497 Opinion of the Court. Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657, 669–670. The Government's munitions plants provided an appropriate place for the beneficial application of the Act's standards of working conditions without danger of reduced employment through loss of business. This Act would fail materially in its purpose if it did not reach the producers of the tremendous volume of wartime goods destined for interstate transportation. In 1941-1945 the manufacture of munitions was a major source of employment. Wages and hours in that industry were a major factor in fixing the living standards of American labor. 19 13 A. The "transportation" of munitions of the United States to destinations outside of the state of their production is "commerce" within the meaning of the Act. The Act applies to "employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.' The precise question here is whether the munitions were produced for "commerce" when such production was for transportation outside of the state and for use by the United States in the prosecution of war, but not for sale or exchange. Section 3 (b) of the Act contains the following definition of "commerce": "(b) 'Commerce' means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof." (Emphasis supplied.) 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 203 (b). 13 "SEC. 6. (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce [certain minimum wages] . . . . "SEC. 7. (a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce [longer than certain maximum hours] . . . ." 52 Stat. 1062, 1063, 29 U. S. C. §§ 206 (a) and 207 (a). 874433 0-50-37 Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. This definition is an exercise by Congress of its constitutional power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, . . . U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3. Such power has been held repeatedly to include the power to regulate interstate shipments or transportation as such, and not merely to regulate shipments or transportation of articles that are intended for sale, exchange or other trading activities.1 Congress could have expressly exempted from the Act employees engaged in producing goods for interstate transportation not leading to a sale or exchange. Congress also could have exempted employees engaged in producing munitions for use by the United States in war, rather than for sale or exchange by it. Congress might even have exempted all employees producing goods in any Government-owned plants. However, Congress stated no such exemptions. On the contrary, Congress included, by express definition of terms, employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate transportation. In view of these considerations, we find no merit in an interpretation of the Act which would exclude from its coverage those employees who were engaged in the production of munitions for interstate transportation for use or consumption, as distinguished from transportation of them for sale or exchange. B. The munitions produced were "goods" within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The respondents argue that, even though the munitions were produced for commerce, they were not "goods" within the meaning of the Act. Section 3 (i) defines "Goods" as follows: 14 E. g., Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160; Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124; Thornton v. United States, 271 U. S. 414; Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432; United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470. See also, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533, 549; Bell v. Porter, 159 F. 2d 117, 118-119 (C. A. 7th Cir.). 497 Opinion of the Court. "(i) 'Goods' means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof, but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof." (Emphasis supplied.) 52 Stat. 1061, 29 U. S. C. § 203 (i). Respondents claim that this language excludes the petitioners from the coverage of the Act because the petitioners were engaged in producing munitions which thereafter, and prior to their interstate transportation, were to be delivered to the United States as the ultimate consumer. This interpretation would deprive the original jurisdictional fact-that at the time the munitions were produced they were intended for interstate transportation of its covering effect merely because those munitions, upon a later delivery to the United States, would then cease to be "goods" within the meaning of the Act. We believe that the crucial fact which establishes the coverage of the Act is the status of the munitions, as "goods," during the time they were being produced. The literal meaning of the exclusionary clause in § 3 (i), and that which best serves the purposes of the Act, is merely that, after the products shall have been delivered into the actual physical possession of their ultimate consumer, they then shall cease to be "goods." This retains the important effect that, thereafter, it is not a violation of § 15 (a) (1)15 for the ultimate consumer to transport the 15 "SEC. 15. (a) . . . it shall be unlawful for any person— "(1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the kig geen vu viltuly via any of the pro*ache Ten i mal upon curvrou teme ve sutyen & ine v vr not "ua § VII. vampsmer for nor MACE TULI UT WI 20 Bran 1066 1982 2120 2 ant & * Juvegane of the question we to win & the utmate consumer. wowever, a a our opetuon that the en propres of the contamer mass* Bre butyan to the bet The farm that procurte jose ther MATA DE KOE VII Trg some its the actual prystal possesBOL of Tyr W ́tuk counter de son fem the coverage of the wat we fer be the magiojma produeną the procurte are eodisered. A se førte at the time that the produrra are being proceed determine WAY 25, Myaya angged in the produce of gods for comBANK BUG It te tine d the procentio of the containers they were cauty qora wi'LL 'te Bezling of the watite shoe they were not, * Must post de que, a the net la physal poseson of the ultimate h.. that the term goode quoted above is intended to WAAAMUJALAN, WE NA protect whmate consumers, other than producers, than dan jene, or processore of the goods in question from the hot yoodać proveon of section 15 (a) (1). This seems clear from the Jang jage of the statute. But Congress clearly did not intend to permit an employer to avoid the minimum wage and maximum hours standarde of the act by making delivery within the State into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer who transports or slupes the goods outside the State. Thus, it is our opinion that employees engaged in building a boat for delivery to the purchaser at the boatyard are within the coverage of the act if the employer, at the time the boat is being built, intends, hopes, or has reason to believe that the purchaser will sail it outside the State." 29 C. F. R. $ 776.7 (h). 497 Opinion of the Court. session of the United States as their ultimate consumer, before their subsequent interstate shipment, does not deprive the employees who produced the munitions of the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is not material whether such interstate transportation was to take place before or after the delivery of the munitions. to the United States. In either event, the employees were engaged in the production of "goods" for "commerce." To hold otherwise would restrict the Act not only arbitrarily but also inconsistently with its broad purposes. III. THE WALSH-HEALEY ACT AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. 17 The Walsh-Healey Act was adopted about one year after the National Industrial Recovery Act " had been declared unconstitutional. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495. Seeking then to regulate wages and hours of employees, the Walsh-Healey Act kept within a narrow field of assured constitutionality. It prescribed that, in Government contracts for the manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles and equipment in any amount exceeding $10,000, the contractor pay its employees not less than the minimum wages determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar work in the locality. It prescribed also that no such employees be permitted to work in excess of eight hours in any one day or in excess of 40 hours in any one week,' 17 48 Stat. 195. 18 18 This clause was amended in 1942 by adding the following: "Provided, That the provisions of this subsection [c] shall not apply to any employer who shall have entered into an agreement with his employees pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 1 or 2 of subsection (b) of section 7 of an Act entitled 'Fair Labor Standards Act |