339 U.S. Opinion of the Court. spondent Southern Railway. A dispute arose between certain conductors and the railroad concerning the railroad's obligation under the collective-bargaining agreement to give conductors extra pay for certain services. The claims of the conductors were referred to the union, which sought by negotiation to persuade the railroad to pay. The railroad refused, and thereafter prayed a South Carolina state court for a declaratory judgment interpreting the agreement as not requiring the claimed payments. The trial court first refused to exercise jurisdiction. Citing Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, it held that state courts, like federal courts, should leave settlement of such disputes to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The State Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state court did have power to interpret the bargaining agreement and adjudicate the dispute. 210 S. C. 121, 41 S. E. 2d 774. After a lengthy trial the lower court held that the collective agreement did not require the compensation sought by the conductors and entered the declaratory judgment requested. The Supreme Court affirmed. 215 S. C. 280, 54 S. E. 2d 816. For reasons set out in the Slocum case, ante, p. 239, we hold that the South Carolina state court was without power to interpret the terms of this agreement and adjudicate the dispute. We discuss this case separately because it sharply points up the conflicts that could arise from state court intervention in railroad-union disputes. After the railroad had sued in the state court, the union filed a petition for hearing and award before the Adjustment Board. The state court nevertheless proceeded to adjudicate the dispute. Sustaining the state court's action would invite races of diligence whenever a carrier or union preferred one forum to the other. And if a carrier or a union could choose a court instead of the Board, the other party would be deprived of the privilege conferred by § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, 48 255 Opinion of the Court. Stat. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i), which provides that after negotiations have failed "either party" may refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board. The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE REED is of the view that the decision below should be affirmed for the reasons set out in his dissent in Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., ante, p. 245. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Syllabus. 339 U.S. MORFORD v. UNITED STATES. ON PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 236. Decided April 10, 1950. Petitioner, who is Executive Director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., was convicted in the District of Columbia of violating R. S. § 102, 2 U. S. C. § 192, by willfully refusing to produce certain documents before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives in compliance with a subpoena duly served upon him. On voir dire examination, counsel for petitioner was not permitted to question government employees on the jury panel with specific reference to the possible influence of Executive Order 9835, the so-called "Loyalty Order," on their ability to render a just and impartial verdict; and four government employees were permitted to serve on the jury over his objection. Held: The conviction is reversed because of this denial of an opportunity to prove actual bias on the part of the government employees who served on the jury. P. 259. 85 U. S. App. D. C. 172, 176 F. 2d 54, reversed. Petitioner, who is Executive Director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., was indicted in the District of Columbia for violating R. S. § 102, 2 U. S. C. § 192, by willfully refusing to produce certain documents before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives in compliance with the subpoena duly served upon him. Four government employees served on the jury over his objection, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 85 U. S. App. D. C. 172, 176 F. 2d 54. Certiorari granted and conviction reversed, p. 259. Abraham J. Isserman, David Rein and Joseph Forer for petitioner. 258 DOUGLAS, J., concurring. Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Campbell and Robert S. Erdahl for the United States. Briefs of amici curiae supporting petitioner were filed by William L. Standard for the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and for the Congress of American Women; Victor Rabinowitz, Nathan Witt and Leonard B. Boudin for the American Communications Association (CIO) et al.; Leo J. Linder for the Methodist Federation for Social Action; Lester M. Levin for the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions; and John J. Abt for the Progressive Party of America et al. PER CURIAM. In this case the trial court did not permit counsel for petitioner to interrogate prospective government employee jurors upon voir dire examination with specific reference to the possible influence of the "Loyalty Order," Executive Order No. 9835, on their ability to render a just and impartial verdict. Such questioning was permitted in Dennis v. United States, ante, p. 162; see n. 4 of the Court's opinion, ante, pp. 170-171. We said in Dennis that "Preservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury." Ante, pp. 171-172. Since that opportunity was denied in this case, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concur in the reversal for the reasons expressed in their opinions in Dennis v. United States, ante, p. 162. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS Concurs in the reversal of the judgment. Since, however, counsel requested that all DOUGLAS, J., concurring. 339 U.S. government employees be excluded from the jury in these cases, he thinks the request should have been granted for the reasons stated by the dissenting Justices in Frazier v. United States, 335 U. S. 497, and in Dennis v. United States, ante, p. 162. MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |