14. MFunds allocated for road use.. Invalid, because formula bore

15. AStatutory declaration without

no reasonable relation to road use.

Valid.

allocation of funds.

s was upon the statute as a whole, not on the specific amount was introduced as to such amount.

874433 0-50

Syllabus.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. MEXIA TEXTILE MILLS, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 434. Argued April 18, 1950.-Decided May 15, 1950.

After a hearing from which the employer withdrew without introducing any evidence, the National Labor Relations Board issued an order requiring the employer, who was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, to cease and desist from certain unfair labor practices. Subsequently, the Board petitioned the Court of Appeals for enforcement of this order. The employer moved for leave to adduce additional evidence, alleging in substance that it had complied with the order and that the union which had been certified by the Board as bargaining representative no longer represented a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. The Court of Appeals ordered the case referred back to the Board with directions to take evidence and report whether the order had been complied with; if so, whether the matter should not be dismissed as moot; and, if not, what recommendations the Board had to make. Held: The order of the Court of Appeals is vacated and enforcement of the Board's order must be decreed under § 10 (e), unless "extraordinary circumstances" are pleaded which justify the employer's failure to urge its objections before the Board. Pp. 564–570.

(a) An employer's compliance with an order of the Board does not render the cause moot nor deprive the Board of its opportunity to secure enforcement from an appropriate court, since a Board order imposes a continuing obligation and the Board is entitled to have a resumption of the unfair practice barred by an enforcement decree. Pp. 567–568.

(b) That the employer doubts the certified union's ability to muster a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit does not justify denial of an enforcement decree. P. 568.

(c) Although a motion for leave to adduce additional evidence pursuant to § 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act is "addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court," the power of the court to order the taking of additional evidence cannot be employed to enlarge the statutory scope of judicial review. Pp. 569-570.

Order vacated.

Opinion of the Court.

339 U.S.

The case is stated in the opinion. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported in 25 L. R. R. M. 2295. The order of the Court of Appeals is vacated, p. 570.

A. Norman Somers argued the cause for petitioner. Solicitor General Perlman, Robert N. Denham, David P. Findling and Mozart G. Ratner filed a brief for petitioner. John M. Scott argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a proceeding brought by the National Labor Relations Board charging unfair labor practices of the respondent, Mexia Textile Mills, a manufacturer of cotton goods at Mexia, Texas, engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.2 On the Board's petition for enforcement of its cease and desist order, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit referred the case back to the Board with directions to take evidence and report whether the order had been complied with by the respondent; if so, whether the matter should not be dismissed as moot; and, if not, what recommendations the Board had to make. We granted certiorari upon the claim that the effect of the order of the Court of Appeals was at variance with previous decisions of this Court. 338 U. S. 909 (1950).

The pertinent facts are these. In November 1944, the Board conducted an election at the respondent's plant, in which the Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. O., received an overwhelming majority. The Board thereupon certified that Union as the exclusive representative

1 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.

261 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 141 et seq.

3146 of the 164 valid votes were cast in favor of the union, of the approximately 186 eligible voters.

563

Opinion of the Court.

of those production and maintenance employees who constituted the appropriate bargaining unit designated by the Board. In January 1947 the Union filed a charge with the Board complaining that respondent had refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union and was thus guilty of unfair labor practices within the meaning of §§ 8 (1) and 8 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board issued its complaint pursuant to those charges in June 1947. Respondent, in answer, admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act, denied the charges contained in the complaint, and alleged, inter alia, that the Union no longer represented a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, though the number of employees who had withdrawn was unknown to respondent. A hearing was held before a trial examiner in August 1947. The Trial Examiner denied respondent's motions for a more definite statement of the complaint, and for an order permitting the inspection and copying of certain evidence. Respondent's counsel thereupon withdrew from the hearing and took no further part therein.

In December 1947 the Trial Examiner issued his report. He concluded that "From the evidence, it is apparent that, although the respondent conferred with the Union on possible contract provisions, it did not bargain in good faith and had no intention of doing so." The failure to bargain was manifest from evidence of incidents taking place from the time of the certification of the Union until a month before its complaint was filed. Unilateral wage increases and respondent's efforts to shunt the Union representatives from one company official to another in search of the final authority in wage and contract negotiations these and other findings led the Examiner to conclude that "an unmistakeable effort to escape genuine collective bargaining" was demonstrated. Further, the Examiner determined, there was no merit in the respond