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FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting-Appendix.

339 U.S.

458. See also N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.

§§ 122-84. 122-85 (Supp. 1949). (13) South Carolina. See State v. Bethune, 88 S. C. 401, 71 S. E. 29. See also S. C. Code Ann. § 6239 (1942).

(14) Tennessee. See Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 90-91, 135 S. W. 327, 329-30; Bonds v. State, 8 Tenn. 142. See also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4476, 4502 (Williams 1934).

(15) Washington. See State v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 403, 58 P. 248; Grossi v. Long, 136 Wash. 133, 238 P. 983; State ex rel. Alfani v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 125, 245 P. 929; State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108 P. 2d 641, 650-51.

C. States suspending execution of death penalty under statutory provisions for hearing before judge or jury upon initiation by designated prison or police official: I. Official's refusal to initiate subject to judicial review:

(16) Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41–109, 43-2622 (1947). See Howell v. Kincannon, 181 Ark. 58, 24 S. W. 2d 953; Howell v. Todhunter, 181 Ark. 250, 25 S. W. 2d 21; Shank v. Todhunter, 189 Ark. 881, 75 S. W. 2d 382.

*See note 4 supra. Most of the States in Parts C and D require the official responsible for initiating the further inquiry to act if there is "good reason," or a like ground, for believing that the convicted man is insane. In some of these States the relevant statute provides that the official "may" act where "good reason" exists, thereby raising the familiar problem as to when "may," considering its function, means "must" in legislative English. Compare Howell v. Todhunter, 181 Ark. 250, 25 S. W. 2d 21.

9

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting-Appendix.

(17) Cal. Pen. Code §§ 1367, 3701-03 (1949). See Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 208 P. 2d 668.

II. Whether official's refusal to initiate inquiry is subject to review undefined by legislation or adjudication:

(18) Idaho Code Ann. §§ 19-2709 to 192712, 19-3301 (1948).

(19) Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.240 (1948). See Ky. Codes, Crim. Prac. §§ 295-96 (1948); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 153, 259 S. W. 25; Stucker v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 618, 88 S. W. 2d 280; Murrell v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 65, 163 S. W. 2d 1.

(20) Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 4192-94 (1939).

(21) Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 94-8009 to 94-8012 (1947).

(22) Nev. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 11192.01 to 11192.06 (Supp. 1945).

(23) N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-1404 to 421407 (1941).

(24) Ohio Gen. Code Ann. §§ 13456-8,
13456-9 (1939).

(25) Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1005-08
(1937). See Bingham v. State, 82
Okla. Crim. 305, 169 P. 2d 311.
(26) Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 48 (Supp.
1948). See Commonwealth v. Barnes,
280 Pa. 351, 124 A. 636 (whether stat-
ute applies after conviction and sen-
tence or whether common law princi-
ciples govern is not clear). But cf.
Ex parte McGinnis, 14 W. N. C. 221
(Pa. Sup. Ct.).

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting-Appendix.

339 U.S.

(27) Tex. Stat., Code Crim. Proc. arts.

921-27 (1948). See Dotson v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 434, 195 S. W. 2d 372. A hearing may also be initiated on the affidavits of two private physicians. Cf. Ex parte Millikin, 108 Tex. Crim. 121, 299 S. W. 433; Millikin v. Jeffrey, 117 Tex. 134, 299 S. W. 393 (similar earlier statute).

(28) Utah Code Ann. §§ 105-37-9 to 10537-12 (1943). See State ex rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P. 2d 408; State v. Green, 88 Utah 491, 55 P. 2d 1324.

(29) Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-1701, 10-1702 (1945).

III. Official's refusal to initiate given explicit finality without review:

None.

D. States suspending execution of death penalty under statutory provisions for inquiry by Governor or by a body of physicians and laymen on initiation by designated prison or police official:

I. Proceeding appears to afford opportunity to be heard:

(30) Iowa Code §§ 792.5 to 792.7 (1946).

II. Proceeding appears to be ex parte:

(31) Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8817 (1949).

(32) Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-2406

(1935).

(33) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2509 (1943).

See In re Grammer, 104 Neb. 744, 178
N. W. 624.

9

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting-Appendix.

III. Whether proceeding is ex parte or affords op

portunity to be heard is uncertain:

(34) Ariz. Code Ann. §§ 44-2307, 44-2309

(1939).

(35) Fla. Stat. § 922.07 (1941).

(36) Miss. Code Ann. § 2558 (1942).

E. States in which suspension of execution of death penalty because of insanity is at discretion of Governor: (37) Ga. Code Ann. §§ 27-2601, 27-2602

(1936), Solesbee v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 433.

(38) Indiana. Diamond v. State, 195 Ind. 285, 144 N. E. 466 (only remedy is reprieve by Governor).

(39) Mass. Gen. Laws c. 279, § 48 (1932), Juggins v. Executive Council, 257 Mass. 386, 154 N. E. 72 (only remedy seems to be reprieve by Governor with advice and consent of Executive Council).

F. States as to which legislation or judicial decisions afford no clear basis for classification:

874433 O-50-7

(40) Delaware. Compare Del. Rev. Code
§ 3083 (1935) (insanity after convic-
tion but before sentence in capital
cases); id. § 3084 (insanity while serv-
ing imprisonment sentence).
(41) Maryland. Compare Md. Ann. Code
Gen. Laws art. 27, § 798; art. 59, § 47
(1939) (insanity while serving im-
prisonment sentence).

(42) New Hampshire.

FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting-Appendix.

339 U.S.

(43) N. Y. Crim. Code § 495a. Compare 2 Rep. Atty. Gen. N. Y. 294, 297 (1914), with People v. Skwirsky, 213 N. Y. 151, 153–54, 107 N. E. 47-48. (44) Oregon. Compare Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 26-930, 26-931 (1940) (insanity at trial).

(45) South Dakota. Compare S. D. Code 34.2001 (1939) (a person cannot "be tried, adjudged to punishment, or punished for a public offense while he is insane"); id. §§ 34.2002 to 34.2004 (insanity after conviction but before sentence).

(46) Vermont.

(47) Virginia. Compare Va. Code Ann. §§ 19-208, 37-93 (1950) (insanity after conviction but before sentence); id. § 19-209 (insanity while serving imprisonment sentence).

(48) West Virginia. Compare W. Va. Code Ann. § 6198 (1949) (insanity after conviction or while serving sentence).

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