The inding of the Cure Cour that the National Assoetazon ↑ Real Estate Barts and to perinya me prster tid for n fart conspire #ra the Washington Boart to ix and presence the Fares of ommision to be "harged by mencers of the arer s distained, ones I was not "eat" emneous' rain the meaning if Rule 52 of the Feteru Rules of Gri Prestre Pp. 44ICK. 24 7 Supp 462 afirmed a par and revered ʼn car. In a civil alt in a federal district court to enjoin a conspiracy to fx rates of commissions of real estate brokers in the District of Columbia m viciation of $3 of the Sherman Act, judgment was entered for defendants. 94 F. Supp. 902. On appeal to this Court, afirmed in part and reversed in part. p. 46. The Assistant to the Attorney General Ford and Victor H. Kramer argued the cause for the United States. With them on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Bergaon, Herbert N. Maletz and J. Roger Wollenberg. Roger J. Whiteford argued the cause for the National Association of Real Estate Boards et al., appellees. With him on the brief was John J. Wilson. William E. Leahy argued the cause for the Washington Real Estate Board et al., appellees. With him on the brief was William J. Hughes, Jr. 485 Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a civil action brought by the United States to enjoin appellees' from engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of § 3 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 3. The core of the case is the charge that the members of the Washington Real Estate Board combined and conspired to fix the commission rates for their services when acting as brokers in the sale, exchange, lease and management of real property in the District of Columbia. The same conspiracy was charged in a criminal proceeding. The criminal case was tried first. At the end of the Government's case the court granted the defendants' motion for a judgment of acquittal. 80 F. Supp. 350. Appellees then moved for summary judgment in this civil suit, contending that the judgment of acquittal in the criminal case is res judicata here. That motion was denied." 1 National Association of Real Estate Boards, a nation-wide incorporated trade association; Herbert U. Nelson, its executive vicepresident; Washington Real Estate Board, an incorporated association of real estate brokers in Washington, D. C.; and 15 of its members individually and as representatives of a class consisting of all members of the Washington Board. 2 "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared illegal." 3 The indictment was returned against the Washington Real Estate Board and the National Association of Real Estate Boards. 4 An appeal from that order was dismissed. 85 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 176 F. 2d 631. Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. The civil case was then tried. It was stipulated that the trial would be on the record in the criminal case. the United States reserving the right to offer additional exhibits. No evidence was offered by appellees. The court entered judgment for the appellees, holding that the agreement to fix the rates of brokerage commissions, which had been shown, was not a violation of the Act. 84 F. Supp. 802. The case is here on appeal. 32 Stat. 823, 62 Stat. 989, 15 U. S. C. § 29. First. The fact that no interstate commerce is involved is not a barrier to this suit. Section 3 of the Sherman Act is not leveled at interstate activities alone. It also puts beyond the pale certain conduct purely local in character and confined to the District of Columbia. That Congress has the power so to legislate for the District by virtue of Art. I. § 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution and did so by $3 was settled by Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 432–435. Second. The Washington Board has adopted standard rates of commissions for its members-charges which cover the wide range of services furnished by a real estate agent. The Board's code of ethics provides that "Brokers should maintain the standard rates of commission adopted by the board and no business should be solicited at lower rates." Members agree to abide by this code. The prescribed rates are used in the great majority of transactions, although in exceptional situations a lower charge is made. But departure from the prescribed rates has not caused the Washington Board to invoke any sanctions. Hence the District Court called the rate schedules "non-mandatory." Enough has been said to show that under our decisions an illegal price-fixing scheme has been proved, unless the * See note 2, supra. 485 Opinion of the Court. fixing of real estate commissions is not included in the prohibitions of § 3 of the Act. Price-fixing is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade. It is not for the courts to determine whether in particular settings price-fixing serves an honorable or worthy end. An agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed to serve. That is the teaching of an unbroken line of decisions. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 218 et seq.; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 142, 143. And the fact that no penalties are imposed for deviations from the price schedules is not material. See Eastern States Lumber Assn. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 608609; American Column Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 411; Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific Paper Assn., 273 U. S. 52, 62. Subtle influences may be just as effective as the threat or use of formal sanctions to hold people in line. Third. The critical question is whether the business of a real estate agent is included in the word "trade" within the meaning of § 3 of the Act. The District Court thought not. It was of the view that where personal services are involved, a combination to fix the price or compensation is legal. It seemingly was influenced by the declaration in § 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 17, that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce . . . nor shall such [labor] organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws." But we think it a misconception to assimilate the services involved here to those of employees or to compare the present case to those involving the application of the Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. antitrust laws to labor unions. Cf. Aper Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219. We do not have here any more than we did in American Medical Assn. v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, or United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U. S. 460, cf. Columbia River Packers Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 143, an aspect of the employeeemployer relationship to which the antitrust laws have made special concessions. Members of the Washington Board are entrepreneurs. Some are individual proprietors; others are banks or corporations. Some may have no employees; others have large staffs. But each is in business on his own. The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services rather than commodities does not take it out of the category of "trade" within the meaning of § 3 of the Act. The Act was aimed at combinations organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition "in the marketing of goods and services." See Aper Hosiery Co. v. Leader, supra, p. 493. Justice Story in The Nymph, 18 Fed. Cas. 506, while construing the word "trade" in the Coasting and Fishery Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 305, said, "The argument for the claimant insists, that 'trade' is here used in its most restrictive sense, and as equivalent to traffic in goods, or buying and selling in commerce or exchange. But I am clearly of opinion, that such is not the true sense of the word, as used in the 32d section. In the first place, the word 'trade' is often, and indeed generally, used in a broader sense, as equivalent to occupation, employment, or business, whether manual or mercantile. Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, |