from the particulars digested into tables, to the was handling a subject which it were unbecominquisition after new particulars, (which is never- ing to defile with any ambition or affectation; theless itself a useful thing, and like a kind of but yet that he must needs descend to the recollearned experience,) but that we should first pro- lection, (unless indeed he were very inexperienced ceed to general and large comprehensions, and so in affairs and minds, and would begin his journey far indulge the natural bent of the understanding. without any search,) that inveterate errors, like But at the same time he saw that the natural but the ravings of the lunatic, must be subdued by vicious motion and impulse of the mind to jump art and contrivance, and are aggravated by viofrom particulars to high and general comprehen- lence and opposition. We must, therefore, use sions, (such as what are called the first principles prudence, and humour them, (as far as we can of arts and things,) and to get at the rest by de- with simplicity and candour,) that contradictions scending through the middle ones, must be alto- may be extinguished before they are inflamed. gether checked; but the nearest comprehensions For this object he is preparing a work on nature, must be first drawn out and discovered, and then which may destroy errors with the least harshthe middle ones, and we must climb the true lad-ness, and enter the senses of mankind without der by repeated steps. For the paths of thought and understanding almost agree with that twofold way in morals, sung by the ancients; for one road, smooth at the entrance, leads to pathless wilds, the other, steep and difficult at first, ends in level road.

violence; which would be easier from his not bearing himself as a leader, but bringing and scattering light from nature herself, so that there may be no future need of a leader. But as time meanwhile glides away, and he has been more engaged in business than he wished; it seems a He thought that such a form of induction long work; especially when he considers the` should be introduced as should conclude gene- uncertainty of life, and pants to lay up something rally from certain instances, so that it can be in safety. It therefore seemed to him that someproved that there cannot be found a contradictory thing simpler might be proposed which, though instance, lest by chance we pronounce from not uttered to the many, might perchance at fewer than are adequate, and from those which least be sufficient to preserve so salutary a matter are at our feet; and (as one of the ancients said) from abortion. And after considering the matter, seek knowledge in our private worlds, and not in and weighing it long and attentively, it seemed the public one. He saw that that comprehension to him the best way that tables of invention, or only should be approved of and received, which formulæ of just inquisition, that is, a mass of was not made and fitted to the measure of the particulars, arranged for the work of the underparticulars from which it was derived, but standing, should be offered in some subjects, by which was rather more ample and iax, and sup- | way of an exemplar and almost visible descripported its amplitude and laxity by the designation tion of the work. For nothing can be found to of new particulars, as a sort of suretiship, lest | place in a clearer light the right road or the wanwe should stop at what is already known, or derings of error; or show more plainly that perchance in too wide an embrace catch shadows what is offered is but words: nor which would and abstract forms. He saw that many things be more carefully avoided by the man who either besides these should be invented to work notably, mistrusted his scheme, or desired it to be caught not so much to the perfecting of the matter, as to at and celebrated above its deserts. But, if it is the shortening of the labour, and to the speeding not allowed him to complete his designs, as there of men's harvest from it. And whether all this are nevertheless human minds of a strong and be rightly thought or otherwise, we must, if lofty character, it may be that, even without more need be, appeal from the opinions, and stand by assistance, taking the hint from what is offered, the effects. they may be able to look for and master the rest of themselves. For he is almost of opinion (as some one said) that this will be enough for the wise, though even more would not be for the dull. But he saw that it would be too abrupt to begin his teaching with the tables themselves; and, therefore, that he should say something suitable by way of preface, which he thinks he has now done, and that all which has been hitherto said leads only thither. Lastly, he saw that, if any good be found in what has been or shall be said, it should be dedicated as the fat of the sacrifice to God, and to men in God's similitude, who procure the good of mankind by true affection and benevolence.

He thought, also, that what he is treating of is rather performance than opinion, and that it lays the foundations, not of any sect or school, but of immense utility and enlargement. Wherefore thought must be taken not only about accomplishing the matter, but about communicating and transmitting it, which is of equal consequence. But he found that men minister to their love of fame and pomp by sometimes publishing, sometimes concealing the knowledge of things which they think they have got; and that they who propose what is least solid are, more than others, used to barter what they offer in an obscure and doubtful light, that they may more easily swell the sails of their vanity. But he thought that he

G. W.

OF THE

PRINCIPLES AND ORIGINS OF NATURE,

ACCORDING TO THE FABLES OF CUPID AND HEAVEN:

OR, THE

PHILOSOPHY OF PARMENIDES, TELESIUS, AND PARTICULARLY OF DEMOCRITUS, AS EXHIBITED IN THE FABLE CONCERNING CUPID.

THE fables of the ancients repecting Cupid or certain light of the Divine Word has shone Love, cannot be made to agree in one and the upon men. That chaos therefore which was same person. They indeed profess to speak of coeval with Cupid, signified the confused and two Cupids of two different periods, the one the disordered mass or collection of matter. But most ancient of the gods, the other of a much matter itself, with its power and nature, in a later era. At present we will treat of the ancient word, the elements of things were shadowed out Cupid. They relate that this Cupid was the in Cupid himself. He is introduced without a most ancient of the gods, and therefore of all parent, that is, without a cause: for cause is, as things, excepting chaos, which is said to have it were, the parent of effect; and in tropical disbeen coeval with him. This Cupid had no pa- course nothing is therefore more usual than for rent, but being united to heaven, was the father the parent to stand for cause, and the offspring of the gods and of all things. Some indeed for effect. But there cannot be in nature (for we would derive him from an egg over which Night always except God) any cause of the first matbrooded. Different atttributes are ascribed to ter, and of its proper influence and action, for him, so that he is represented as a boy blind, there is nothing prior in time to the first matter. naked, winged, and armed with darts. His Therefore there is no efficient nor any thing more chief and especial influence is over the uniting known to nature; there is therefore neither genus of bodies. To him were given the keys of the nor form. Wherefore whate:er primitive matter earth, the sea, and the sky. Another and younger is, together with its influence and action, it is sui Cupid is also celebrated in fable, the son of Ve- generis, and admits of no definition drawn from nus. To him are ascribed the attributes of the perception, and is to be taken just as it is found, ancient Cupid, besides many peculiar to himself. and not to be judged of from any preconceived This fable, with the sequel respecting heaven, idea. For the mode of it, if it is given to us to seems to embrace in a concise parable the doc- know it, cannot be judged of by means of its trine of the elements of things and of the origin cause, seeing that it is, next to God, the cause of of the world, and to agree with that of Demo- causes, itself without a cause. For there is a critus, except that it appears somewhat closer, certain real limit of causes in nature, and it more reasonable, and clearer. For the observa- would argue levity and inexperience in a philosotions of that confessedly acute and accurate pher to require or imagine a cause for the last philosopher nevertheless were of a too diffusive and positive power and law of nature, as much nature, and did not seem to keep their proper as it would not to demand a cause in those that limit, and to confine and support themselves suffi- are subordinate. ciently. And indeed these dogmas, which lie veiled in the parable, although better regulated, are yet of such a nature as to appear to have come from the mind left to itself, and not uniformly and gradually assisted by experience; for this seems to have been the common fault of antiquity. But it must first be remarked, that the opinions brought forward in this part of my treatise were the conclusions and productions of unassisted reason, and rested on perception alone, the failing and imperfect oracles of which are deservedly rejected, now that the higher and more

On this account the ancients have fabled Cupid to be without a parent, that is, without a cause. And they did so not without design. Nay, perhaps there is not any thing more important; for nothing has more corrupted philosophy than the seeking after the parents of Cupid; I mean, that philosophers have not received and embraced the elements of things as they are found in nature, as a certain fixed and positive doctrine, and as it were by an experimental trust in them; but have rather deduced them from the laws of words, and from dialectics and slight mathematical conclu

66

sions and common notions, and similar wander- fire, nor any other thing, the body of which is ings of the mind beyond the bounds of nature. perceptible by sense, or open to the touch." And This, therefore, must be constantly in the philoso- again he says of their nature, but it is requisite pher's thoughts, that Cupid is without parents, the elements in the work of creation, should put lest perchance his understanding turn aside to forth a secret and dark nature, lest any contrarious empty questions; because in universal percep- and opposing principle arise." Therefore atoms tions of this kind the human mind becomes dif- are neither like sparks of fire, nor drops of water, fusive, and departs from the right use of itself nor bubbles of air, nor grains of sand, nor the and of its objects, and, whilst it tends toward minute particles of spirit or ether. Nor, is the things more distant, falls back upon those that power and form of them a something heavy or are nearer. For when, through its own limited | light, or hot or cold, or dense or rare, or hard or capacity, it is accustomed to be most affected by soft, as are found in larger bodies, since those those things which occur familiarly to it, and powers, and the rest of that order, are compounded which can enter and strike the mind suddenly; it and wrought together. And, in like manner, the comes to pass that when it stretches itself toward natural motion of an atom is neither that motion those things which, according to experience, are of descent which is called natural, nor a motion for the most part universal, and, nevertheless, is opposed to that force, nor a motion of expansion unwilling to rest satisfied, then, as if desirous of and contraction, nor of impulsion and connexion, something more within the reach of its know- nor the rotatory motion of the heavenly bodies, ledge, it turns itself to those things which have most nor any other of the greater motions simply. But, effected or allured it, and imagines them to be more notwithstanding this, in the body of an atom are causative and palpable than those universals. the elements of all bodies, and in the nature of an Therefore, it has been now laid down that the first atom the beginning of all motions and natural essence of things, or Cupid, is without a cause. properties. But, yet, in this very point, namely, the motion of an atom as compared with the motion of greater substances, the philosophy of the parable appears to differ from that of Democritus. For he is not only opposed to the parable, but inconsistent, if not contradictory in his more copious assertions on this head. For he should have ascribed a heterogeneous motion to an atom not less than a heterogeneous body and power. But, he out of the motions of greater substances, has chosen two, to ascribe them as primitive motions to atoms, namely, the descent of heavy and the ascent of light bodies, (which he explained by the striking or the percussion of the more heavy, in forcing upwards the less heavy bodies.) But the parable all along preserves the heterogeneous and exclusive nature it ascribes to atoms, as well in speaking of its motion as of its substance. But the parable further intimates, that this exclusion has its limit, for night does not brood over the egg forever: and it is certainly proper to the Deity, that in our inquiry into his nature by means of the senses, exclusions should not terminate in affirmatives. And there is another reason for this, namely, that, after the due exclusions and negations, something should be affirmed and settled, and that the egg should be produced as it were by a seasonable and mature incubation; not only that the egg should be brought forth by night, but also that the person of Cupid should be delivered of the egg: that is, that not only should an obscure notion upon this subject be originated, but one that is distinct. Thus much upon demon. strations, as far as they can be given, upon the first matter, and I think in accordance with the parable.

We have now to inquire into the mode of this thing which is uncaused; and the mode of it is likewise very obscure, which indeed the fable elegantly hints in Cupid being hatched beneath the brooding wing of night. So at least the inspired philosopher saith, "God hath made all things beautiful in their seasons: He hath also set the world in their heart, yet so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning unto the end." For the great law of essence and nature which cuts and runs through the vicissitudes of things, (which law seems to be described in the compass of the words, "the work which God wrought from the beginning even to the end,") the power lodged by God in the primitive particles, from the multiplication of which, the whole variety of things might spring forth and be composed, may indeed just strike, but cannot enter deeply the mind of man. But, that saying concerning the egg of night, is very aptly referred to those proofs by means of which our Cupid is brought to light. For those proofs which are concluded by means of affirmatives, seem to be the offspring of light; those which are concluded by means of negatives and exclusions, may be called the offspring of darkness and night: and Cupid is in truth the egg sprung from night; for all the knowledge we can gather respecting him comes by the way of negatives and exclusions. But a proof gathered by exclusions has still some degree of ignorance in it, and is a kind of night as to that which is included in it: whence Democritus admirably remarked, that the atoms or seeds and their properties were like nothing that falls under the observation of sense, and held them to be of a dark and secret nature. He thereforc pronounced of them, "They are neither like

We come now to Cupid himself, the primitive matter and its properties, involved in so great

darkness; and let us see what light the parable mostly present to the human understanding which can throw upon it. And here I am aware that it most imbibes, and with which itself is most opinions of this sort the most incredible have moved. Hence it is that forms, as they are called, entered men's mind. Certainly was this danger seem to exist more than either matter or action, incurred here by the philosophy of Democritus because the one is hid, the other glides before us; itself upon atoms, which, from its seeming acute- the one is not so strongly impressed, the other ness and profundity, and for its remoteness from constantly inheres. But forms, on the other hand, common notions, was childishly entertained by are deemed evident and lasting, so that the primithe vulgar, but unsettled, and nearly overthrown tive and common matter seems as it were an by the arguments of other philosophies which accessory, and to be in the place of a support to came nearer to the vulgar comprehension; and yet them; but every sort of action only an emanation he was the admiration of his age, and was styled from the form, and forms, therefore, to be in every Pentathlus for his multifarious erudition, and was respect worthy of the higher rank. And hence, deemed by universal consent the greatest of also, seems to be derived the kingdom of forms natural philosophers, and obtained the name of a and ideas in essences, by the addition of a kind wise man. Nor could even the opposition of of fantastic matter. Some things moreover have Aristotle (who, like the Ottomans, could not feel grown out of this superstition; (from want of firm upon his throne until he had murdered his judgment having, as might have been expected, brother philosophers; and who was solicitous, as followed this error;) abstract ideas and their powers appears from his own words, that posterity should have been introduced with such confidence and not doubt his dogmas) effect by his violence, nor authority, that this troop of dreamers had nearly the majesty of Plato effect by reverence the demo- overpowered the more sober class of thinkers. lition of this philosophy of Democritus. But But these follies have for the most part disapwhilst the dicta of Aristotle and Plato were cele- peared, although one person in our age, with more brated with applause and professorial ostentation daring than advantage, made it his endeavour to in the schools, the philosophy of Democritus was raise and prop them up when they were of themin great repute amongst the wiser sort, and those selves on the decline. I think, however, that it who more closely gave themselves to the depths can to an unprejudiced person be easily shown and silence of contemplation. It kept its ground how, contrary to reason, abstract matter was made and was approved in the era of Roman letters; into an element. It arose thus; men supposed for Cicero every where makes mention of him that forms endued with action subsisted by themwith perfect approbation; and soon after we read selves, but none thought that matter thus subsisted the panegyric of the poet, who appears to echo by itself; not even those who considered it an after the manner of the poets the sentiment of his element; and it seemed unreasonable and contrary times, whose wisdom shows that in a land of to the nature of an inquiry upon the elements of dulness and beneath a Boeotian sky, the greatest things to make entities out of mere imaginations. and the most illustrious men can spring up. And it is not our object to search how we can (Juv. Sat. 10, v. 48.) most conveniently conceive of the nature of entities or distinguish them, but what are in truth the first and simplest possible of all entities, from which all others are derived. But the first ones ought no less to possess a real existence than those which flow from it; rather more. has its own peculiar essence, and from it come all the rest. But the assertions that have been made respecting abstract matter are as absurd as it would be to say that the universe and nature were made out of categories and such dialectic notions, as out of elements. For the difference is by no means important between asserting that the world sprang from matter and form and privation, and asserting that it arose out of substance and the contrary qualities. But almost all the ancients, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, though disagreeing in other respects upon the prime matter, joined in this, that they held an active matter with a form, both arranging its own form and having within itself the principle of motion. Nor can any one think otherwise without leaving experience altogether. All these, then, submitted their mind to nature.

Neither Aristotle, therefore, nor Plato, but Genseric, Attila, and the barbarians were the ruin of this philosophy. For, then, after that human learning had suffered shipwreck, those records of the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy, as being lighter and more inflated matter, were preserved and came down to our times, whilst the more solid sank and went into oblivion. I cannot but consider, on the other hand, the philosophy of Democritus worthy of being rescued from neglect, especially since it agrees in most things with the authority of antiquity. In the first place, then, Cupid is described as a certain person, and to him are attributed infancy, wings, arrows, and other attributes, concerning which we will afterward speak separately. But this we assume in the mean while, that the ancients laid down the primitive matter (such as can be the origin of things) with a form and properties, not abstract, potential, and informal. And certainly that matter which is stripped and passive seems altogether an invention of the human mind, and to have sprung thence, for those things are

For n

But Plato subjected the world to his contempla- ties in the unfixed and distributable nature of the tions, and Aristotle his contemplations to terms: same element. The second is of those who for the studies of men were at that time verging maintain an element one in substance, and fixed toward logomachies and disputations, and leaving and invariable, but derive a diversity of entities the severer investigation of truth. Wherefore through the various magnitudes, figures, and po. dogmas of this nature are rather to be condemned sitions of this kind of element. The third is of in the mass than refuted in detail. For they those who maintain more elements, and a divercome not from a desire of knowledge, but of much sity of entities, on the ground of their temperaspeaking and that abstract matter is not the ment and commixture. The fourth, of those who matter of the universe, but matter for disputation. lay down an infinite, or, at least, very numerous For a true philosopher will dissect, not sever body of elements of things, but with their species nature, (for they who will not dissect, must pull and forms; and these have no need of inventing her asunder,) and the prime matter is to be laid something to lead things to a various principle, down joined with the primitive form, as also with seeing they already separate nature from a primithe first principle of motion, as it is found. For tive element. Among these, only the second sect the abstraction of motion has also given rise to seems to me to set forth Cupid. as he is, native innumerable devices concerning spirits, life, and and unclothed. The first introduces him as veiled, the like, as if there were not laid a sufficient the third with a ceat, the fourth with a cloak and ground for them through matter and form, but mask. they depended on their own peculiar elements. But these three are not to be separated, but only distinguished, and matter is to be so treated (whatever it be) in regard of its adornment, appendages, and form, as that all kind of influence, essence, action, and natural motion may appear to be its emanation and consequence. Nor need we fear that from this that inquiry should stagnate, or that variety which we perceive should become incapable of explanation, as will be shown hereafter. And that the first matter is possessed of form, the parable teaches in making Cupid a definite person. Yet so that matter in the mass was at first without form for chaos is without form, Cupid is a person. And this perfectly agrees with Holy Scripture. For it is not written that God created in the beginning the matter of chaos, but the heavens and the earth.

There is also subjoined a description of the state of things as it was before the work of the days, in which distinct mention is made of the heaven and earth, which are the names of forms, but yet, that the mass according to the whole was without form. But Cupid is introduced into the parable personified, yet so as that he is naked. Therefore, after those who speak of matter as abstract, they err next (though in a contrary way) who speak of matter as not unclothed. And, on this topic I have inserted some remarks, in treating upon what kind of proofs are suited to the subject of the first matter, and upon the heterogeneous nature of the first matter. But the proper place for this subject, upon which we shall now

enter.

We will examine, therefore, who of those who attributed the origin of things to matter endowed with form, held a native and bare form of matter, and who, on the other hand, a form spread over it and shapen. There are, in all, four sects of those who have hazarded opinions on this subject. The first is of those who maintain one element of things, but set up a diversity of enti

For the better explication of the parable, I will make a few remarks on each. In the first place, then, of those who have laid down but one first element, I find none who affirm that of the earth. The nature of the earth, indeed, was against it; quiet, and senseless, and inactive, but yielding to the influence of the heavens, of fire, and other things; so that none thought of asserting this of the earth. Yet, the wisdom of the ancients assigned to the earth the next place after chaos, making it first the parent, then the bride of the heaven, from which union proceed all things. But we are not to suppose from this, that the ancients ever thought of the earth as the principle of essence, but as the element, or rather origin of the system. We, therefore, leave this subject to the parable on heaven that follows; where we will inquire into the origin of things, which inquiry comes after that of their elements.

Thales made water the prime element. For, he saw that matter was mostly disposed in moisture, and that in water. But he deemed that it was right to make that the element of things in which the virtues and powers of entities, espe cially the elements of generations and renovations, were mostly found. He remarked that the generating of animals was by moisture, and that the seeds and kernels of plants, as long as they vegetated and were not dried up, were moist and tender. He remarked that metals melted and flowed, and were, as it were, the thickened juices of the earth, or rather a kind of mineral waters. He remarked that the earth itself was enriched and renewed by showers or the irrigation of rivers; and that the earth and loam seemed nothing but the dregs and sediments of water; but that the air was very evidently the expiration and expansion of water, and that fire was not conceived of itself, nor altogether continued, or was kept alive of itself, but from and through moisture; and, moreover, that that fat of moisture, in which the nre and flame are supported and live.