FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. 339 U.S. doctrine. In the present context of the Court's business in relation to these cases-their volume and the required knowledge of local law with which the local federal judges are much more familiar than we can possibly be-all considerations of policy urge against requiring certiorari to be filed and denied before the District Court may be allowed to exercise jurisdiction. The reasons underlying stare decisis are not applicable to such a procedural suggestion as Ex parte Hawk made regarding the requirement of petitioning this Court for certiorari before evoking the District Court's jurisdiction on habeas corpus. That suggestion never was translated into practice so far as the records of this Court disclose. What was specifically decided in Ex parte Hawk did become the practice of this Court-that is, petitions for leave to file a writ of habeas corpus in this Court under § 262 of the Judicial Code, now 28 U. S. C. § 1651, were thereafter denied. But no instance has been revealed in which this Court acted on the suggestion that exhaustion of State remedies includes denial of certiorari here. Apart from the fact that Wade v. Mayo displaced the inclusion of certiorari as part of the State remedies, it was recognized at the last term of Court that the scope of Ex parte Hawk was that it expressed the "doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies." Young v. Ragen, 337 U. S. 235, 238. 12. A final point remains and that is the suggestion that the provision of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code requires adherence to what was said in Ex parte Hawk about resort to certiorari. The Code provisions say no such thing nor do the Reviser's notes. Section 2254 of Title 28 merely formulates the judicial doctrine first announced by this Court in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241-the doctrine of exhaustion of State remedies: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears 200 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." Wade v. Mayo made it clear that certiorari is not a remedy "available in the courts of the State" and no claim is now made to the contrary. With that abandonment goes the uncritical inclusion by Ex parte Hawk of certiorari among the remedies of the State. Wade v. Mayo, to be sure, could not have been before the Congress, but the Reviser characterized § 2254 as "declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court," adding "See Ex parte Hawk." That decision is sound enough in its essential requirement for "exhaustion of State remedies." The slip in analysis it contained as to what are "State remedies" is surely not the equivalent of an enactment by Congress. A far more persuasive case for finding reenactment by Congress of a decision of this Court was rejected in Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61. 13. In short, the decision reached today has alternative consequences neither of which, I respectfully submit, can be justified. In barring a District Court from entertaining a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of a State prisoner prior to denial of certiorari here, the decision must mean either (1) that denial of a petition for certiorari in this class of cases, unlike denials in all other classes of cases, would serve the purpose of an adjudication on the merits, thereby carrying with it all the weight that an adjudication on the merits by this Court should carry with a District Court even in habeas corpus cases, or (2) that such a denial, as is true of denials in any other type of case, has no legal significance. FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. 339 U.S. The first alternative—that in habeas corpus cases denial of certiorari has the effect of a disposition on the meritswould require a complete change in our consideration of such petitions by this Court. They would have to be treated as we now treat cases in which a petition for certiorari is granted so as to be heard on the merits. This would cast a new burden upon the Court full of the direst consequences to the proper disposition of the rest of the business of the Court. In addition, if denial of certiorari as though on the merits but without full dress consideration would, for all effective purposes, preclude resort to the District Courts on a claim that State custody is in violation of the Constitution, it would judicially nullify the habeas corpus jurisdiction which was first given to the lower federal courts by the Act of February 5, 1867, and has ever since been retained. On the second alternative, i. c., that denial of certiorari in habeas corpus cases is like any other denial of certiorari, the Court would announce that a meaningless step in this Court is an indispensable preliminary to going to the local District Court. I agree with the opinion of Judge Phillips below that the case should be reversed and remanded to the District Court. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, being of the opinion that this is the better of the two unsatisfactory courses open to us, joins this opinion. Syllabus. SLOCUM, GENERAL CHAIRMAN, LACKAWANNA DIVISION NO. 30, ORDER OF RAILROAD TELEGRAPHERS, v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA & WESTERN RAILROAD CO. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. No. 391. Argued February 8, 1950.-Decided April 10, 1950. 1. A railroad had separate collective-bargaining agreements with two labor unions. A dispute arose between the two unions concerning the scope of their respective agreements, each claiming for its members certain jobs with the railroad. The claims were pursued in "the usual manner" under § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, without reaching an adjustment. Instead of invoking the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board, the railroad filed a declaratory judgment action in a state court, naming both unions as defendants. After a trial, the state court interpreted the agreements and entered a declaratory judgment. Held: Under § 3 of the Railway Labor Act, the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board to adjust grievances and disputes of the type here involved is exclusive, and the state court erred in interpreting the agreements and entering a declaratory judgment. Pp. 240-245. 2. The rationale of Order of Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, holding that federal courts should not interpret a carrier-union collective agreement prior to an interpretation of such agreement by the Adjustment Board, equally supports a denial of power to a state court to invade the jurisdiction conferred on the Adjustment Board by the Railway Labor Act. Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, distinguished. Pp. 243–245. 299 N. Y. 496, 87 N. E. 2d 532, reversed. A railroad brought a declaratory judgment action in a New York state court, naming as defendants two labor unions with which it had separate collective-bargaining agreements. The state court interpreted the agreements and entered a declaratory judgment, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, 274 App. Div. 950, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 513, and the Court of Appeals, 299 N. Y. 496, 87 N. E. 2d 532. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 890. Reversed and remanded, p. 245. 874433 0-50-20 Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. Leo J. Hassenauer and Manly Fleischmann argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Pierre W. Evans argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Rowland L. Davis, Jr. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act confers jurisdiction on the National Railroad Adjustment Board to hold hearings, make findings, and enter awards in all disputes between carriers and their employees "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . ." The question presented is whether state courts have power to adjudicate disputes involving such interpretations when the Adjustment Board has not acted. The respondent railroad has separate collective-bargaining agreements with the Order of Railroad Telegraphers and the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks. A dispute arose between the two unions concerning the scope of their respective agreements. Each claimed for its members certain jobs in the railroad yards at Elmira, New York. The railroad agreed with the Clerks Union. The chairman of Telegraphers protested, urging reassignment of the work to members of his union and claiming back pay on behalf of certain individual members. The claims were pursued in "the usual manner" required by $3 First (1) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (1), as a prerequisite to invoking jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board. That section further provides that, 148 Stat. 1185, 118-1193, 45 U. S. C. § 153. The full name of the latter union is Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees. *"The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carner or carers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, |