when he contrasts the "dumb way" of acquaintance with all that knowledge-about enables us to "say," "tell," " describe"; (b) he connects it with the presence and absence of analysis, and makes it turn on whether or no we apprehend the "inner nature" and the "relations" of a thing. At the same time, he makes two further statements which are very striking, but not easily reconcilable with the first two, viz.: (c) he apparently holds of everything in the world that we must either know it by acquaintance or else not at all; and (d) that the difference between acquaintance and knowledge-about is relative. Without considering further whether James's account can be made consistent with itself, I shall take the points elicited from it and use them at once to define the position which I wish to advocate.

1. In the first place, I suggest that we cannot distinguish between acquaintance and knowledge-about either by the test of language or by the test of analysis. Consider, e.g., a botanist who, having prepared a series of microscopic sections, is now engaged in studying them, and pari passu in drawing diagrams* of the structures revealed, and in formulating and writing down his theoretical conclusions. Granted that in his work he is using a great deal of previously acquired knowledge; granted, too, that when he first entered on his botanical studies, his acquaintance was "dumb" for lack of a technical vocabulary, and poor in discrimination of structures and relations for lack of training in observation illuminated by theory. But in so far as there is progress in knowledge in the course of such research, can we intelligibly say that it consists in an advance from acquaintance to knowledge-about? Does it not rather consist in a steady expansion of acquaintance towards greater fullness and completeness? If this is the correct view, we can appreciate

* It is an interesting question which has not, so far as I am aware, been considered on its merits, how the distinction between "acquaintance" and "description" applies to diagrams, sketches, photographs, maps, models, and other kinds of "reproductions."

that the investigator who observes and theorizes at first-hand has the advantage over those who merely read his account and have to construct as much as they can of his meaning out of the botanical knowledge which they possess already, aided by his diagrams and illustrations. If they wish to check and test his reports and conclusions, they must for themselves repeat his experiments and observations. They must personally traverse the path of his research: they must acquire the same intimate acquaintance with the facts. The authority of his first-hand observation and theory can be overthrown or confirmed only by other first-hand testimony.

2. In short, I am suggesting that current distinctions between "acquaintance" and "description" (or "knowledgeabout"), or between "immediate experience" and "thought," should be supplemented by the distinction between knowledge which, for want of a better word, I must call first-hand and knowledge which is second-hand or vicarious. The main point is that first-hand knowledge, as I would use the term, is not restricted to "acquaintance" so far as that is merely dumb or unanalysed, or to "immediate "experience, if "immediate " once more means experience before it has been worked upon by discrimination, comparison, analysis, interpretation. On the contrary, there need be no limit to the amount of analysis and of expression through words and other symbols which "first-hand knowledge" may cover, provided always that our thinking is done, in Royce's phrase, " from the life," or, to put it differently, that we possess our meanings fulfilled, or realized, as abundantly as possible.

A series of illustrations may serve to make the point clear. A man who has been in love may philosophize upon his passion, but no amount of intellectual sharpness could tell a man what it is to be in love who did not know."* "Know" here obviously means "know by acquaintance," know by being in

love. It would be irrelevant to object that it is possible to be in love without knowing that one is in love. For the point here is simply that one who had never even in the faintest degree been in love, could neither understand the language in which poets or philosophers have expressed that experience, nor could he have anything himself to express. If he were to use the term "love," he would quite literally not know what he was talking about. He would be as helpless and unintelligent in this field as the congenitally blind man is in the world of colours. But, on the other hand, acquaintance with what it is to be in love, or, as we should rather say, first-hand knowledge of it, still admits of many degrees and forms, and the limitation of one's own first-hand experience will inevitably affect the extent to which one can possess, in fulfilled form, the meaning of Plato's Symposium, or the whole range and depth of Dante's love for Beatrice. In any case, however, being in love, even though we call it an "immediate " experience, is certainly neither dumb nor unanalysed. It commonly includes manifold utterance and self-analysis. Even as a mere Erlebniss, it is yet a most complicated form of experience, opening up not merely new ranges of sensation and emotion, but of thought and action-in short, it is hardly to be contained within the limits of “acquaintance or "immediate experience," as these terms are usually understood, yet it is genuine, and vivid, and first-hand throughout: an enjoyment of meanings fulfilled and fulfilments hoped for.

Now, the passage quoted just now concerning love is part of an argument to the effect that much current thinking about religion is poor thinking, not from lack of logical acumen, but from lack of data with which to think-from poverty and narrowness of religious experience. Religious experience, here, = being acquainted with religion = being religious. The argument, then, is that being religious is an indispensable presupposition for philosophizing on religion. This example suggests some curious points for reflection. First, shall we not philosophize better for exploring and practising at first-hand the various

forms of religious experience? The reading of James's Varieties is, surely, no adequate substitute for cultivating one's own religious life. If so, what of the detachment of many modern thinkers, not only from official church membership, but from the traditional vehicles of religious feeling, thought and action? If we do not pray, if we do not worship, if we do not participate in religious ceremonies with living faith, do we not thereby lose acquaintance with what it is to be religious, and are we not so much the more poorly qualified for thinking justly and truly on religion? It is certainly a curious phenomenon that philosophers, along with the educated classes generally, should everywhere be drifting away from religion at the very time when the ontological argument is being restated by way of developing "the meaning of God in human experience,"* and when theologians lay down, as the first canon for the study of Christ's teaching, the necessity of getting at the experiences behind the term "God."

Another point for reflection raised by this example is that we may be acquainted with religion, as with all other forms of expressive behaviour, in two ways: (a) from the spectator's standpoint who studies, at first-hand, the behaviour which he observes, including the language which forms part of it; and (b) from the agent's point of view who knows, at first hand, what it feels like thus to behave and to use that sort of language. Now, though both these ways of knowing the phenomena are firsthand, is not the second incomparably more vital and complete? For a full acquaintance with religion we would, surely, need the worshipper's knowledge much more than the spectator's. The example of anthropologists may serve to emphasize this point. The European observer studies a native tribe, its customs, its beliefs, its ceremonies. He records, shall we say, a careful description of a religious dance as he sees it, takes snapshots and

* Cf., e.g., W. E. Hocking's book under this title. See also my Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, ch. x.

+ Cf. R. T. Glover, The Jesus of History.

perhaps motion-pictures of it, collects the musical instruments employed, takes a phonographic record of the music. The result is "science"-the best that science can do. To the scholars at home pictures and phonograph, so far as they go, make the facts accessible better than the most accurate verbal description (e.g., how could the music be described ?), but their knowledge will still be inferior to that of the original observer who saw the whole performance in its full setting of scene and circumstance. And his knowledge, in turn, is incomplete compared with that of the participants, whether as merely enjoying the expression of their feelings or as also believing in the significance of the dance, be it as magic, be it as an act of worship.

Another example to illustrate the value of the insider's firsthand knowledge: it is noticeable how constantly Dr. Bosanquet, in his various writings on Political Philosophy, appeals to experience," generally qualified as "special" or "genuine,” in support of the principles he lays down, and as an aid in their interpretation and application.* And if we are poorly qualified to theorize about matters social, economic and political, unless we are acquainted at first hand with the handling of men and affairs, so we shall also be poorly qualified to philosophize about art, if we have no genuine and trained power of aesthetic appreciation, or about science if we have not something of the mathematical, physical, biological habit of mind from personal work in these fields. Such a programme for a philosopher's education, it will be noticed, will end by being not unlike the

* Cf., e.g., The Philosophical Theory of the State, 3rd edit., p. 181 sq. ; or p. 184, on a pretty house as an element in the best life: "Who could doubt it who knows what home-life is?" He meets his critics very largely with the suggestion that either their experience is inadequate, or else that they fail to make full use of it in their theories. "Experience" here whole attitude as citizen, the whole way of feeling, thinking, acting towards the community. This must be of the right sort, if it is to yield a sound theory.

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