the high seas which are not justified by the rules of international law or required under the principle of self-preservation."

The British replies were long and complicated, citing American trade statistics and alleging precedents established by Federal maritime operations in the Civil War.

March 30, 1915, a second American note answered many of these subtly-argued points and declared that a recent "Order in Council" constituted "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace."

A correspondence followed, marked by British communications still more complex than the early ones and extremely voluminous. President Wilson finally summed up the American contention in the following comprehensive note, answering British notes of January 7, February 10, June 22, July 23, July 31, August 2 and August 6, 1915.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, October 21, 1915.

To Ambassador W. H. Page (London):

I desire that you present a note to Sir Edward Grey in the sense of the following:

This Government has delayed answering the earlier of these notes in the hope that the announced purpose of His Majesty's Government "to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible consideration for the interest of neutrals" and their intention of "removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American cargoes" and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons engaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurances to the United States Government that they would make it their first aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "measures taken by the Allied Governments," would in practice not unjustifiably infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in trade and commerce. It is, therefore, a matter of regret that this hope has not been realized, but that, on the contrary, interferences with American ships and cargoes destined in good faith to neutral ports and lawfully entitled to proceed have become increasingly vexatious, causing Ameri

can shipowners and American merchants to complain to this Government of the failure to take steps to prevent an exercise of belligerent power in contravention of their just rights. As the measures complained of proceed directly from orders issued by the British Government, are executed by British authorities, and arouse a reasonable apprehension that, if not resisted, they may be carried to an extent even more injurious to American interests, this Government directs the attention of His Majesty's Government to the following considerations:

[Here followed a denial of the correctness of deductions drawn from trade statistics as to the injury to American foreign trade, and (1) objection to the seizure of cargoes on suspicion, and their detention while the British government looked for evidence to support the suspicion (2) insistence that international usage permitted only a search at sea and not a deviation of vessels from their course in order to carry them into a port for search (3) a denial that American practice in this respect during the Civil War justified the British proceedings (4) denial of the British claim that modern conditions made search at sea impracticable, and a statement from American naval experts that the "facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are in fact greater than in former times" (5) objections to a demand for evidence of innocent voyage beyond the papers of the ship and the goods found on board, and a repetition of the American objection to the practice of seizing and detaining ships "on mere suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous sources to justify the detention." (6) Repudiation of the British claim that the American seizure of the Bermuda in the Civil War (a famous case cited frequently by Great Britain) was in any sense similar to the British practices.

The British contention that greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining Great Britain's enemies raised a presumption that they were intended for sale to the belligerents, was characterized as not laying down a "just or legal rule of evidence. Such a presumption is too far from the facts and offers too great opportunity for abuse by a belligerent, who could, if the rule were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas and prey with impunity on neutral commerce." On this subject the note continued:]

Great Britain cannot expect the United States to submit to such manifest injustice or to permit the rights of its citizens to be so seriously impaired.

.

When

goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of merchandise for sale in a neutral country, it is an unwarranted and inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for examination as to whether those goods are ultimately destined for the enemy's country or use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be drawn from trade statistics, which, when stated by value, are of uncertain evidence as to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell goods into the general stock of a neutral country, and denounces as illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere with that right on the ground that it suspects that the previous supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew or replace, has been sold to an enemy. That is a matter with which the neutral vendor has no concern and which can in no way affect his rights of trade. Moreover, even if goods listed as conditional contraband are destined to an enemy country through a neutral country, that fact is not in itself sufficient to justify their seizure. Relying upon the regard of the British Government for the principles of justice so frequently and uniformly manifested prior to the present war, this Government anticipates that the British Government will instruct their officers to refrain from these vexatious and illegal practices. .

The British note of July 23, 1915, appears to confirm the intention indicated in the note of March 15, 1915, to establish a blockade so extensive as to prohibit trade with Germany or Austria-Hungary, even through the ports of neutral countries adjacent to them. Great Britain, however, admits that it should not, and gives assurances that it will not, interfere with trade with the countries contiguous to the territories of the enemies of Great Britain. Nevertheless, after over six months' application of the "blockade" order, the experience of American citizens has convinced the Government of the United States that Great Britain has been unsuccessful in her efforts to distinguish

between enemy and neutral trade. Arrangements have been made to create in these neutral countries special consignees, or consignment corporations, with power to refuse shipments and to determine when the state of the country's resources requires the importation of new commodities. American commercial interests are hampered by the intricacies of these arrangements, and many American citizens justly complain that their bona fide trade with neutral countries is greatly reduced as a consequence, while others assert that their neutral trade, which amounted annually to a large sum, has been entirely interrupted.

While the United States Government was at first inclined to view with leniency the British measures which were termed in the correspondence but not in the Order in Council of March 11 a "blockade," because of the assurances of the British Government that inconvenience to neutral trade would be minimized, this Government is now forced to the realization that its expectations were based on a misconception of the intentions of the British GovernIn the circumstances now developed it feels that it can no longer permit the validity of the alleged blockade to remain unchallenged.

ment.

The Declaration of Paris in 1856, which has been universally recognized as correctly stating the rule of international law as to blockade, expressly declares that "blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

[Here followed detailed statements that the German coasts were open to trade with the Scandinavian countries, that German naval vessels cruised freely both in the North Sea and the Baltic and took prizes, and that the British Government itself had issued certain orders that showed the ineffectiveness of the blockade. Referring to the incidental blockade of neutral ports, the American note said:]

It is a matter of common knowledge that Great Britain exports and re-exports large quantities of merchandise to

Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, whose ports, so far as American commerce is concerned, she regards as blockaded. In fact, the British note of August 13 itself indicates that the British exports of many articles, such as cotton, lubricating oil, tobacco, cocoa, coffee, rice, wheat flour, barley, spices, tea, copra, etc., to these countries have greatly exceeded the British exports for the corresponding period of 1914. The note also shows that there has been an important British trade with these countries in many other articles, such as machinery, beef, butter, cotton waste, etc.

Finally, there is no better settled principle of the law of nations than that which forbids the blockade of neutral ports in time of war. The Declaration of London, though not regarded as binding upon the signatories because not ratified by them, has been expressly adopted by the British Government without modification as to blockade in the British Order in Council of October 29, 1914. Article 18 of the Declaration declares specifically that "The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts."

[Here followed citations from authorities and a quotation from Sir Edward Grey's own earlier definitions of blockade, as well as prize court decisions, after which the note said:]

Without mentioning the other customary elements of a regularly imposed blockade, such as notification of the particular coast line invested, the imposition of the penalty of confiscation, etc., which are lacking in the present British "blockade" policy, it need only be pointed out that, measured by the universally conceded tests above set forth, the present British measures cannot be regarded as constituting a blockade in law, in practice, or in effect.

It is incumbent upon the United States Government, therefore, to give the British Government notice that the blockade, which they claim to have instituted under the Order in Council of March 11, cannot be recognized as a legal blockade by the United States.