643 DOUGLAS, J., concurring. ments. What we have said answers this contention insofar as it alleges a lack of state jurisdiction because appellants were served outside Virginia. If service by mail is challenged as not providing adequate and reasonable notice, the contention has been answered by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 320–321. See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U. S. 306. The due process questions we have already discussed. are the only alleged errors relied on in appellants' brief,* and appellants' special appearance only challenged state jurisdiction and the service of process. We therefore have no occasion to discuss the scope of the Commission's order, or the methods by which the state might attempt to enforce it.5 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring. Affirmed. Since the formula adopted by the Court is adequate to dispose of this case, I have joined in the opinion. But I feel that the type of problem presented requires a more selective treatment. Hence my separate opinion. * One federal question suggested in the appellants' statement of jurisdiction was that § 6 as interpreted by the state court infringed federal control of the mails delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 7 of the United States Constitution. But appellants' brief on submission of the case does not include this question in the "specifications of errors relied upon" and does not even mention that constitutional clause. 5 For examples of problems which might be raised by attempts to impose punishment for violation of the order, see Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280, 284-285; cf. Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 712, 719. Section 6 itself provides no method for enforcement, except insofar as such stature might be attributed to its provision for giving a cease and desist order "publicity . . . to the public through the press or otherwise as the commission may, in its discretion, determine to be advisable for the reasonable information and protection of the public." DOUGLAS, J., Concurring. 1 339 U.S. Virginia's Blue Sky Law is a comprehensive scheme for the protection of the state's investors. Securities can be offered for sale in the state only after the issuer obtains a permit. To get it, the applicant must supply detailed information about its solvency, its earning record, and the nature of the securities. Promoters may be required to supply a bond. Applicants must appoint an agent, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, to receive service of process. Only after proof of their good character and financial responsibility are security salesmen licensed." After issuance, the state Corporation Commission is authorized again to investigate the issuer with an eye to possible revocation of its permit. These are the high points of the comprehensive regulation which Virginia seeks to apply to appellants. That the business of insurance is interstate commerce is established by United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533. Any doubts about the power of a state to exclude an interstate insurance company which refuses to comply with its regulatory laws were dispelled by the passage of the McCarran Act. 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015. See Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 461, 462. The requirements of due process do not, in my opinion, preclude the extension of Virginia's regulatory scheme to appellant. I put to one side the case where a policyholder seeks to sue the out-of-state company in Virginia. 1 Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, 1928, c.. 529, p. 1373, as amended, Acts of 1932, c. 236, p. 434; Michie's 1942 Code of Virginia, § 3848 (47) et seq. 4 2 Michie § 3848 (47). 3 Michie § 3848 (51). Michie § 3848 (51) (r). 5 Michie § 3848 (55). Michie § 3848 (50) (m). 7 Michie § 3848 (53). 643 DOUGLAS, J., concurring. His ability to sue is not necessarily the measure of Virginia's power to regulate, as the Court said in Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 21. It is the nature of the state's action that determines the kind or degree of activity in the state necessary for satisfying the requirements of due process. What is necessary to sustain a tax or to maintain a suit by a creditor (see Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, supra; Provident Savings Assn. v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103, 114–116; Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018, 1024) is not in my view determinative when the state seeks to regulate solicitation within its borders. Blue Sky Laws are a well-recognized exercise of the police power of the states. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 552. The wiles of the salesman have been many; the devices to avoid state regulation have been clever and calculated. One of those who contested the constitutionality of the Michigan Blue Sky Law in Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U. S. 568, 573, had no place of business in the state and was not sending agents into it. The history of the various methods used to evade state regulation is too recent to require extended comment. Instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce were extensively employed by those beyond. the reach of a state to sell securities to its citizens. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10. The Securities Act of 1933 (48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq.) was passed to fill the gap.8 A state is helpless when the out-of-state company operates beyond the borders, establishes no office in the state, and has no agents, salesmen, or solicitors to obtain 8 By § 3 (a) (8) insurance policies issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of specified state agencies are exempt from this federal regulation. Section 18 provides that the Act does not affect the jurisdiction of any state agency over a security or a person. DOUGLAS, J., concurring. 339 U.S. business for it within the state. Then it is beyond the reach of process. In the present case, however, that is only the formal arrangement. The actual arrangement shows a method of soliciting business within Virginia as active, continuous, and methodical as it would be if regular agents or solicitors were employed. Cf. Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313. Practically all of appellants' business in Virginia originates with and is the result of the activities of its Virginia members. The recommendation of a member relieves an applicant of the duty of furnishing any reference. Though the old members are not designated as "agents," it "clearly appears," as stated by the Supreme Court of Appeals, "that the association relies almost exclusively on these activities of its Virginia members to bring about an expansion of its Virginia business." Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 887; 51 S. E. 2d 263, 267. This device for soliciting business in Virginia may be unconventional and unorthodox; but it operates functionally precisely as though appellants had formally designated the Virginia members as their agents. Through these people appellants have realistically entered the state, looking for and obtaining business. Whether such solicitation is isolated or continuous, it is activity which Virginia can regulate. See Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 658. The requirements of due process may demand more or less minimal contacts than are present here, depending on what the pinch of the decision is or what it requires of the foreign corporation. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316–319. Where 9 9 As Mr. Justice Rutledge said in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 77 U. S. App. D. C. 129, 134, 134 F. 2d 511, 516, ". . . some casual or even single acts done within the borders of the sovereignty may confer power to acquire jurisdiction of the person, provided there is also reasonable provision for giving notice of the suit in accordance with minimal due process requirements." 643 MINTON, J., dissenting. the corporate project entails the use of one or more people in the state for the solicitation of business, in my view it does no violence to the traditional concept of due process to allow the state to provide protective measures governing that solicitation. That is all that is done here. I cannot agree that this appeal is premature. Virginia has placed an injunction on appellants, an injunction. which may have numerous consequences, e. g., contempt proceedings. There is an existing controversy-real and vital to appellants. MR. JUSTICE MINTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE JACKSON joins, dissenting. The State Corporation Commission of Virginia instituted the proceedings leading to the cease and desist order entered in the instant case under § 6 of the Virginia Securities Law. Michie's Va. Code, 1942, § 3848 (52). That section provides for service by registered mail upon persons or corporations offering securities through the mails or by other means of communication. After hearing, the Commission is authorized to issue the order and to give it such publicity as the Commission considers desirable. In this case no action has been taken under § 15 of the Law which provides that violation of the statute is a misdemeanor and punishable by fine, or under § 17 which provides for the imposition of a fine upon failure to comply with a lawful order of the Commission. Michie's Va. Code, 1942, § 3848 (61) (63). The Commission has in no way attempted to enforce the order issued by the Commission against appellants. Therefore appellants have not been hurt, and the question of due process is not reached. In the scheme of the statute, publicity appears to be the sole sanction of § 6. I know of no reason why Virginia may not go through this |