with the expression as remarkable, it is not probable that they would intentionally alter it. They would be more likely to reverence it as containing a mystery. In the second place, though μovoyevǹs Deós may sound strangely to us, it was not a strange or harsh expression to copyists of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries. On the contrary, it was, as we have seen, a favorite phrase with many writers of this period, being used with equal freedom both by the Arians and their opponents. So far from stumbling at it, transcribers may have been led, by their very familiarity with the expression, to introduce it unconsciously into the text. Let us look at the passage in John. In the clause immediately preceding ὁ μονογενής υἱός, Θεόν had just occurred, bringing Deós before the mind of the copyist. Is it strange that in transcribing he should inadvertently connect this word with povoyevns, the combination being so familiar to him, the words oc and rc being so similar in ancient manuscripts, and eós being so much the more common of these two abbreviated words? Such a mistake, in some early manuscript or manuscripts, might have been easily propagated, so as to extend to the comparatively few authorities which exhibit the reading Jeós. It is much more difficult to acount for such an ancient and wide-spread corruption as must have taken place, if Deós proceeded originally from the pen of the Evangelist. If he had written povoyevns Deos in this passage, so remarkable an expression must have early attracted attention, and stamped itself ineffaceably, like the language in the first verse of his Gospel, upon the whole Christian literature. It would have been continually quoted and appealed

to.

But there is another aspect of the internal evidence, which must strike every one who reads the passage in question with attention. "No man hath seen GOD at any time; the only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." Is it not evident that the introduction of the phrase "only-begotten God," after the use of the word "God" alone and absolutely, immediately before it, is a harshness which we can hardly suppose in any writer?

Does not the word "Father," in a sentence like this, almost necessarily imply that the correlative "Son" has just preceded? And is there anything analogous to this expression, "the only-begotten God," in the writings of John, or in any other part of the New Testament?

In closing this discussion, the writer wishes to express his great respect for Dr. Tregelles, and the earnest desire that his life and health may be spared for the completion of the important work on which he has been so long engaged. No scholar of the present century, with the single exception of Tischendorf, has so high a claim on the gratitude of all who are solicitous to obtain the purest possible text of the original records of our religion. His labors for this object have displayed a patient, earnest, and self-sacrificing devotion worthy of the highest admiration. The reasons for dif fering from him in opinion in regard to the genuineness of Deós in John i. 18, and for desiring a more complete and accurate statement of the evidence than he has given in this case, have now been laid before the reader, who will judge of the whole matter for himself.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1- GERMAN TREATISES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY, PUBLISHED DURING

THE LAST TWENTY YEARS.

It cannot be denied that the more recent German writers have contributed much to the advancement of ethical science. Notwithstanding their frequent speculative aberrations, they have studied the subject more industriously and more profoundly than their English contemporaries, and have established some fundamental principles which will hardly be set aside by any subsequent investigations. While one class of authors verge towards naturalism and found their systems exclusively on the human reason, another class, now in the ascendency, aim at a broader and more comprehensive philosophy by including the principles of Christianity in their ethical systems. That there can be a philosophy equally true to nature and to Christianity, — a philosophy that is strictly systematic and homogeneous in all its parts and yet drawn from both of these sources,- can be doubted by no one who believes in the truth of both. What Christianity adds to the teachings of nature must be in harmony with nature; and these teachings themselves become much more lucid when viewed and interpreted in the light of revelation. That the German mind is capable of grappling with these subjects in a way that is both philosophical and evangelical, is proved by the writings of such men as Julius Müller, whose work on the Doctrine of Sin is unsurpassed by any other on the subject. It is a pleasing fact that the great ethical writers of Germany are approximating more and more to the pure Christian standard. In this respect there is an almost regular progression in the writers whose works we propose to notice.

It is not necessary to our purpose to refer to even the best of the older writers, such as Buddeus, Crusius, and Mosheim, or to Reinhard of later times, partly because their works, though valuable of their kind, are less theoretical than practical, and partly because they have exercised no sensible influence upon the more recent authors. The founders of the several philosophical schools, especially Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Herbert, opened new paths of inquiry, and multiplied the ways by which the science of ethics was approached. But an account of their ethical theories would require more space than we can give them. We must, therefore, take it for granted that these theories, in their general outlines, are sufficiently understood by our readers, and limit ourselves to such incidental notices of them as may be appropriate while speaking of the moral treatises of their disciples. Confining our remarks to those writers who have directed their chief attention to moral philosophy as a science, we need not go out of the period prescribed for this Article, except in the case of Schleiermacher. He

was the first great ethical writer of the present century who inaugurated a reconstruction of the science on more comprehensive and more rigidly philosophical principles. Although his system, as a whole, will not continue to stand without important modifications, he has laid down principles in regard to method which will not be allowed to fall into forgetfulness, He has also done good service in fructifying the science by detailed observations of great value. Having a mind uncommonly prolific, strongly ethical both by nature and by habit, and stored with all learning, he throws out, with liberal hand, ingots of gold from whatever mine he explores.

In respect to method, he did much to clear the science of a heterogeneous mass of adventitious matter and to place it upon a foundation strictly philosophical. One needs only look into Reinhard to see what a medley of empyrical rules, maxims, and ecclesiastical traditions once constituted the bulk of works on moral philosophy. As practical works, they had and still have their value. Schleiermacher perceived that the term philosophy could be extended to them only by courtesy, He insisted on reducing the whole science to one comprehensive principle, capable of being unfolded into a complete system. According to him, nothing involved in that was to be omitted, nothing else was to be introduced. It is easy to perceive that such a view would give to the science its exact boundaries, would assign to each part its appropriate place, and would give proportion and symmetry to the whole. Even if it should be impossible to find such a principle with absolute certainty, any near approximation to it would improve the form of the science. If he himself did not succeed in discovering the right principle, that does not detract from the merit of maintaining that there is such a principle, and that it is discoverable. Others, following in the way which he has pointed out, may complete the work which he began. In point of fact, his method has been applied with much greater success by others than by himself.

Whatever doubt there may be about Schleiermacher's having reached and grasped the ultimate principle of moral philosophy, no one can question that he has approached it by announcing its three grand manifestations, the chief good, the right, and virtuous feeling. The last is distinguished from the first and second by being exclusively subjective and variable. It is perfect in proportion as it is directed to the chief good, and governed by the right. They all involve each other. They are not so many distinct parts of the general subject, but are rather so many aspects of one and the same thing. Although a tolerable system of ethics could be founded on any one of these, no system can be complete which does not embrace them all in a coördinate relation. That principle which comprehends them all, whatever it be, is the fundamental principle of ethics.

To this theory, so admirably laid down, Schleiermacher was hardly faithful in the execution of its parts. Indeed, he excelled rather in pointing out the way for others than in following it himself. He is a better writer on the method of moral philosophy than on moral philosophy itself. His view

of Christian virtue, as free and perfectly spontaneous, led him to adopt the good, rather than the right, as its standard. The pursuit of the good because one delights in it, was considered a higher moral act than obedience to law as an authoritative rule. The evil resulting from this partially manifested itself in the lax morality of those who adopted the system. It was quite natural that it should be left very much to the individual to judge what was good and what was evil, or, in other words, that his taste should become his rule in moral action. If men were as pure as angels, there might be little danger in being left to pursue the good as an object of desire without the positive restraints of law. But in our present imperfect state, we can free ourselves from the authority of law only so far as our approach to perfection supplies us with the love of the good and of the right as the principle of action. So long as any evil inclinations exist within us, the adoption of Schleiermacher's view, without restriction, will be perilous.

A still greater defect in his ethical works is the perpetual conflict in his mind between Pantheism and Christianity. His life appears to have been a gradual transition from the former to the latter. He has in fact, given us two systems of moral philosophy, the one Christian, the other more pantheistic than Christian.

The first particular work to be noticed, falling within our period is J. U. Wirth's "Speculative Ethics" (Spekulative Ethik) in two small volumes, published in 1841. It is Hegelian in its principles, but is the ablest and best proceeding from that school of philosophy. The first volume, which is but half the size of the second, is devoted to theoretical ethics; the remaining volume, to practical and political ethics. The former is sufficiently abstract and obscure; and if it do no good, it will do no harm to the American reader. The second, or practical part of the work is highly interesting and instructive. Every thought is like new coin fresh from the mint. The author has elaborated his work in the most thorough manner. His analysis is as acute as it is original, and his practical knowledge of the subject is extensive and accurate. He deals more in practical principles, clearly and concisely stated, and less in wire-drawn disquisitions and multiplied details, than is common with writers on this branch of the subject. Most writers give all their valuable thoughts in the theoretical part, the application of which in the practical part is so mechanical that it can be anticipated by a reader of active intellect. Wirth is like the sun below the horizon, and sending forth only gray twilight in the former, but risen and shining in an almost cloudless sky in the latter. That which was too abstruse to be understood which appeared to be nothing but a dry and empty abstraction when theoretically stated, assumes a concrete form in its practical application, and is then full of significance. The chief defect of the book is its Hegelianism. Its chief excellence is the truthfulness and soundness of its observations crowded into a small compass, which lose little of their real value by appearing under their thin, transparent Hegelian guise.

Next in the order of time is G. Hartenstein's "Fundamental Principles