87

87

Opinion of the Court.

to require a contribution to the public treasury before the bequest shall take effect. . . .

"We think that it follows from this that the act in question is not open to the objection that it is an attempt to tax the property of the United States, since the tax is imposed upon the legacy before it reaches the hands of the government. The legacy becomes the property of the United States only after it has suffered a diminution to the amount of the tax, and it is only upon this condition that the legislature assents to a bequest of it." 12

We shall not overrule the Fox case, and, of course, we find no distinction between realty and personalty. Within broad limits, the state has power to say what is devisable and to whom it may be given. We may assume with the United States that the state's power over testamentary gifts is not absolute," but we find nothing in the Supremacy Clause which prohibits the state from preventing its domiciliary from willing property to the Federal Government.1

The alternative contention is that § 27 of the Probate Code, as interpreted, discriminates against the United States in violation of the Constitution. The argument is that even if the Supremacy Clause would not be vio

12 United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628, 630.

13 Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503. Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633.

14 As was pointed out in the Fox case, our determination does not affect the right of the United States to acquire property by purchase or eminent domain in the face of a prohibitory statute of the state. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367. An authorized declaration of taking or a requisition will put realty or personalty at the disposal of the United States for "just compensation." It may tax testamentary transfers. Its powers will not suffer.

Opinion of the Court.

339 U.S.

lated if the statute provided that no governmental body could be made the beneficiary of a California will, there is a violation of the Supremacy Clause when the United States is treated less advantageously than California. Apparently the capacity of the United States to receive gifts is analogized to the right of a person to sue on a federal cause of action in a state court. Reliance is placed on the cases which have held that federal rights must be enforced by the courts of a state when "ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion." 15 Thus, urges appellant, since state courts may not discriminate in the availability of judicial relief between state created rights and federally created rights, no more can a state discriminate between California and the United States as beneficiaries under wills.

When a state refuses to hear pleas based on federally created rights while it takes cognizance of those created by state law, there may be invalid discrimination because by the Supremacy Clause federal laws are made laws of the state. Therefore to allow a suit based on state law and to refuse one based on federal law could "discriminate" without any reason for the classification." But the United States' capacity to receive, even though called a "right" or a "power," is not a "law of the state." As we have shown in the earlier discussion, that capacity cannot be magically transformed into something that must be enforced. The cases upholding the rights of persons to sue are not in point.

15 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 56; Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377; McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230.

16 Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136; Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, 57.

17 McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., supra, 234; cf. Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra.

87

Opinion of the Court.

In a sense, of course, the United States is being treated differently from California, and differences and distinctions in a state's treatment of persons are frequently claimed to be discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. But such differences and distinctions, even when applied to persons clearly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, are not in themselves unconstitutional. It is only when the variations are arbitrary and without reasonable legal basis that an unconstitutional discrimination occurs. A long line of decisions has molded this judicial concept.18 Thus, although we should make the somewhat dubious assumption that the United States must receive equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no constitutional violation. California's decision to permit only itself and its subordinate municipalities to be unlimited governmental beneficiaries under the wills of its domiciliaries is based on a permissible distinction. It is justified by reason of the state's close relationship with its residents and their property.19 A state may by statute properly prefer itself in this way, just as states have always preferred themselves in escheat.

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

18 E. g., Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342; La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465; Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525; New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U. S. 573; Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U. S. 80.

19 Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553; cf. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U. S. 541, 551.

874433 0-50-11

AFFOLDER v. NEW YORK, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 200. Argued November 18, 1949.-Decided March 13, 1950.

In this action against a railroad under the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, based on an alleged violation of the automatic-coupler requirement of the Safety Appliance Act, it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff, a switchman, lost a leg in his attempt to stop a string of moving cars which had separated from others after an earlier failure of two of them to couple on impact. The verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court were for the plaintiff. Held:

1. The issue of proximate cause was properly determined in favor of the plaintiff. Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. R. Co., 338 U. S. 430. P. 98.

2. The duty of the carrier under the automatic-coupler requirement of the Safety Appliance Act is unrelated to negligence, but is an absolute one requiring proper performance of the couplers on the occasion in question. O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co.,

338 U. S. 384. P. 98.

3. The charge of the trial court in this case sufficiently informed the jury as to the relevant legal rules. It did not deprive the railroad of a defense based on the possibility that the separation of the cars was due to the plaintiff's failure to open the coupler. Pp. 98-100.

4. In the circumstances of this case, the amount of damages ($80,000) awarded by the trial court's judgment was not excessive. P. 101.

174 F.2d 486, reversed.

In an action under the Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the District Court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed. 174 F. 2d 486. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 813. Reversed, p. 101.

96

Opinion of the Court.

William H. Allen argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Mark D. Eagleton.

Lon Hocker argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

1

We have for review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, reversing petitioner's recovery of an $80,000 judgment against the respondent railroad based on an alleged violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2 Petitioner was a member of a crew engaged in classifying, or sorting, a number of railroad cars in the respondent's yards. Twenty-four cars had been coupled together on one track. The twenty-fifth, a Rock Island car, was kicked eastward down the track to couple with the others. It did so, its east end joining the other cars. A Pennsylvania car was the next car kicked eastward down the track, but it and the Rock Island car failed to couple together. After three or four other cars had been added, the Rock Island car and the twenty-four others to which it was attached began rolling down the track. Petitioner ran after the moving train of cars in an attempt to board and stop them, as was his duty. His leg was lost as he fell under a car in this attempt.

The trial was to a jury, petitioner contending that the failure of the Pennsylvania car to join the Rock Island car on impact was in itself a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, resulting in the separation and

1 "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." 27 Stat. 531, 45 U. S. C. § 2.

2 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60.