least on a level with the Greeks and with the scholastics of our own middle ages. They even attained the notion that all perception and cognition were due to a connexion of intelligence with a skin, a notion, which seems to be endorsed by modern science. What is known as the "relativity" of perception in the case of such pairs "long" and "short" was also considered and by some denied,* as we may also find in modern psychological works. §3. Process and Analysis of Perception. As a practical exemplification of the stages recognized by Indians in the process of perception we may quote a particular (Jain) statement† as follows: Originating with a seeing, which occurs immediately upon conjunction of object and subject and which takes in existence only, we have a first apprehension of a thing qualified by intermediate generic forms-this is notice.' Next comes desire for the speciality of the thing noticed this is 'curiosity.' "Next, ascertainment of the speciality of the object of the curiosity-this is 'apperception.' "The same, when it has attained a confirmed condition, is ' retention' or 'contemplation.' From curiosity 'doubt' is distinguished by being preceded thereby. Although all these are in a way the same, they have different designations in virtue of being special develop ments. "Owing to being experienced without confusion, even when they occur in incomplete form, owing to their revealing severally unanticipated developments of the * Tattva-cintūmani, Vol. I, p. 560. + Pramana-naya-tattv-ālok-ālankāra, II, 7–18. thing, and owing to their successive origination, these overpass each other. "In some cases the succession is unobserved by reason of rapid origination.” The Nyaya-Vaiseshika philosophy is usually content for its purposes to distinguish in perception two stages, which I will represent by the terms "unquestioning" (nirvikalpaka) and definitive" (savikalpaka). The literal meanings "without alternative" and "with alternative," while indicating the nature of the distinction, are unsuitable for use, and for the second there is a synonymous term vyavasaya (apperception) which is rather literally rendered by "decision." This important discrimination will justify a rather extensive quotation* : "Immediately upon conjunction with the eye there does not arise a cognition in the form 'pot,' as a something qualified by 'potness,' by reason of the previous nonexistence of the qualification 'potness'; for the cause of awareness of a qualified cognition is cognition of a qualification. And so at first there comes to pass a cognition not penetrating to a being qualified as between pot and potness; and it is this that is the 'unquestioning.' And this not perceived. For a cognition not penetrating to a being qualified is not perception, since that presents itself as I cognize a pot.' Here in the self a cognition comes to light by way of being a determination [thereof], in the cognition again 'pot,' and in the pot 'potness.' That which is the determination, the same is called a‘qualification'; in the qualification the further qualification is called the delimitant of the being that qualification. A cognition having for determination the delimitant of the being of a qualification is cause of the qualificand's being qualified Now in the unquestioning a determination such as * Siddhānta-muktāvalī, 58. 'potness' is wanting; hence in that cognition a glimpsing of the qualification of the pot, as qualified by potness, is not possible. Without the determination 'potness' there can be no cognition of what is qualified as 'pot,' because of the rule that cognition of a thing other than a genus is determined by some attribute." The upshot of this is that there is in perception a stage at which the thing is indeed apprehended, but without discrimination of its "thisness" from its "essence," as the matter is elsewhere put. At that, the unquestioning, stage it is held that the cognition is really suprasensual and not subject to the alternative of truth and falsity. But what is the point of calling such a cognition suprasensual? What appears to be meant is not that the thing, but that the cognition is not perceived, i.e. by the mind-organ. In other words, we perceive, but do not perceive that we perceive. Furthermore, the cognition is infallible, so that error, if any, must come in, as the Epicureans held, with the προσδοξαζόμενον. At the second, or definitive, stage we qualify the object by a generic term, recognizing that the pot is a pot. According to our system this implies a thinking of the genus itself, and we have to show how this comes about. In its realism the system demands that the genus must be there, in order to be thought; accordingly it is said to be apprehended by a non-mundane contact (alaukika-sannikarsha), which is designated sāmānyalakshanā, “having the generality for mark." Here again we may indulge in a quotation : "Here, if by the word 'mark' self-identity is intended, we get the meaning, 'a presence of which the self-identity is an universal.' And this is to be understood as by way of a determination in a cognition having for object the thing connected with the sense-organ. Thus, where * Siddhānta-muktāvalī, 63. conjoined with the sense-organ is smoke, and with that for object the cognition 'smoke' has come to pass, in that cognition there arises the determination 'smokeness,' and with contact qua smokeness' a cognition 'smoke' having for object all smokes. "Conjunction with the sense-organ is to be understood as mundane (normal), and this in the case of exterior sense-organs. In the case of the mind-organ merely the universal by way of being a determination in the cognition is 'presence.' Hence, when by verbal communication and so forth we are made aware of some ghost, a mental awareness of all ghosts is accounted for. "Furthermore, generality means 'being common' and that is in some cases eternal, 'smokeness' and so forth, in other cases non-eternal, 'pot' and so forth. Where a particular pot is cognized as being, by conjunction, on the ground or, by inherence, in its parts, thereupon there arises a cognition of all the grounds, or of all the parts, having that pot. Nor "In perception nothing is presented without a contact; and so without 'generality-mark' how would there be a presentation of all smokes qua smoke and of all fires qua fire: this is why 'generality-mark' is accepted. should it be asked what harm there is in non-presentation of all fires and smokes: for, inasmuch as in regard to the perceived smoke a connexion with fire has been apprehended and other smoke is not given, there is then no accounting for the doubt whether 'smoke' is overlapped by 'fire'; whereas on my view, since by 'generality-mark' all smoke is given, a doubt is possible as to whether 'smoke' at other times in other places is overlapped by 'fire.' We are now, perhaps, in a position to seize the whole doctrine which is meant to be conveyed. According to this doctrine, what is first presented is a particular object in its undivided entirety. But in point of fact the object consists of an universal inherent in its material; and this universal emerges to the view of the soul, which has contact with it in a suprasensual manner. But the universal, as such, inheres equally in all particulars; and, since it has no existence except as inherent, all the particulars come in some way into contemplation. Even a particular may act as an universal in view of the different other objects to which it stands in the same relation. There is, however, yet another factor of which we must take account. When we see a lump of sugar, we know that it is sweet, a fact which we explain by "association of ideas." The Nyaya (but not all other systems) will have it that we perceive the sugar to be sweet, and it admits another nonmundane contact under the name "cognition-mark" (jñānalakshanā). Since, however, the object is clearly legitimate, namely, the distinction of the inherent universal from the associated, we need not quarrel with the way of putting the matter or discuss the arguments. Probably the most interesting feature in the theory as so far expounded is its attitude to the universals, which it holds to be involved in the perception. It is not so long since in this Society we heard it maintained that the perception of a thing involves in a way a consciousness of all its congeners. Possibly, therefore, some further observations, partly from the Indian side, may be in point. The particular functioning as an universal has already come before us. But there is another Indian system, that of the Jains, which deals more formally with the subject. Here also we may make a quotation :-* "Generality is of two kinds, crosswise generality and vertical generality. * Pramana-naya-tattv-ālok-ālankāra, V, 3–5. |