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of a wilful evasion of the law. State v. Harkin, 7 Nev. 377, 383.

The district judge, upon the trial of a criminal case, has the right to state to the jury, upon their request, the testimony of any witness. State v. Smith, 10 Nev. 106, 114.

An instruction of the court, assuming as a fact that A. was a creditor of B., where this was a fact in issue in the case, was clearly erroneous.

The evidence being clear that A. was a creditor, and it appearing that if that question had been submitted to the jury as a special issue and they had found otherwise it would have been the duty of the court to set aside the verdict: Held, that under such circumstances, the inadvertent assumption of the fact by the court was not such an error as justified a reversal of the case. Gaudette v. Travis, 11 Nev. 149, 161.

The court, in referring to the testimony of the defendants, as witnesses in their own behalf, told the jury that they could not believe them both, because they were wholly inconsistent, as to the principal fact in the case: Held, that this was not an infringement upon the constitutional prohibition against charging juries as to matters of fact. State v. McLane, 15 Nev. 345, 366.

On trial of defendant for grand larceny, the court instructed the jury that if satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, "that defendant killed, or had the calf killed, by the witnesses, and that she then cut out the brand and cut off the ears of the calf, and burned up the ears and part of the hide so cut out, this would be a circumstance to be considered by you, indicating that the defendant was not the owner of the calf, and of her knowledge that she was not the owner," etc. Held, that the word "indicating," as used in the instruction, would be understood by the jury as tending to show a certain result, and that

Style of process.

328.

the language of the instruction is not in violation of this constitutional provision. State v. Loveless, 17 Nev. 424, 426 (30 P. 1080).

In a prosecution for murder where the defendant relies upon a justification, and evidence tending to establish such defense is given, it is error for the judge, in refusing to give certain instructions concerning the law of self-defense, to remark to counsel, in the presence of the jury, that he did not give the instructions for the reason that he does not "remember of any testimony given in this case tending to show that the deceased ever made an assault upon the defendant, or that there was any attempted assault made by deceased at the time of the killing; but the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts in the case.' (Hawley, C. J., dissenting).

Instructions (a) may be refused when the legal propositions they contain are substantially embodied in the charge given by the court. (b) Must not assume facts not admitted. (c) Should not be argumentative. (d) The court having charged the jury to carefully consider all the facts, circumstances and evidence, the refusal of instructions singling out, and laying stress upon, particular points in the testimony, was not error. State v. Buralli, 27 Nev. 41, 53, 54 (71 P. 532).

Cited, Murphy v. Southern Pacific Company, 31 Nev.

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SEC: 13. The style of all process shall be "The State of Nevada": and all prosecutions shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of the same.

T. C. C. pp. 217, 492.

A writ issued against and served on a party which does not run in the name of "the State of Nevada," or purnort to be by the authority of the "State of Nevada," confers no jurisdiction on the court over the party named in the writ. But if a party on whom such a defective writ has been served comes into court, and petitions for time within which to answer such writ, he thereby acknowledges the authority and jurisdiction of the court, and waives all defects in the form of the writ. State ex One form of action.

rel. Curtis v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 202, 210,
A summons is not
a process within the
meaning of this section; hence, a summons
that runs in the name of "The People of the
State of Nevada" is not void. Brooks v. Nev.
Nickel Syndicate Limited, 24 Nev. 311, 332
(53 P. 597).

Cited, Bell v. District Court, 28 Nev. 296 (163 A. S. 854, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843. $1 P. 875).

329. SEC: 14. There shall be but one form of civil action, and law and equity may be administered in the same action.

Compensation of judicial officers.

330. SEC: 15. The Justices of the Supreme Court and District Judges shall each receive quarterly for their services, a compensation to be fixed by law, and which shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which they shall have been elected, unless in case a Vacancy occurs, in which case the successor of the former incumbent shall receive only such salary as may be provided by law at the time of his election or appointment; and provision shall be made by law for setting apart from each years revenue a sufficient amount of Money, to pay such compensation; Provided, that District Judges shall be paid out of the County Treasuries of the Counties comprising their respective Districts.

T. C. C. pp. 211, 485, 491.

In the payment of a debt, legal tender notes are in contem-lation of law equal to coin; an act of the legislature, therefore, making the salary of a state officer payable in legal tender notes after it had previously made it payable in coin, is not rendered unconstitutional by this section.

This provision only prohibits the legislature from increasing or decreasing the number of dollars in lawful money at which the salary

of an officer is fixed, at the time of his election. State ex rel. Beatty v. Rhoades, 3 Nev. 240, 251.

The provision allowing mileage in the former law was intended as a part of the compensation of commissioners for their services. The language of the salary act that the salaries fixed "shall be in full for all services," excludes the idea that the legislature intended to allow the former provision upon that subject to

stand. State ex rel. Scott v. Trusdale, 16 Nev. 357. 360.

It is not in contravention of this section, to provide that the judges' salaries shall pe paid quarterly out of the county treasuries into the, Costs advanced.

state treasury, and by the state treasurer paid to the judges in monthly installments. State ex rel. Coffin v. Atherton, 19 Nev. 333, 346 (10 P. 901).

331. SEC: 16. The Legislature at its first Session, and from time to time. thereafter shall provide by law, that upon the institution of each civil action, and other proceedings, and also upon the perfecting of an appeal in any Civil Action or proceeding, in the several Courts of Record in this State, a special Court fee, or tax shall be advanced to the Clerks of said Courts, respectively by the party or parties bringing such action or proceeding, or taking such appeal and the money so paid in shall be accounted for by such Clerks, and applied towards the payment of the compensation of the Judges of said Courts, as shall be directed by law.

Leave of absence of judicial officers limited.

332. SEC: 17. The Legislature shall have no power to grant leave of absence to a Judicial Officer, and any such Officer who shall absent himself from the State for more than Ninety consecutive days, shall be deemed to have vacated his Office.

T. C. C. p. 202.

No officer superseded until election of successors.

333. SEC: 18. No Judicial Officer shall be superceeded nor shall the Organization of the several Courts of the Territory of Nevada be changed until the election and qualification of the several Officers provided for in this article.

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334. SECTION 1. The Assembly shall have the sole power of impeaching. The concurrence of a majority of all the members elected, shall be necessary to an impeachment. All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate, and when sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be upon Oath or Affirmation to do justice according to Law and Evidence. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, shall preside over the Senate while sitting to try the Governor or Lieutenant Governor upon impeachment. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the Senators elected.

T. C. C. pp. 93, 470.

Officers liable to impeachment, judgment in.

335. SEC: 2. The Governor and other State and Judicial Officers, except Justices of the Peace shall be liable to impeachment for Misdemeanor or Malfeasance in Office; but judgment in such case shall not extend further than removal from Office and disqualification to hold any Office of honor, profit, or trust under this State. The party whether convicted or acquitted, shall, nevertheless, be liable to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.

T. C. C. pp. 94. 470.

Judicial officers, how impeached.

336. SEC: 3. For any reasonable cause to be entered on the journals of each House, which may, or may not be sufficient grounds for impeachment, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of

the District Courts shall be removed from Office on the vote of two thirds of the Members elected to each branch of the Legislature, and the Justice or Judge complained of, shall be served with a copy of the complaint against him, and shall have an opportunity of being heard in person or by counsel in his defense, Provided, that no Member of either branch of the Legislature shall be eligible to fill the vacancy occasioned by such removal.

T. C. C. p. 203.

This section, providing for the removal from office of judges in a certain manner by the legislature, is exclusive and prohibitory upon the legislature of other means Other officers, removal from office.

for such removal. State ex rel. O'Neale v. McClinton, 5 Nev. 329, 333.

Cited, Bell v. District Court, 28 Nev. 298 (163 A. S. 854, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, 81 P. 875).

337. SEC: 4. Provision shall be made by law for the removal from Office of any Civil Officer other than those in this Article previously specified, for Malfeasance; or Nonfeasance in the performance of his duties.

T. C. C. p. 470.

ARTICLE 8.

MUNICIPAL AND OTHER CORPORATIONS

Special act prohibited, exception.

338. SECTION 1. The Legislature shall pass no Special Act in any matter relating to corporate powers except for municipal purposes; but corporations may be formed under general laws; and all such laws may from time to time, be altered or repealed. T. C. C. pp. 254, 320, 330, 473.

This section clearly recognizes the authority of the legislature to create municipal corporations by special enactment. This interpretation is not inconsistent with the provisions of section 8 of this article. City of Virginia v. Chollar-Potosi G. & S. M. Co., 2 Nev. 86 (affirmed); State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 129, 142.

The said act of 1897 (p. 50) incorporating the city of Reno, having been passed pursuant to this section, section 34 of said act, granting to the city the right within a certain limit to borrow money for procuring water and erecting water works, is not in violation of article 8. section 8. State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 261 (52 P. 274).

This section, by much stronger implication, seems to reserve to the legislature the power to pass special laws in regard to municipal corporations; that is, to create them; or, at least, to confer special and additional powers after they are in existence.

The city of Virginia was a municipal corporation when the constitution was adopted, and has never ceased to be a corporation. The law amending the charter is, therefore, unconstitutional.

Property of corporations taxed.

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The expression "in any manner relating to corporate powers," is a rather ambiguous phrase, but we think the framers of the constitution meant by that language to prohibit the formation of corporations by special acts. The subsequent language "but incorporations may be formed under general laws," that was the meaning intended to be conveyed. Then, to use more appropriate language, the section would read in this way: "the legisla ture shall pass general laws for the formation of corporations; but no corporations (except corporations for municipal purposes) shall be created by special act."

The act of February 9, 1865 (Stats. 1864–5, 144) attempts to give a right to Birdsall and his associates to exercise corporate powers not provided for in a general law. It is an attempt upon the part of the legislature to grant a special privilege to one corporation that could not be enjoyed by any other and is in violation of this section. State of Nevada ex rel. Keith v. Dayton Road Co., 10 Nev. 155, 161. Cited. State ex rel. Williams v. District Court, 30 Nev. 225, 227 (94 P. 70).

339. SEC: 2. All real property, and possessory rights to the same, as well as personal property in this State, belonging to corporations now existing or hereafter created shall be subject to taxation, the same as property of individuals: Provided, that the property of corporations formed for Municipal, Charitable, Religious, or Educational purposes may be exempted by

law.

As the act of 1891, p. 56, provides that all railroads, however owned, are to be assessed by the state board, and all other property by the county assessors, it is not

Dues, corporators not liable.

in conflict with this section. It makes no improper discrimination between the corporations and individuals. Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 391, 397 (32 P. 437).

340. SEC: 3. Dues from corporations shall be secured by such means as may be prescribed by law; Provided, that corporators in corporations formed under the laws of this State shall not be individually liable for the debts or liabilities of such corporation. T. C. C. pp. 323, 474.

Subject to existing laws.

341. SEC: 4. Corporations created by, or under the laws of the Territory of Nevada shall be subject to the provisions of such laws, until the Legislature shall pass laws regulating the same, in pursuance of the provisions of this Constitution.

To sue and be sued.

342. SEC: 5. Corporations may sue and be sued in all courts, in like manner as individuals.

T. C. C. p. 330.

Certain paper money interdicted.

343. SEC. 6: No bank-notes or paper of any kind shall ever be permitted to circulate as money in this State, except the Federal currency, and the Notes of banks authorized under the laws of Congress.

T. C. C. p. 474.

Right of way.

344. SEC: 7. No right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation until full compensation be first made or secured therefor.

T. C. C. p. 36.

Credit of cities and towns limited.

345. SEC: 8. The Legislature shall provide for the Organization of Cities and Towns by general laws; and restrict their powers of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, except for procuring supplies of water.

T. C. C. p. 475.

This section is inoperative until acted upon by the legislature.

Such section, if standing alone, and not qualified by any other sections of the constitution. might raise a strong implied prohibition against the legislature passing any special laws on the same subject. City of Virginia V. Chollar-Potosi G. & S. M. Co., 2 Nev. 86, 89, 90.

State forbidden to speculate.

Cited. State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 142-145.

See State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 262, under section 1 of this article (52 P. 274).

Cited, State ex rel. Williams v. District Court, 30 Nev. 225, 227, 228, 234 (94 P. 70).

346. SEC: 9. The State shall not donate or loan money, or its credit, subscribe to, or be, interested in the Stock of any company, association, or corporation, except corporations formed for Educational or Charitable purposes.

T. C. C. pp. 129, 334, 501.

The legislature has power to appropriate money as it sees fit except when limited by the constitution. State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 17, 31.

Limitation of county indebtedness.

347. SEC: 10. No county, city, town, or other Municipal corporation shall become a stockholder in any joint Stock Company, Corporation, or association whatever, or loan its credit in aid of any such Company, Corporation or Association, except, railroad corporations, companies, or associations.

T. C. C. p. 129.

In the very section preceding this, the state is prohibited not only from becoming a stockholder in any company or association, but also from donating money to them. Now, if it were the purpose to make the same prohibition respecting counties and towns, why were they not, like the state, expressly forbidden to donate? The failure to make the prohibition in express terms, under such circumstances, warrants the conclusion that it was not the intention to do so. Counties and towns, therefore, are not prohibited by this section from donating money to such railroad companies, if to any kind of company or association. son v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284, 301.

Gib

The act authorizing the issuance of the bonds of Ormsby County to the Virginia and Truckee Railroad Company (Stats. 1869, p. 43) is not unconstitutional.

This section, though it does not confer any right upon such organizations, does not prevent the legislature from authorizing a county to aid a railroad, either by loaning its credit, donation, or otherwise.

To allow a county to loan its credit to a railroad company is virtually allowing a donation, because the right to loan its credit must involve the right to pay any liabilities which may be incurred by that means. Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 284, 299, 301.

Fiscal year.

ARTICLE 9.

FINANCE AND STATE DEBT

348. SECTION 1. The fiscal year shall commence on the first day of January in each Year.

T. C. C. pp. 404, 501.

Annual tax.

349. SEC: 2. The Legislature shall provide by law, for an annual tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the State for each fiscal year; and whenever the expenses of any Year shall exceed the income, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax sufficient with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency, as well as the estimated expenseses of such ensuing Years or two Years.

The levy of state taxes by the board of county commissioners, though provided for in the revenue laws, is an idle ceremony, for the reason that the levy is made by the legislature. Cited State v. Manhattan Silver Mining Co., 4 Nev. 318, 330. 333.

See Klein v. Kinkead, 16 Nev. 194, 204-206, under section 3 of the article.

The constitution of this state declares that all property shall be taxed, except mines and other property for certain enumerated pur

poses. The legislature cannot exempt any taxable property not enumerated. Money at interest, secured by mortgage, is taxable.

Held, upon a full review of the authorities, that the taxing of money at interest secured by mortgage, when the property mortgaged is taxed is not double taxation, and is not in violation of the constitution of this state. State v. Carson City Savings Bank, 17 Nev. 146 (30 P. 703).

State may contract debts, limitation, exception.

350. SEC: 3. For the purpose of enabling the State to transact its business upon cash basis from its organization, the State may contract public debts; but such debts shall never in the aggregate, exclusive of interest, exceed the sum of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars; except for the purpose of defraying extraordinary expenses as hereinafter mentioned; Every such debt shall be authorized by law for some purpose or purposes, to be distinctly specified therein, and every such law shall provide for levying an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest Semi-Annually, and the principal within twenty years from the passage of such law, and shall specially appropriate the proceeds of said taxes to the payment of said principal and interest; and such appropriation shall not be repealed, nor the taxes be postponed or diminished until the principal and interest of said debts shall have been wholly paid. Every contract of indebtedness entered into or assumed by or on behalf of the State, when all its debts and liabilities amount to said sum beforementioned, shall be void and of no effect. Except in cases of money borrowed to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, defend the State in time of War, or if hostilities be threatened, provide for the public defense.

T. C. C. pp. 385, 493,

This section discussed and commented on. It does not quality the 24th section of the 17th article.

Tax levied under the law in question is illegal and void, but the bonds authorized to be issued are legal and valid debts against the state if negotiated. State ex rel. Nightingill v. Board of Commissioners of Storey County, 1 Nev. 264, 267-271.

The legislative fund act of 1869 was not in violation of the constitutional provision against contracting a public debt exceeding three thousand dollars, though then there was a public debt to that amount, for the reason that the act did not create a debt within the meaning of the constitution.

Where language is employed in the constitution similar to the language in the constitution of other states; which had previously received judicial interpretation, the legal presumption arises that the language is used with reference to such interpretation.

If, as is now decided, warrants issued under the legislative fund act of 1869, create no debt against the state within the meaning of this section, the addition of an interest clause to such warrants cannot make them unconstitutional.

Interest constitutes no part of the original demand; it is simply a statutory allowance for delay.

With the question of the policy or expediency of a statute the judicial department has nothing to do; in that regard the legislature is supreme.

That a power may be abused is no argument against either its existence or its exercise. State ex rel. Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15, 16, 23, 24, 27, 28.

In construing sections 2 and 3 of this article: Held, that the object in authorizing a bonded indebtedness was to enable the state to maintain its business upon a cash basis, and

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