidence, can be received in order to show that an act of the legislature, properly enrolled, authenticated and deposited with the secretary of state, did not become a law. This court, for the purpose of informing itself of the existence or terms of a law, cannot look beyond the enrolled act certified to by those officers who are charged by the constitution with the duty of certifying and with the duty of deciding what laws have been enacted. State ex rel. George v. Swift, 10 Nev. 176. 180. 181-185, 187-189, 192, 196, 199, 200 (21 A. R. 721). Cited, State ex, rel. Chase v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 270 (21 A. R. 738); State ex rel. Cardwell v. Glenn, 18 Nev. 35, 38, 39 (1 P. 186). journals, to determine whether the bill was read on three several days in each house, as required by this section. State ex rel. Osburn v. Beck, 25 Nev. 68, 79 (56 P. 1008); State ex rel. Sutherland v. Nye, 23 Nev. 99, 101 (42 P. 866). Section 35, article 4, provides that, when a bill is received by the governor, within five days of the final adjournment of the legislature, he may prevent it from becoming a law by returning it to the secretary of state, with his objection, within ten days after the adjournment, but that such bill shall be referred to the succeeding legislature, which may pass it over the veto by a two-thirds vote. A bill was passed by both houses of the legislature, and signed by the presiding officers, who transmitted it to the governor, who returned it, with his objections, to the secretary of state after the adjournment of the session. Held, that the failure of the presiding officers of the succeeding legislature to sign the bill, which was passed over the veto, rendered the law invalid, since this section is mandatory, and applies to the passage of bills over the governor's veto. State ex rel. Coffin v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 99, 101, 102, 105 (64 P. 466), Fitzgerald, J., dissenting. An enrolled bill, signed by the proper officers and deposited with the secretary of state, is Conclusively presumed to have been regularly enacted; and the courts cannot look to memoranda endorsed on the bill, or to the legislative Public moneys, how disbursed and accounted for. 277. SEC: 19. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. An accurate statement of the receipts and expenditures of the public money shall be attached to and published with the laws at every regular session of the Legislature. T. C. C. pp. 97, 471. The legislature has power to appropriate money as it sees fit except when limited by the Constitution. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 17, 31. Section 1 of the statutes of 1897 (page 82) provides that the following sums are appropriated "for the purposes hereinafter named, and for the support of the state government for the fiscal years 1897 and 1898. For the salary of The governor, $8.000." Forty other sums are named for as many purposes, without designating any fund. Section 34 reads: For the salary of one teacher and one assistant teacher at the state orphans' home, $2,400, payable out of the general school fund." Held, that, though the last clause of section 34 is in conflict with the constitution and void, the remainder of the section is not affected by such fact, and makes a valid appropriation out of the "general fund" in the state treasury. State ex rel. Keith v. Westerfield, 23 Nev. 468 ( P. 119). It will be observed that it is not required that the fund out of which the appropriations are to be made shall be named in the appropriation act. Usually, if not always, other acts. or the constitution, show what fund the money appropriated is to be drawn from. State ex rel. Keith v. Westerfield, 23 Nev. 473 (49 P. 119). Since Statutes 1901, p. 60, sec. 38, which makes appropriations for the fiscal years 1901 and 1902 for the current and contingent expenses of the supreme court, etc., appropriates money to pay for the furniture for the supreme court room, the question of the court's power, notwithstanding this section, to order furniture for its court room and require the state to pay therefor. in the absence of an appropriation act, does not arise. State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 380 (68 P. 689). Statutes 1907 (p. 408, c. 185) created a state industrial and publicity commission, and |