816 Opinion of the Court. United States filed a brief and argued orally in support of the appellant. It is clear that appellant has standing to bring these proceedings. He is an aggrieved party, free to travel again on the Southern Railway. Having been subjected to practices of the railroad which the Commission and the court below found to violate the Interstate Commerce Act, he may challenge the railroad's current regulations on the ground that they permit the recurrence of comparable violations. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 92-93. 6 The material language in § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act has been in that statute since its adoption in 1887. 24 Stat. 380. From the beginning, the Interstate Commerce Commission has recognized the application of that language to discriminations between white and Negro passengers. Councill v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 1 I. C. C. 339; Heard v. Georgia R. Co., 1 I. C. C. 428; Heard v. Georgia R. Co., 3 I. C. C. 111; Edwards v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 12 I. C. C. 247; Cozart v. Southern R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 226; Gaines v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 471; Crosby v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 112 I. C. C. 239. That section recently was so applied in Mitchell v. United States, supra. The decision of this case is largely controlled by that in the Mitchell case. There a Negro passenger holding a first-class ticket was denied a Pullman seat, although such a seat was unoccupied and would have been avail 6"The Western and Atlantic Railroad Company will be notified to cease and desist from subjecting colored persons to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in violation of section 3 of the Act to regulate commerce, and from furnishing to colored persons purchasing first-class tickets on its road accommodations which are not equally safe and comfortable with those furnished other firstclass passengers." 1I. C. C. at p. 347. Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. able to him if he had been white. The railroad rules had allotted a limited amount of Pullman space, consisting of compartments and drawing rooms, to Negro passengers and, because that space was occupied, the complainant was excluded from the Pullman car and required to ride in a second-class coach. This Court held that the passenger thereby had been subjected to an unreasonable disadvantage in violation of § 3 (1).' The similarity between that case and this is inescapable. The appellant here was denied a seat in the dining car although at least one seat was vacant and would have been available to him, under the existing rules, if he had been white. The issue before us, as in the Mitchell case, is whether the railroad's current rules and practices cause passengers to be subjected to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in violation of § 3 (1). We find that they do. The right to be free from unreasonable discriminations belongs, under § 3 (1), to each particular person. Where a dining car is available to passengers holding tickets entitling them to use it, each such passenger is equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations. The denial of dining service to any such passenger by the rules before us subjects him to a prohibited disadvantage. Under the rules, only four Negro passengers may be served at one time and then only at the table reserved for Negroes. Other Negroes who present themselves are compelled to await a vacancy at that table, although there may be many vacancies elsewhere The rules also denied access by Negroes to the dining car and observation car. The principles there announced applied equally to those facilities. 8 That specific denial of service was condemned by the Commission and the District Court as a violation of § 3 (1). Review of that condemnation is not sought here. 816 Opinion of the Court. in the diner. The railroad thus refuses to extend to those passengers the use of its existing and unoccupied facilities. The rules impose a like deprivation upon white passengers whenever more than 40 of them seek to be served at the same time and the table reserved for Negroes is vacant. We need not multiply instances in which these rules sanction unreasonable discriminations. The curtains, partitions and signs emphasize the artificiality of a difference in treatment which serves only to call attention to a racial classification of passengers holding identical tickets and using the same public dining facility. Cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, ante, p. 637, decided today. They violate § 3 (1). Our attention has been directed to nothing which removes these racial allocations from the statutory condemnation of "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. . . It is argued that the limited demand for dining-car facilities by Negro passengers justifies the regulations. But it is no answer to the particular passenger who is denied service at an unoccupied place in a dining car that, on the average, persons like him are served. As was pointed out in Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97, "the comparative volume of traffic cannot justify the denial of a fundamental right of equality of treatment, a right specifically safeguarded by the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act." Cf. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337. That the regulations may impose on white passengers, in proportion to their numbers, disadvantages similar to those imposed on Negro passengers is not an answer to the requirements of § 3 (1). Discriminations that operate to the disadvantage of two groups are not the less to be condemned because their impact is broader Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. than if only one were affected. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 22. Since 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act invalidates the rules and practices before us, we do not reach the constitutional or other issues suggested. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to set aside the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which dismissed the original complaint and to remand the case to that Commission for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs in the result. MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Syllabus. AUTOMATIC RADIO MANUFACTURING CO., INC. v. HAZELTINE RESEARCH, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT. No. 455. Argued April 5, 1950.-Decided June 5, 1950. Petitioner, a manufacturer of radio broadcasting receivers, entered into a licensing agreement with respondent, a radio research organization, whereby, for royalties amounting to a small percentage of petitioner's selling price of complete radio broadcasting receivers, petitioner obtained permission to use in the manufacture of its "home products" any or all of 570 patents which respondent held and any others to which it might acquire rights. Respondent is not a manufacturer but derives its income from licensing its patents; and its policy is to license any and all responsible manufacturers. Under the agreement, petitioner was not obligated to use any of respondent's patents in the manufacture of its products; but it was required to pay the royalty, whether it used them or not. Held: 1. It is not per se a misuse of patents to require the licensee to pay royalties based on a percentage of its sales, even though none of the patents is used. Pp. 830-834. (a) On the record in this case, there was nothing to support petitioner's averment that respondent refused to grant a license under any one or more of its patents to anyone who refused to take a license under all, since the affidavit in support thereof was made upon information and belief and the relevant portion did not comply with Rule 56 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. P. 831. (b) There is no indication in this case of a conspiracy to restrict production of unpatented goods, or any goods, to effectuate a monopoly. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, distinguished. P. 832. (c) In this case, the royalty provision did not create another. monopoly and created no restraint of competition beyond the legitimate grant of the patent. P. 833. (d) The mere accumulation of patents, no matter how many, is not per se illegal. P. 834. |