suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require its suspension. T. C. C. pp. 8. 460. When accused avers that the indictment does not allege an offense, and the state admits that the facts are stated therein, the court on habeas corpus will determine whether Bail, fines and punishments limited. the indictment states an offense, and, if it does not, must discharge the accused. Ex Parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82,99 (100 P. 134, 135 A. S. 651). 235. SEC: 6. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained. T. C. C. pp. 8, 461. Upon proper showing on habeas corpus excessive bail will be reduced. Ex Parte Douglass, 25 Nev. 425 (62 P. 49). 236. SEC: 7. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties; unless for Capital Offenses when the proof is evident, or the presumption great. T. C. C. pp. 8, 461. court or judge to ascertain whether the proof is evident or the presumption great and thereby determine whether the offense committed-as shown by this and other testimony-is a bailable offense. Ex Parte Finlen, 20 Nev. 141, 144 (18 P. 827). In construing the above section, it was held that, as the petition for the writ of habeas corpus contained allegations, which, if true, showed the offense of petitioner to be manslaughter only, the petitioner was entitled to have the evidence of the witnesses before the grand jury reviewed for the purpose of enabling the Trial on indictment secured-Not to be twice put in jeopardy-Private property for public use. 237. SEC: 8. No person shall be tried for a capital or other infamous crime (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of the Militia when in actual service, and the land and naval forces in time of war, or which this State may keep with the consent of Congress in time of peace, and in cases of petit larceny under the regulation of the Legislature) except on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury; and in any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person, and with counsel as in civil actions. No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation having been first made or secured, except in cases of war, riot, fire, or great public peril, in which case compensation shall be afterward made. T. C. C. pp. 12, 20, 36, 461. This section does not restrict the legislature in prescribing the form of the indictment. It only requires that the grand jury should in some form express its approval of the prosecution before a party can be put on trial for such offense. State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 409, 438, 480. 481. Where an indictment which omitted the essential allegation of venue, was amended in that respect: Held, it was no longer an "indictment of a grand jury" within the meaning of this section. State v. Chamberlain, 6 Nev. 257, 260. Our constitution does not require formality of statement in the indictment. State v. Derst, 10 Nev. 445; State v. McClear. 11 Nev. 44. When the people adopted this section they had in view a grand jury as it existed under the common law and the *tatutes at the time the constitution was adopted. State v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 354 (28 L. R. A. 33, 40 P. 372). Upon an indictment and trial for murder, and a verdict adjudging the defendant guilty of rape, the court has no jurisdiction to sentence and imprison defendant for such crime of rape, since this section requires presentment and indictment for the particular offense before conviction is had. and, further, because the defendant is thereby deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Ex Parte Dela, 25 Nev. 346, 354 (83 A. S. 3.60 P. 217), cited Egan v. Jones, 21 Nev. 436. When the verdict is so defective that no judgment can be entered upon it, the defendant, who might have had it perfected when rendered, is considered as consenting to t and as waiving any objections to being put to answer before another jury. State v. Rover, 10 Nev. 399, 400 (21 A. R. 745). Whenever the accused has been placed upon trial, on a valid indictment before a competent court, and a jury duly empaneled, sworn and charged with the case. his jeopardy attaches, and the discharge of the jury before a verdict, unless with the consent of the defendant, or the intervention of some unavoidable accident or some overruling necessity, operates as an acquittal. Ex Parte Maxwell, 11 Nev. 428, 434. It will be admitted that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn to try the case. State v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 106. Where a defendant is convicted, and he asks for a second trial to relieve himself of the jeopardy in which he finds himself by reason of the conviction and judgment, and his prayer is granted, he is estopped from asserting a former acquittal on his second trial, and waives his constitutional right of pleading once in jeopardy, or that the right has been in any way infringed, because by his own voluntary assent, act and petition he has been relieved of a bar which prevented him from interpos!ng this plea. In re Somers, 31 Nev. 531, 536 (103 P. 1073). The provisions of this section guarantee to a person prosecuted for an offense before a court martial, organized under the laws of this state, the right to defend with counsel. State v. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 120 (77 A. S. 786, 50 P. 127). Compelling a defendant, against his objection, to exhibit his arm, in such manner as to show the marks thereon to the jury is not a violation of this section. State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 81, 83. 85, 86, 95, 98, 100, 103. 104, 114 (33 A. R. 530). A witness not only cannot be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, but this exemption extends also to his private books and papers. Ex Parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 362, 363 (90 P. 737). Where the defense in a homicide case was sadistic insanity, and accused was examined by a physician for the purpose of testifying for accused as to his physical condition as bearing upon the question of insanity, accused's examination upon an order of court by physicians appointed by it upon the state's request to enable them to testify as to the same facts did not compel him to become a witness against himself. State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384 (108 P. 934, 935); cited, Ex Parte Smith, 33 Nev.- (111 P. 932). Under the 4th and 5th amendments to the Constitution of the United States, "The officer of a corporation having in his possession the books of the corporation, described in a subpoena duces tecum directed to the corporation, must produce the books or be held in contempt; and a corporation cannot resist, upon the ground of the constitutional protection against self-crimination, the compulsory production of its books and papers before the grand jury under a subpoena duces tecum." Wilson v. U. S., 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 538; 220 U. S. Cent. Dig., secs. 19-27; Dec. Dig.. sec. 16. "Due process of law" requires that a party shall be properly brought into court, and when there, shall have a right to set up any lawful defense to any proceeding against him. The legislature, under pretense of regulating pleadings, cannot deprive a party of substantial rights. Wright v. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 342, 349. By "due process of law" is meant such general legal forms and course of proceedings as were known either to the common law, or were generally recognized in this country at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284, 301-303. The proceeds of sale under execution are the property of the judgment creditor to the extent of his judgment, and the judgment debtor is not only the owner of the surplus, but he has a right to insist that no part of the proceeds shall be applied to the payment of any claim against him that has not been ascertained and determined by due process of law. Cosia v. Kyle, 15 Nev. 397. "Due process of law." It has been universally held. under a like constitutional restriction, that it does not mean "the process"-or otherwise expressed "the proceeding" shall be the same as pursued at common law, but that the mode and manner of their procedure may be regulated and prescribed by statute. State v. Millain. 3 Nev. 466. The summary process provided by statute for the sale of property for delinquent taxes amounting to less than three hundred dollars does not deprive a person of property without due process of law. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390 (32 P. 437). Such summary proceedings do not deprive a person owing less than three hundred dollars of the equal protection of the laws; although, where the amount is more than that sum, there must be a regular action in court for its collection. This is only a reasonable exercise by the legislature of the right to classify the taxpayers. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390 (32 P. 437). This provision does not require that delinquent taxes shall be collected by an action in court under the form of legal procedure. If that method is adopted, the procedure is very much in the discretion of the legislature. All that is required under any system is that the substantial and fundamental rights of the taxpayers shall be protected. All defenses that savor of technicality only, or that do not show that he is being unjustly subjected to taxation, may be excluded. State v. C. P. R. R. Co., 21 Nev. 260, 264 (30 P. 689). Although public policy demands that credence should be given to the findings and judgments of courts of general jurisdiction, yet it must not be carried to the extent of establishing conclusive presumptions which would have a tendency to deprive a citizen of these rights. Lonkey v. Keyes S. M. Co., 21 Nev. 321 (17 L. R. A 351, 31 P. 57). The privilege of admission to the common schools of the state is no more inherent in or connected with the status of citizenship than is the election franchise. This privilege is not embraced within any meaning which has ever been attributed to the words "life. liberty or property". State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 355, per Garber, J. dissenting (8 A.R. 713). "Due process of law" not only requires that a party shall be properly brought into court, but that he shall have the opportunity in court to establish any facts, which, according to the usages of the common law or the provisions of the constitution, will be a protection to himself and property. Persing v. Reno Stock Brokerage Co., 30 Nev. 342, 349 (96 P. 1054). The term, "life, liberty and property," embraces every right which the law protects. They include not only the right to hold and enjoy, but also the means of holding. enjoying, acquiring, and disposing of property. Branson v. I. W. W., 30 Nev. 295 (95 P. 354). The unsworn motion of defendant's attorney to dismiss the complaint upon the allegations thereof was not sufficient to warrant the court in taking such judicial notice of such motion as to deprive plaintiff of its constitutional right, of being heard upon the merits of the motion, in a proper proceeding, as to whether it had complied with the law before doing business in the State. Symons-Kraussman Co. v. Reno Wholesale Liquor Co.. 32 Nev. 241 (107 P. 96, 97). The "Banking Act" of March 24, 1909 (Stats. 1909, c. 191), provided by section 2 that it should be unlawful under penalty for any corporation, partnership, firm or individual to engage in the banking business except by means of a corporation duly organized for such purpose under the laws of the state. Sections 5 and 6 created a state banking board to have general supervision of banks and banking. Section 12 provided that it should be unlawful to engage in banking without obtaining a license from such board, which license should issue only to corporations duly organized to do a banking business. Held, that such act was in conflict with this section. Marymont v. State Banking Board, 33 Nev. (111 P. 295, 296). Due process of law requires an orderly proceeding. adapted to the nature of the case, in which the citizen has an opportunity to be heard, and to defend, enforce, and protect his rights. A hearing and an opportunity to be heard is absolutely essential. State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 33 Nev. (116 P. 595, citing to same effect Hettel v. Court, 30 Nev. 382 (96 P. 1062, 133 A. S. 730); Golden v. Court, 31 Nev. 250 (101 P. 1021). The legislature has an undoubted right to confer upon the county commissioners the power to open roads, upon a proper compensation being made to those whose property is taken for such purpose, but until such compensation is made, the state cannot legally appropriate the property of the citizen except in certain cases mentioned in this section. Champion v. Sessions, 1 Nev. 478, 484. This provision does not, in any way, restrict the power of the state to seize, upon summary process, any property for taxes, and that, too, without securing or making compensation therefor. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev, 303. The constitution secures a "just compensation," not a compensation to be regulated by the necessities which may compel its appropriation to the public use. The actual value in money, to be ascertained by its location, the price at which similar land may be or has been sold in its vicinity, or which it would sell at. is the measure of damage. Virginia and Truckee R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 367. The manner in which private property shall be taken is not pointed out in the constitution, hence, it would seem the legislature has the power to prescribe any method which will produce a just and fair result. Virginia and Truckee R. R. Co. v. Elliott. 5 Nev, 368. The word "just" in this provision is evidently intended to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation"to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered shall be real, substantial, full and ample. Virginia & Truckee R. R. Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165, 171, 174. When the legislative power of appropriation of the private property of a citizen is attempted to be exercised, the true test of its validity is, whether or not the use for which the property is to be appropriated is a "public use" within the meaning of these words as used in this section. Dayton G. & S. M. Co. v. Seawall, 11 Nev. 394, 398-401, 412. Stats. 1903, p. 190, c. 102, sec. 20, subdivision 9, providing that moneys received from licenses in cities shall be apportioned one-fourth to the state, one-fourth to the county in which the city is located, and the remainder to the city, is in contravention to this section. State v. Boyd, 27 Nev. 249, 257 (74 P. 654); cited. State v. Burns. 27 Nev. 292 (74 P. 983); cited, Bell v. District Court, 28 Nev. 296 (163 A. S. 854, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, 81 P. 875). TO [ASSEMBLY JOINT AND CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 17, RELATIVE AMENDING SECTION EIGHT OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA PERTAINING TO INDICTMENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES. Approved March 22, 1909, 346. Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurring, That section eight of article one of the Constitution of the State of Nevada be amended to read as follows: SECTION 8. No person shall be tried for a capital or other infamous crime (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases of the militia when in actual service and the land and naval forces in time of war or which this State may keep, with the consent of Congress, in time of peace, and in cases of petit larceny, under the regulation of the Legislature) except on presentment or indictment of the grand jury, or upon information duly filed by a District Attorney or Attorney-General of the State, and in any trial, in any court whatever, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person, and with counsel, as in civil actions. No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation having been first made, or secured, except in cases of war, riot, fire, or great public peril, in which case compensation shall be afterward made.] [Proposed and passed at the Twenty-fourth Session of the Legislature, March 22, 1909. Stats. 1909, p. 346; agreed to and passed at the Twenty-fifth Session, February 20. 1911, Stats. 1911, p. 454, and is now subject to ratification by the people at the next general election to be held in 1912.] Freedom of speech and press. 238. SEC: 9. Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for libels the truth may be given in evidence to the Jury; and if it shall appear to the Jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated. T. C. C. pp. 13. 461. Right of assembly and petition. 239. SEC: 10. The people shall have the right freely to assemble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the Legislature for redress of Grievances. T. C. C. pp. 14, 462. The direct primary law of March 23, 1909 (Stats. 1909, c. 198), is not unconstitutional as violating this section. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400 (109 P. 444, 451). Military establishment limited. 240. SEC: 11. The military shall be subordinate to the civil power; no standing army shall be maintained by this State in time of peace, and in time of war, no appropriation for a standing army shall be for a longer time than two years. T. C. C. pp. 19, 462. Soldier quartered, how. 241. SEC: 12. No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of War, except in the manner to be prescribed by law. T. C. C. pp. 19, 462. Representation. 242. SEC: 13. Representation shall be apportioned according to population. T. C. C. p. 462. It is impracticable to apportion representation by any other method than by geographical lines, and it will be resumed that the lines have been fixed in conformity with the requirements of the constitution in the absence of a showing to the contrary. State v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. (52 P. 274). Debtor's property exempt from execution. The constitution contains no restrictive nor mandatory provisions as to the time when, or how often, the legislature may make the representative apportionment. The legislature, therefore, may make such apportionment as often as it so wills. State v. Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 456 (51 L. R. A. 229, 62 P. 237). 243. SEC: 14. The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for payment of any debts or liabilities hereafter contracted; and there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud, libel, or slander, and no person shall be imprisoned for a Militia fine in time of peace. T. C. C. pp. 46. 463. This section discussed. Elder v. Williams, 16 Nev. 423. This section does not prohibit the arrest and detention of a defendant for the fraudulent disposition of his prop erty with intent to defraud his creditors, under a judgment in an action for tort. Ex Parte Bergman, 18 Nev. 332, 341, 342 (4 P. 209). It is the policy of our constitution and laws to allow debtors, within reasonable limits, to retain those things that are necessary to enable them to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, and to carry on their usual employments. Certain inhibitions. Edgecomb v. Creditors, 19 Nev. 154 (7 P.533), per Leonard, J., dissenting. Cited, State ex rel. Quinn v. District Court, 16 Nev. 77. Cited. Ex Parte Smith, 33 Nev. (111 P. 931). 244. SEC: 15. No bill of attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed. T. C. C. pp. 46, 463. When there are a number of warrants outstanding against a county, and payable out of the "general fund," and certain new statutes were passed providing that the revenues to be collected, which would otherwise have gone into such fund, shall constitute a " redemption fund" for the payment of such warrants as shall be offered at the lowest price; Held, that as the holders of such outstanding warrants never had any security for payment except the good faith of the state, and as the legislature had entire control over revenues to be raised, the statutes in question did not impair the obligation of any contract. Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212, 224. The salary law (Stats. 1879, 133) authorizing the county commissioners to transfer money from the general fund to the salary fund of the county, is not in violation of the constitutional provisions against impairing the obligation of contracts. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289 (30 P. 896). The constitutional prohibition against the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts has no application where the statute in question is a public law relative to a public subject within the domain of the general legislative power of the state, and involving the public right and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 290, 304 (30 P. 896). The certificates of indebtedness issued by the county auditor for allowances on the general fund of the county do not create a contract to pay the same out of the general fund in the order of presentment out of the first money in, or to come into, the treasury and apportioned to that fund. The only contract created by the certificate of indebtedness is that it shall be paid out of the Rights of foreigners. general fund in the order of presentation or allowance. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 289 (30 P. 896). The constitution of this state does not forbid the passing of retrospective laws, and the inhibition contained in the constitution of the United States against any ex post facto law does not embrace civil laws of this character. Esser v. Spaulding, 17 Nev. 290 (30 P. 896). No right can be considered a vested right unless it is something more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general laws; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand, made by another. Esser v. Spaulding. 17 Nev. 290 (30 P. 896). Section 20, subdivision 8. of the act incorporating the city of Reno, approved March 16, 1903, and sections 1 and 3 of the act empowering city and other boards to revoke and discontinue business licenses, approved March 10, 1903, are not repugnant to any provision of our state or federal constitution, and under them, a license may be revoked without notice to the licensee, where there is reason to believe that the business is a nuisance, a menace to public health, or detrimental to peace or morals. Wallace v. Mayor, etc. of the city of Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 77 (103 A. S. 747. 63 L. R. A. 337, 73 P. 528). Where the remedy has attached itself to the right. and is being prosecuted by due course of law, to separate between them and to take away the remedy is to do violence to the right, and comes within that section of our constitution which prohibits laws from being passed impairing the obligation of contracts. State ex rel. Howell v. Wildes, 33 Nev. (116 P. 595). 245. SEC: 16. Foreigners who are, or may hereafter become Bona-fide residents of this State, shall enjoy the same rights, in respect to the possession, enjoyment and inheritance of property, as native-born citizens. T. C. C. pp. 54, 463. A citizen and subject of the Chinese Empire, who is a bona fide resident of this state, is entitled, under the laws of this state, to locate and purchase any of the public lands belonging to this state. State v. Preble, 18 Nev. 251, 252, 253 (2 P. 754). Slavery prohibited No act authorized by the constitution can be said to be against the public policy of the state. State v. Preble. 18 Nev. 251, 252, 253 (2 P. 754). 246. SEC: 17. Neither Slavery nor involuntary Servitude unless for the punishment of crimes shall ever be tolerated in this State. T. C. C. pp. 55, 463. Search and seizure regulated. 247. SEC: 18. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized. T. C. C. pp. 55, 463. Cited, Ex Parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 363. Treason defined. 248. SEC: 19. Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies or giving them aid or comfort. And no person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. T. C. C. pp. 56, 463. Rights in general retained. 249. SEC: 20. This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people. T. C. C. pp. 59, 464. The powers reserved by the people from the federal government have never been, nor are they in any instance exercised by the people at large, but by the governments of the states, which are clothed with all the sovereign authority so reserved. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284. The direct primary law of March 23, 1909 (Stats. 1909, e. 198), is not in derogation of this section. Riter v. Douglass. 32 Nev. 400 (109 P. 444, 451). The act of March 24, 1909 (Stats. 1908-09, c. 191), the "Banking Act," provided by section 2 that it should be unlawful under penalty for any corporation, partner ship, firm, or individual to engage in the banking business except by means of a corporation duly organized for such purpose under the laws of the state. Sections 5 and 6 created a state banking board to have general supervision of banks and banking. Section 12 provided that it should be unlawful to engage in banking without obtaining a license from such board, which license should issue only to corporations duly organized to do a banking business. Held, that such act was in conflict with this section. Marymont v. State Banking Board, 33 Nev.(111 P. 295, 296). ARTICLE 2. RIGHT OF SUFRAGE How and by whom the franchise may be enjoyed. 250. SECTION 1. Every male citizen of the United States (not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution) of the age of twenty-one years and upwards who shall have actually and not constructively, resided in the State six months, and in the district or county thirty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at such election; Provided that no person who has been or may be convicted of Treason or Felony in any State or Territory of the United States, unless restored to civil rights, and no person who, after arriving at the age of Eighteen years shall have voluntarily borne arms against the United States, or held civil or military office under the Socalled Confederate States, or either of them, unless an amnesty be granted to such by the Federal Government, and no idiot or insane person shall be entitled to the privilege of an elector. Amended by striking out the word white before the word male. Proposed and passed at the Eighth Session of the Legislature, January 15, 1877, Statutes of 1877, page 213; agreed to and passed at the Ninth Session of the Legislature. January 27, 1879, Statutes of 1879, page 149, and approved and ratified by the people at the general election of 1880.] T. C. C. pp. 60, 464, 465. [SUBSTITUTE FOR ASSEMBLY JOINT AND CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 6, RELATIVE TO AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE TWO OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, PERTAINING TO THE RIGHT OF ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. Approved March 18, 1911, 457. Resolved by the Assembly, the Senate concurring, That section one of article two of the Constitution of the State of Nevada be amended to read as follows: SECTION 1. All citizens of the United States not laboring under the disabilities named in this constitution, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have actually, and not constructively, resided in this state six months, and in the district or county thirty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that now or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at such election; provided, that no person who has been or may be convicted of treason or felony in any state or territory of the United States, unless restored to civil rights, and no idiot or insane person shall be entitled to the privilege of an elector. There shall be no denial of the eiective franchise at any election on account of sex.] [Proposed and passed at the Twenty-fifth Session of the Legislature, Stats. 1911, p. 457.] who desire to be represented on official ballots. Enactment of a primary election law is an inherent right of the legislature under the constitution. The direct primary law of March 23, 1909 (Stats. 1909, c. 198), is not unconstitutional as destroying political parties, nor as denying electors the right to determine the political principles their candidates must espouse, nor enabling electors of opposite political faith to name the candidates of their political opponents. The state has the right under the police power vested in its legislature to make reasonable regulations in the interest of public welfare for the nomination of candidates of the various parties. The rights of political parties can be no greater than the rights of electors under the constitution. The legislature can, in regulating primary elections, prescribe qualifying classifications for political parties Riter v. A person who was a qualified elector under the constitution of this state did not become disqualified by the failure to pay his poll tax and to have his name registered, until after the first week of October, A. D. 1865. By the provisions of the registry law, all persons had until the last day in the first week of October, A. D. 1865, within which to have their names registered, no disqualification could result until after that time. An elector otherwise qualified would therefore be a competent juror until after the expiration of the first week in October. State v. Salge, 1 Nev. 450, 457. The form of a law by which a person is deprived of a constitutional right is immaterial; it is a nullity, whatever be its form. Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev. 369, 371. Held, on application for registry by one who could not take the oath prescribed in the registry law (Stats. 1864-5. p. 382), but who was entitled under the constitution to the right of suffrage, that the oath required by |