382 Opinion of the Court. ute for that of Congress. Cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra at 95, 102. In Bridges v. California, supra, we said that even restrictions on particular kinds of utterances, if enacted by a legislature after appraisal of the need, come to this Court "encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation." 314 U. S. at 261. Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925). The deference due legislative determination of the need for restriction upon particular forms of conduct has found repeated expression in this Court's opinions. When compared with ordinances and regulations dealing with littering of the streets or disturbance of householders by itinerant preachers, the relative significance and complexity of the problem of political strikes and how to deal with their leaders becomes at once apparent. It must be remembered that § 9 (h) is not an isolated statute dealing with a subject divorced from the problems of labor peace generally. It is a part of some very complex machinery set up by the Federal Government for the purpose of encouraging the peaceful settlement of labor disputes. Under the statutory scheme, unions which become collective bargaining representatives for groups of employees often represent not only members of the union but nonunion workers or members of other unions as well. Because of the necessity to have strong unions to bargain on equal terms with strong employers, individual employees are required by law to sacrifice rights which, in some cases, are valuable to them. See J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332 (1944). The loss of individual rights for the greater benefit of the group results in a tremendous increase in the power of the representative of the group the union. But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself. Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. See Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U. S. 232 (1949); Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248, 255 (1944); Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 94 (1945). We do not suggest that labor unions which utilize the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board become Government agencies or may be regulated as such. But it is plain that when Congress clothes the bargaining representative "with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents," 15 the public interest in the good faith exercise of that power is very great. What of the effects of § 9 (h) upon the rights of speech and assembly of those proscribed by its terms? The statute does not prevent or punish by criminal sanctions the making of a speech, the affiliation with any organization, or the holding of any belief. But as we have noted, the fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not determine the free speech question. Under some circumstances, indirect "discouragements" undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes. A requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature. But we have here no statute which is either frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas 16 nor one 15 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 202 (1944). 16 Cf. cases cited in note 9, supra, and Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937). 382 17 Opinion of the Court. which, although ostensibly aimed at the regulation of conduct, may actually "be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views." Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 516 (1939). There are here involved none of the elements of censorship or prohibition of the dissemination of information that were present in the cases mainly relied upon by those attacking the statute.18 The "discouragements" of § 9 (h) proceed, not against the groups or beliefs identified therein, but only against the combination of 17 Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). 18 In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941), Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated the considerations thought controlling in a number of these cases: "In Lovell v. Griffin, [303 U. S. 444], the ordinance prohibited the distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit from the city manager, thus striking at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, [307 U. S. 496], the ordinance dealt with the exercise of the right of assembly for the purpose of communicating views; it did not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets the standard of official action but enabled the local official absolutely to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal would prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' The ordinance thus created, as the record disclosed, an instrument of arbitrary suppression of opinions on public questions. The court said that 'uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right.' In Schneider v. State, [308 U. S. 147] (p. 163) the ordinance was directed at canvassing and banned unlicensed communication of any views, or the advocacy of any cause, from door to door, subject only to the power of a police officer to determine as a censor what literature might be distributed and who might distribute it. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, [310 U. S. 296] (p. 305) the statute dealt with the solicitation of funds for religious causes and authorized an official to determine whether the cause was a religious one and to refuse a permit if he determined it was not, thus establishing a censorship of religion." 312 U. S. at 577-578. Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. those affiliations or beliefs with occupancy of a position of great power over the economy of the country. Congress has concluded that substantial harm, in the form of direct. positive action, may be expected from that combination. In this legislation, Congress did not restrain the activities of the Communist Party as a political organization; nor did it attempt to stifle beliefs. Compare West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), Section 9 (h) touches only a relative handful of persons, leaving the great majority of persons of the identified affiliations and beliefs completely free from restraint. And it leaves those few who are affected free to maintain their affiliations and beliefs subject only to possible loss of positions which Congress has concluded are being abused to the injury of the public by members of the described groups. We have previously had occasion to consider other statutes and regulations in which the interests involved were, in large measure. like those now being considered. In Unted Public Workers v. Mitchell, supe, we upheld 382 Opinion of the Court. a statute which provided that employees of the Federal Government could not participate in partisan political activities, concededly a First Amendment right, if they would retain their positions. The decision was not put upon the ground that government employment is a privilege to be conferred or withheld at will. For it was recognized that Congress may not "enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work." 330 U. S. at 100. But the rational connection between the prohibitions of the statute and its objects, the limited scope of the abridgment of First Amendment rights, and the large public interest in the efficiency of government service, which Congress had found necessitated the statute, led us to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with the First Amendment. Similarly, in In re Summers, supra, we upheld the refusal of a state supreme court to admit to membership of its bar an otherwise qualified person on the sole ground that he had conscientious scruples against war and would not use force to prevent wrong under any circumstances. Since he could not, so the justices of the state court found, swear in good faith to uphold the state constitution, which requires service in the militia in time of war, we held that refusal to permit him to practice law did not violate the First Amendment, as its commands are incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, the relation between the obligations of membership in the bar and service required by the state in time of war, the limited effect of the state's holding upon speech and assembly, and the strong interest which every state court has in the persons who become officers of the court were thought sufficient to justify the state action. See also Hamilton v. Regents, supra. |