532 Opinion of the Court. The public policy of Washington relied upon by the courts below to sustain this injunction is an important and widely accepted one. The broad purpose of the Act from which this policy flows was to prevent unreasonable judicial interference with legitimate objectives of workers. But abuse by workers or organizations of workers of the declared public policy of such an Act is no more to be condoned than violation of prohibitions against judicial interference with certain activities of workers. We therefore find no unwarranted restraint of picketing here. The injunction granted was tailored to prevent a specific violation of an important state law. The decree was limited to the wrong being perpetrated, namely, "an abusive exercise of the right to picket." Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. at 295. The judgment is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK is of the opinion that this case is controlled by the principles announced in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, and therefore concurs in the Court's judgment. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. CAPITOL GREYHOUND LINES ET AL. v. BRICE, COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND. No. 118. Argued December 5, 1949. Decided May 15, 1950. Section 25A of Art. 661⁄2 of Maryland Annotated Code (1947 Cum. Supp.) imposes a tax of 2% of the fair market value of motor vehicles as a condition precedent to the issuance of certificates of title thereto and to the operation of the vehicles over Maryland roads. This tax is applied indiscriminately to interstate and intrastate common carriers transporting passengers over Maryland roads and the proceeds are used wholly for road purposes. For the privilege of using its roads Maryland also charges common carriers a mileage tax for each passenger seat of 1/30 of a cent per mile traveled on Maryland roads. Held: 1. As applied generally to interstate carriers transporting passengers over Maryland roads, the title tax of 2% of fair market value does not violate the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Pp. 543-548. (a) Such a tax must be judged by its result, not by its formula, and must stand unless proven to be in excess of fair compensation for the privilege of using the roads. Pp. 544-547. (b) The title tax is not invalid on the ground that it varies for each carrier without relation to road use. Pp. 545–546. (c) If a new rule prohibiting taxes on interstate carriers measured by vehicle value is to be declared, it should be declared by Congress, not by this Court. Pp. 547-548. 2. The record in this case is insufficient to invalidate the tax, as applied to appellants, on the ground that the taxes actually levied are in excess of a fair compensation for the privilege of using Maryland roads. P. 548. Md. - 64 A. 2d 284, affirmed. The case is stated in the first two paragraphs of the opinion. The judgment below is affirmed, p. 548. Clarence W. Miles argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Benjamin C. Howard. 542 Opinion of the Court. Hall Hammond, Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Ward B. Coe, Jr., Assistant Attorney General. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. The basic question presented is whether one of two Maryland taxes imposed on all common carriers transporting passengers over Maryland roads can be exacted from interstate carriers consistently with the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. A subsidiary contention impliedly raised by carrier appellants here is that the tax is invalid as applied to them. The Supreme Court of Maryland upheld the tax, Md., 64 A. 2d 284. The case is here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). The tax challenged by appellants is prescribed by § 25A of Art. 66% of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 1947 Cum. Supp. In the language of appellants that section imposes "a tax of 2% upon the fair market value of motor vehicles used in interstate commerce as a condition precedent to the issuance of certificates of title thereto (the issuance of such certificates being a further condition precedent to the registration and operation of such vehicles in the State of Maryland) . . . First. Appellants do not contend that as interstate carriers they are wholly exempt from state taxation. This Court and others have consistently upheld taxes on inter 1 1 Maryland also imposes a tax for each passenger seat of onethirtieth of a cent per mile traveled on Maryland roads. Maryland Ann. Code (1947 Cum. Supp.), Art. 81, § 218. Prior to 1947 the mileage tax applied both to interstate and intrastate carriers; the 2% "titling tax" here challenged applied to intrastate carriers only. At that time the state legislature made significant changes. It made the titling tax applicable to interstate as well as to intrastate carriers and reduced the seat-mile tax from one-eighteenth cent to one-thirtieth cent. Chapters 560 and 326, 1947 Laws of the General Assembly of Maryland. 874433 0-50- -39 339 U.S. Opinion of the Court. state carriers to compensate a state fairly for the privilege of using its roads or for the cost of administering state traffic regulations. Courts have invoked the commerce clause to invalidate state taxes on interstate carriers only upon finding that: (1) the tax discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce; (2) the tax was imposed on the privilege of doing an interstate business as distinguished from a tax exacting contributions for road construction and maintenance or for administration of road laws; or (3) the amount of the tax exceeded fair compensation to the state. This Maryland tax applies to interstate and intrastate commerce without discrimination. The tax proceeds are used by Maryland wholly for road purposes, and the State Supreme Court held that the tax was imposed for the privilege of road use. And neither in the Maryland courts nor here have appellants specifically charged that the amount of taxes imposed on carriers will always be in excess of fair compensation. Their challenge is leveled against the formula, not the amount. The taxes upheld have taken many forms. Examples are taxes based on mileage, chassis weight, tonnagecapacity, or horsepower, singly or in combination—a list which does not begin to exhaust the innumerable factors bearing on the fairness of compensation by each carrier to a state. The difficulty in gearing taxes to these factors was recognized by this Court as early as Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 168, where it said that so long as fees are reasonable in amount "it is clearly within the discretion of the State to determine whether the compen 2 See cases collected in Notes, 75 L. Ed. 953 and 92 L. Ed. 109. * Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163; Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183; Ingels v. Morf, 300 U. S. 290. And see case collections cited in note 2, supra. 'For examples of the many factors on which taxes have been hinged, Note, 92 L. Ed. 109, 119–123. 542 Opinion of the Court. sation for the use of its highways by automobiles shall be determined by way of a fee, payable annually or semiannually, or by a toll based on mileage or otherwise."5 Later, in rejecting contentions that the validity of taxes must be determined by formula rather than result, the Court held that a flat fee on the privilege of using state highways "is not a forbidden burden on interstate commerce" unless "unreasonable in amount." Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407, 412. See also Aero Transit Co. v. Comm'rs, 332 U. S. 495, and annotation thereto, 92 L. Ed. 109, 119-120. Yet clearly a flat fee is not geared to mileage, weight or any other factor relevant in considering the fairness of compensation for road use. Thus, unless we are to depart from prior decisions, the Maryland tax based on the cost of the vehicles should be judged by its result, not its formula, and must stand unless proven to be unreasonable in amount for the privilege granted. Appellants, however, in effect urge that we make an exception to the general rule and strike down this tax formula regardless of whether the amount of the tax is within the limits of fair compensation. No tax precisely like this has previously been before us. Appellants argue that a tax on vehicle value should be forbidden by the commerce clause because it varies for each carrier without relation to road use. In support of this contention, they point to the facts shown in this record. Each of the appellant carriers, according to admitted al 5 This statement was made in a case where flat license fees were based on a vehicle's rated horsepower. In that case the person held liable for the state tax was a nonresident driving through the state. By citation of this case we do not mean to imply that the constitutional rule relating to a state's power to collect for the use of its roads by occasional travelers is as broad as where road use by carriers is involved. See Aero Transit Co. v. Comm'rs, 332 U. S. 495, 503. See also the opinions in Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160. |