'potness' is wanting; hence in that cognition a glimpsing of the qualification of the pot, as qualified by potness, is not possible. Without the determination 'potness' there can be no cognition of what is qualified as 'pot,' because of the rule that cognition of a thing other than a genus is determined by some attribute." The upshot of this is that there is in perception a stage at which the thing is indeed apprehended, but without discrimination of its "thisness" from its "essence," as the matter is elsewhere put. At that, the unquestioning, stage it is held that the cognition is really suprasensual and not subject to the alternative of truth and falsity. But what is the point of calling such a cognition suprasensual? What appears to be meant is not that the thing, but that the cognition is not perceived, i.e. by the mind-organ. In other words, we perceive, but do not perceive that we perceive. Furthermore, the cognition is infallible, so that error, if any, must come in, as the Epicureans held, with the προσδοξαζόμενον. At the second, or definitive, stage we qualify the object by a generic term, recognizing that the pot is a pot. According to our system this implies a thinking of the genus itself, and we have to show how this comes about. In its realism the system demands that the genus must be there, in order to be thought; accordingly it is said to be apprehended by a non-mundane contact (alaukika-sannikarsha), which is designated sāmānyalakshanā, "having the generality for mark." Here again we may indulge in a quotation :-* * "Here, if by the word 'mark' self-identity is intended, we get the meaning, ‘a presence of which the self-identity is an universal.' And this is to be understood as by way of a determination in a cognition having for object the thing connected with the sense-organ. Thus, where * Siddhanta-muktāvalī, 63. conjoined with the sense-organ is smoke, and with that for object the cognition smoke' has come to pass, in that cognition there arises the determination 'smokeness,' and with contact qua 'smokeness' a cognition 'smoke' having for object all smokes. "Conjunction with the sense-organ is to be understood as mundane (normal), and this in the case of exterior sense-organs. In the case of the mind-organ merely the universal by way of being a determination in the cognition is presence.' Hence, when by verbal communication and so forth we are made aware of some ghost, a mental awareness of all ghosts is accounted for. Furthermore, generality means being common' and that is in some cases eternal, 'smokeness' and so forth, in other cases non-eternal, 'pot' and so forth. Where a particular pot is cognized as being, by conjunction, on the ground or, by inherence, in its parts, thereupon there arises a cognition of all the grounds, or of all the parts, having that pot. Nor "In perception nothing is presented without a contact; and so without 'generality-mark' how would there be a presentation of all smokes qua smoke and of all fires qua fire: this is why 'generality-mark' is accepted. should it be asked what harm there is in non-presentation of all fires and smokes: for, inasmuch as in regard to the perceived smoke a connexion with fire has been apprehended and other smoke is not given, there is then no accounting for the doubt whether 'smoke' is overlapped by 'fire'; whereas on my view, since by 'generality-mark' all smoke is given, a doubt is possible as to whether 'smoke' at other times in other places is overlapped by 'fire.'" We are now, perhaps, in a position to seize the whole doctrine which is meant to be conveyed. According to this doctrine, what is first presented is a particular object in its undivided entirety. But in point of fact the object consists of an universal inherent in its material; and this universal emerges to the view of the soul, which has contact with it in a suprasensual manner. But the universal, as such, inheres equally in all particulars; and, since it has no existence except as inherent, all the particulars come in some way into contemplation. Even a particular may act as an universal in view of the different other objects to which it stands in the same relation. There is, however, yet another factor of which we must take account. When we see a lump of sugar, we know that it is sweet, a fact which we explain by "association of ideas." The Nyaya (but not all other systems) will have it that we perceive the sugar to be sweet, and it admits another nonmundane contact under the name "cognition-mark" (jñānalakshanā). Since, however, the object is clearly legitimate, namely, the distinction of the inherent universal from the associated, we need not quarrel with the way of putting the matter or discuss the arguments. Probably the most interesting feature in the theory as so far expounded is its attitude to the universals, which it holds to be involved in the perception. It is not so long since in this Society we heard it maintained that the perception of a thing involves in a way a consciousness of all its congeners. Possibly, therefore, some further observations, partly from the Indian side, may be in point. The particular functioning as an universal has already come before us. But there is another Indian system, that of the Jains, which deals more formally with the subject. Here also we may make a quotation :-* "Generality is of two kinds, crosswise generality and vertical generality. * Pramana-naya-tattv-ālok-ālankāra, V, 3-5. so, but found in their atoms an absolute differentiation. But clearly the Jains, in admitting both a "crosswise" and a vertical" generality, had taken a step which might ultimately render questionable the very idea of an individual. So far is it from being the fact, as has been alleged, that the Indians were unacquainted with the concept. § 4. The Post-apperception (anu-vyavasāya.) The completed perception results according to the Nyāya in a cognition of a "this" as qualified by a universal, the object being really qualified and the cognition correspondingly determined. But these philosophers recognized a further stage, at which the mind becomes by mental perception cognizant of its cognition. No doubt, their opponents in general admitted such a stage in thought. But there were essential differences as to its character and indispensability. Some philosophers held that the original cognition was suprasensual and inferred from a resultant "known-ness" in the object. But the main contention was with the upholders of "selfluminosity." These maintained that the cognition in itself without "post-apperception " was sufficient to lead to appropriate action; and to the objection that desire also should be similarly autonomous they replied that this was nugatory, since for all action they posited cognition as a requisite. What they mean by "self-luminosity" is that all cognition implies consciousness, and some of them state their view formally as follows:- * "The proof of self-luminosity is perception itself. For all presentations have at their origination the form 'I cognize this,' tracing out a cognizer, a cognition, and a cognized, wherein the self is glimpsed as agent, the cognized as object of the act, and the cognition as action; * Tattva-cintamani, Vol. I, p. 788. so that the cognition is experienced as including in its proper reference the cognizer and the cognized." The point of the debate is, no doubt, a little obscure. What the opponent really maintains is that all cognitions are in the form of a revelation of their object to the subject and not susceptible of error: as the connexion between a cognition and its (true) object he names a "special kind of own nature," which he says is established by experience, although it cannot be conveyed by any single word. The Nyaya denies that all cognitions are in the form "I cognize this," and claims that experience proves that factual certitude in the form "this silver" is sufficient to elicit response. Both admit that the response may be mistaken; but, while the Nyaya holds that this is the fault of a wrong perception, the opponent considers that it is due to a failure to distinguish between the thing perceived and something desired. § 5. Truth and Error. Coming now to the matter of truth and error, we may recall how anxiously the later schools of Greek philosophy were occupied with the question of the non-illusory perception. The whole dispute between the Stoics and the later Academy centred about this point. The Stoics laboured to define an appearance which could which could not deceive, their κатaληπTÊỲ pavтaoía, and even appealed to the goodness of Providence, which would not have created two exactly similar things; while the Academy based upon the view that any appearance might be false its doctrine of the probable. At a much earlier period some of the Sophists denied the possibility of error on the ground that a false statement was simply a different statement, wherein, of course, they were considering merely the content of a judgment and ignoring the real question, which concerns its reference. In the Nyaya-Vaiseshika view perception does, as we have |