Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. assessments at the Omaha office. The funds so collected are used for operating expenses and sick benefits to members. The Association has no paid agents; its new members are usually obtained through the unpaid activities of those already members, who are encouraged to recommend the Association to friends and submit their names to the home office. The appellant Pratt in Omaha mails solicitations to these prospects. He encloses blank applications which, if signed and returned to the home office with the required fee, usually result in election of applicants as members. Certificates are then mailed, subject to return within 10 days "if not satisfactory." Travelers has solicited Virginia members in this manner since 1904, and has caused many sick benefit claims to be investigated. When these proceedings were instituted, it had approximately 800 Virginia members. The Commission, holding that the foregoing facts supported the state's power to act in § 6 proceedings, overruled appellants' objection to jurisdiction and their motion to quash service. The Association and its treasurer were ordered to cease and desist from further solicitations or sales of certificates to Virginia residents "through medium of any advertisement from within or from without the State, and/or through the mails or otherwise, by intra- or inter-state communication, . . . unless and until" it obtained authority in accordance with the "Blue Sky Law." This order was affirmed by the Virginia Court of Appeals. 188 Va. 877, 882, 51 S. E. 2d 263, 271. Appellants do not question the validity of the Virginia law "to the extent that it provides that individual and corporate residents of other states shall not come into the State for the purpose of doing business there without first submitting to the regulatory authority of the State." As to such state power see, e. g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539. Their basic contention is that all their activities take place in Nebraska, and that consequently 643 Opinion of the Court. Virginia has no power to reach them in cease and desist proceedings to enforce any part of its regulatory law. We cannot agree with this general due process objection, for we think the state has power to issue a "cease and desist order" enforcing at least that regulatory provision requiring the Association to accept service of process by Virginia claimants on the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Appellants' chief reliance for the due process contention is on Minnesota Assn. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140. There a Minnesota association obtained members in Montana by the same mail solicitation process used by Travelers to get Virginia members. The certificates issued to Montana members also reserved the right to investigate claims, although the Court pointed out that Benn's claim had not been investigated. This Court held that since the contracts were "executed and to be performed" in Minnesota, the Association was not "doing business" in Montana and therefore could not be sued in Montana courts unless "consent" to Montana suits could be implied. The Court found the circumstances under which the insurance transactions took place insufficient to support such an implication. But where business activities reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state, courts need not resort to a fictional "consent" in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the latter state. And in considering what constitutes "doing business" sufficiently to justify regulation in the state where the effects of the "business" are felt, the narrow grounds relied on by the Court in the Benn case cannot be deemed controlling. In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 62, we recognized that a state has a legitimate interest in all insurance policies protecting its residents against risks, an interest which the state can protect even though the "state action may have repercussions beyond state lines. . . ." And in Hoope Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. ston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313, 316, we rejected the contention, based on the Benn case among others, that a state's power to regulate must be determined by a “conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting or of performance." Instead we accorded "great weight" to the "consequences" of the contractual obligations in the state where the insured resided and the "degree of interest" that state had in seeing that those obligations were faithfully carried out. And in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316, this Court, after reviewing past cases, concluded: "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Measured by the principles of the Osborn, Hoopeston and International Shoe cases, the contacts and ties of appellants with Virginia residents, together with that state's interest in faithful observance of the certificate obligations, justify subjecting appellants to cease and desist proceedings under § 6. The Association did not engage in mere isolated or short-lived transactions. Its insurance certificates, systematically and widely delivered in Virginia following solicitation based on recommendations of Virginians, create continuing obligations between the Association and each of the many certificate holders in the state. Appellants have caused claims for losses to be investigated and the Virginia courts were available to them in seeking to enforce obligations created by the group of certificates. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 320. Moreover, if Virginia is without power to require this Association to accept service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the only forum for injured certificate holders might be Nebraska. Health benefit 643 Opinion of the Court. claims are seldom so large that Virginia policyholders could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit. In addition, suits on alleged losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia where witnesses would most likely live and where claims for losses would presumably be investigated. Such factors have been given great weight in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 508. And prior decisions of this Court have referred to the unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting policyholders to seek redress only in some distant state where the insurer is incorporated.3 The Due Process Clause does not forbid a state to protect its citizens from such injustice. There is, of course, one method by which claimants could recover from appellants in Virginia courts without the aid of substituted service of process: certificate holders in Virginia could all be garnished to the extent of their obligations to the Association. See Huron Corp. v. Lincoln Co., 312 U. S. 183, 193. While such an indirect procedure would undeniably be more troublesome to claimants than the plan adopted by the state in its "Blue Sky Law," it would clearly be even more harassing to the Association and its Virginia members. Metaphysical concepts of "implied consent" and "presence" in a state should not be solidified into a constitutional barrier against Virginia's simple, direct and fair plan for service of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth. We hold that Virginia's subjection of this Association to the jurisdiction of that State's Corporation Commission in a § 6 proceeding is consistent with "fair play and substantial justice," and is not offensive to the Due Process Clause. 3 Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, 418, 419; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 619; cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 319. Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. Appellants also contend that § 6 as here applied violates due process because the Commission order attempts to "destroy or impair" their right to make contracts in Nebraska with Virginia residents. Insofar as this contention can be raised in a special appearance merely to contest jurisdiction, it is essentially the same as the due process issue discussed above. For reasons just given, Virginia has power to subject Travelers to the jurisdiction of its Corporation Commission, and its cease and desist provisions designed to accomplish this purpose "can not be attacked merely because they affect business activities which are carried on outside the state." Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, supra, 320–321. See also Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53, 62. These two opinions make clear that Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, requires no different result. Appellants concede that in the Osborn and Hoopeston cases we sustained state laws providing protective standards for policyholders in those states, even though compliance with those standards by the insurance companies could have repercussions on similar out-of-state contracts. It is argued, however, that those cases are distinguishable because they both involved companies which were “licensed to do business in the state of the forum and were actually doing business within the state . . . ." But while Hoopeston Canning Co. had done business in New York under an old law, it brought the case here to challenge certain provisions of a new licensing law with which it had to comply if it was to do business there in the future. Thus it was seeking the same kind of relief that appellants seek here, and for the same general purpose. What we there said as to New York's power is equally applicable to Virginia's power here. It is also suggested that service of process on appellants by registered mail does not meet due process require |