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ARTICLE 6.

RIGHTS OF HOLDER.

SECTION 90. Right of holder to sue; payment.

91. What constitutes a holder in due course.

92. When person not deemed holder in due course.
93. Notice before full amount paid.

94. When title defective.

95. What constitutes notice of defect.
96. Rights of holder in due course.
97. When subject to original defenses.
98. Who deemed holder in due course.

§ 90. Right of holder to sue; payment.

The holder of a nego

tiable instrument may sue thereon in his own name; and payment to him in due course discharges the instrument.

Newcomb v. Fox, 1 App. Div. 389, 37 N. Y. Supp. 294.

§ 91. What constitutes a holder in due course. A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:

1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;

2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;

3. That he took it in good faith and for value;

4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.

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§ 92. When person not deemed holder in due course. instrument payable on demand is negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its issue, the holder is not deemed a holder in due

course.

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§ 93. Notice before full amount paid. Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same before he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid therefor, he will be deemed a holder in due course only to the extent of the amount theretofore paid by him.

§ 94. When title defective. The title of a person who negotiates. an instrument is defective within the meaning of this chapter when he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud.

§ 95. What constitutes notice of defect. To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith.

Am. Exch. Nat. Bank v. N. Y. Belting Co., 148 N. Y. 698, 705, 43 N. E. 168; Cheever v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co., 150 N. Y. 59, 33 L. R. A. 69, 55 Am. St. Rep. 646, 44 N. E. 701; Knox v. Eden Musee Co., 148 N. Y. 454, 31 L. R. A. 779, 51 Am. St. Rep. 700, 42 N. E. 988; Canajoharie Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191, 202, 10 L. R. A. 676, 25 N. E. 402; Jarvis v. Man. Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652, 31 L. R. A. 776, 51 Am. St. Rep. 727, 43 N. E. 68.

§ 96. Rights of holder in due course. A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon.

As to discounting of paper by State bank with knowledge of usurious inception, see Schlesinger v. Lehmaier, 191 N. Y. 69; Same v. Gilhooley, 189 N. Y. 1. Cromwell v. Co. of Sac, 96 U S. 60, 24 L. ed. 687.

As to rights of holder of negotiable paper transferred after maturity, see editorial note to Y. M. C. A. Gymnasium Co. v. Rockford Nat. Bank, 46 L. R. A. 753, presenting the authorities on that question.

$97. When subject to original defenses. In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who derives his title through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties prior to the latter.

First Nat. Bank of Champlain t. Wood, 128 N. Y. 35, 27 N. E. 1020.

§ 98. Who deemed holder in due course. Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due course. But the last mentioned rule does not apply in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the acquisition of such defective title.

Joy v. Diefendorf, 130 N. Y. 6, 27 Am. St. Rep. 484, 28 N. E. 602; M. Groh's Sons v. Schneider, 34 Misc. 195, 68 N. Y. Supp. 862.

1. As to effect as against bona fide holder of fraud in obtaining execution of note, see editorial note to Green v. Wilkie, 36 L. R. A. 434, presenting the authorities on that question.

2. As to effect on bona fide holders of prior alteration of note, see editorial note to Citizens' Nat. Bank of Baltimore v. Williams, 35 L. R. A. 464, presenting the authorities on that question.

ARTICLE 7.

LIABILITIES OF PARTIES.

SECTION 110. Liability of maker. 111. Liability of drawer.

112. Liability of acceptor.

113. When person deemed indorser.

114. Liability of irregular indorser.

115. Warranty; where negotiation by delivery or by a qualified indorsement.

116. Liability of general indorser.

117. Liability of indorser where paper negotiable by delivery.

118. Order in which indorsers are liable.

119. Liability of agent or broker.

§ 110. Liability of maker. The maker of a negotiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay it according to its tenor; and admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse.

§ 111. Liability of drawer. The drawer by drawing the instrument admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse; and engages that on due presentment the instrument will be accepted and paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it. But the drawer may insert in the instrument an express stipulation negativing or limiting his own liability to the holder.

§ 112. Liability of acceptor. -The acceptor by accepting the instruments engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits:

1. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and

2. The existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse. Under section 112 of Negotiable Instruments Law, a bank which pay a check drawn on it by a depositor guarantees the existence of the drawer, genuineness of the signature, and the authority to draw, and where such signature is forged, the bank cannot receive back the money paid on it although the relation of the parties has not changed. Title Guarantee Trust Co. v. Haven, 126 App. Div. 802. Cont. Nat. Bank v. Tradesman's Bank, 36 App. Div. 112, 55 N. Y. Supp. 545.

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§ 113. When person deemed indorser. A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or ac ceptor is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.

§ 114. Liability of irregular indorser. Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser in accordance with the following rules:

1. If the instrument is payable to the order of a third person, is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties.

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2. If the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer.

3. If he signs for the accommodation of the payee, he is liable to all parties subsequent to the payee.

Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 93, 24 L. ed. 341; Kohn v. Consol. Butter Co., 30 Misc. 725, 63 N. Y. Supp. 265.

As to liability of stranger who indorses commercial paper before delivery, see editorial note to Fullerton v. Hill, 18 L. R. A. 33.

§ 115. Warranty; where negotiation by delivery or by a qualified indorsement. Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement, warrants:

1. That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;

2. That he has a good title to it;

3. That all prior parties had capacity to contract;

4. That he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.

But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee. The provisions of subdivision three of this section do not apply to persons negotiating public or corporate securities, other than bills and notes. Meyer v. Richards, 163 U. S. 385, 41 L. ed. 199, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148; Meriden Nat. Bank v. Gallandet, 120 N. Y. 298, 24 N. E. 994.

As to implied warranty of genuineness on sale of negotiable paper, see also editorial note to Nashville Lumber Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank of Nashville, 27

L. R. A. 519.

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