REIDER v. THOMPSON, TRUSTEE, MISSOURI CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 403. Argued February 7, 1950.-Decided March 13, 1950. Respondent railroad received goods at New Orleans, La., for transportation to Boston, Mass., by way of its line and connecting carriers, and issued its original through bill of lading for the shipment. Petitioner sued respondent for damages under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U. S. C. § 20 (11), alleging that petitioner was the lawful holder of the bill of lading and owner of the goods, that the shipment was in good order and condition when received by respondent at New Orleans, and that it arrived at Boston damaged. Held: 1. The Carmack Amendment was applicable to the shipment, and petitioner stated a claim against respondent upon which relief could be granted. Pp. 115-119. 2. The fact that the shipment originated in a foreign country, and that the goods were transported to New Orleans on an ocean bill of lading, did not render the Carmack Amendment inapplicable, since there was no through bill of lading from the foreign country to Boston and the foreign portion of the journey terminated at New Orleans. Pp. 117-119. 3. With respect to this transaction, respondent was the receiving carrier within the wording and meaning of the Carmack Amendment. P. 119. 176 F. 2d 13, reversed. Petitioner's suit against respondent for damages under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U. S. C. § 20 (11), was dismissed by the District Court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 176 F. 2d 13. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 890. Reversed, p. 119. Eberhard P. Deutsch argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Malcolm W. Monroe. Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. M. Truman Woodward, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas T. Railey, Fred G. Hudson, Jr., Robert E. Milling, Jr. and Elizabeth Ridnour Haak. MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether a claim for relief under the so-called Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act has been stated against respondent carrier. The District Court held that a claim within the Amendment had not been stated. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed by a divided court. 176 F. 2d 13. Because the case presents an issue of importance in the application of a federal statute governing liability of common carriers for damage to goods transported by them, we granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 890. The Carmack Amendment in pertinent part provides: "Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company subject to the provisions of this chapter receiving property for transportation from a point in one State or Territory or the District of Columbia to a point in another State, Territory, District of Columbia, or from any point in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign country shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading...." 34 Stat. 593, 595, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20 (11). Opinion of the Court. Respondent railroad received a shipment of wool and skins at New Orleans, Louisiana, for transportation to Boston, Massachusetts, by way of its line and connecting carriers, and issued its original through bill of lading for the shipment. Petitioner, who alleged that he was the lawful holder of the bill of lading and owner of the goods, sued respondent, as receiving carrier under the Carmack Amendment, for damages, asserting that the shipment was in good order and condition when received by respondent at New Orleans and was damaged on arrival in Boston. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim against respondent upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order granting this motion and dismissing the suit. It is not disputed that if these were all the facts in the case the courts below were in error. Clearly respondent is a common carrier subject to the Act, and a claim for relief against respondent, as receiving carrier, on account of damage to a shipment of goods moving from a point in one state to a point in another state was pleaded under the Carmack Amendment. See Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481. But from a stipulation filed in the District Court and considered with the pleadings, we learn that the shipment originated in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The goods were transported by steamship from there to New Orleans on an ocean bill of lading, freight for which was payable at Buenos Aires. What is stipulated to be an accurate English translation of the ocean bill of lading reads in part: "The SHIPPER, SHIP, CONSIGNEE, DESTINA- SHIPPER: Emilio Rosler S. R. L. PORT OF SHIPMENT: Buenos Aires SHIP: RIO Opinion of the Court. 339 U.S. PORT OF DISCHARGE OF THE SHIP New Orleans destination of the goods: (if the goods are to be transshipped out of the port of discharge) SHIPPER TO THE ORDER OF: The First National Bank of Boston Notice of arrival should be addressed to (if consigned to Shipper's Order) Rudolf Reider 39 South Street Boston Mass. U.S.A." The domestic bill of lading issued by respondent at New Orleans recited that the goods were received from H. P. Lambert Co. and consigned to the same H. P. Lambert Co. at Boston. The Court of Appeals characterized this railroad bill as a "supplemental bill of lading" issued by the domestic carrier to cover its portion of the transportation and delivery of a "through foreign shipment," and held that the Carmack Amendment was not intended to apply to such a foreign shipment. The tests laid down in United States v. Erie R. Co., 280 U. S. 98, and Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111, were applied by the Court of Appeals in determining that the transaction was a "through foreign shipment." And Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341, was relied on as authority for the proposition that the Carmack Amendment was not intended to apply to such a shipment. Reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. The issue in the Porter case, supra, was totally different from the question here. And whether the commerce is properly 1 The Court there briefly alluded to the coverage of the Carmack Amendment. But the sole issue in the Porter case was whether federal regulation of bills of lading had covered the field to the exclusion of state regulation of the same subject matter. The Court's discussion of the Carmack Amendment there does not control our decision in this case. 113 Opinion of the Court. characterized as foreign or domestic is, in our view of the case, not material. The issue is whether this transaction is within the Carmack Amendment. But basically, the problem here is one of liability. The contract giving rise to liability— the bill of lading—is our primary aid in solving that problem. So we turn to the contract to ascertain whether it evidences a transaction within the Carmack Amendment. Does the fact that the shipment in this case originated in a foreign country take it without the Carmack Amendment? We think not. There was no through bill of lading from Buenos Aires to Boston. The record does not show the slightest privity between respondent and the ocean carrier. The contract for ocean transportation terminated at New Orleans. Having terminated, nothing of it remained for the new, separate, and distinct domestic contract of carriage to "supplement." Even the parties to the ocean bill of lading and the domestic bill of lading were different. If the various parties dealing with this shipment separated the carriage into distinct portions by their contracts, it is not for courts judicially to meld the portions into something they are not. The test is not where the shipment originated, but where the obligation of the carrier as receiving carrier originated. Rice v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 33 Idaho 565, 198 P. 161; Barrett v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 29 Idaho 139, 157 P. 1016; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Montgomery & Co., 19 Ga. App. 29, 90 S. E. 740. Thus it is not significant that the shipment in this case originated in a foreign country, since the foreign portion of the journey terminated at the border of the United States. The obligation as receiving carrier originated when respondent issued its original through bill of lading at New Orleans. That contract of carriage was squarely within the provisions of the statute. The case of Alwine v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 141 Pa. Super. 558, 15 A. 2d 507, much relied upon by respondent |