tribution of power be between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly organized but connected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, while the necessity is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict is greater where the interests of a society are divided geographically than in any other, as has already been shown. These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible; and I am at a loss to understand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or who has read history or studied the principles of free government to any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact, that in every free state, there are those who look more to the necessity of maintaining power, than guarding against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but simply to state a fact apparently necessary to explain the contrariety of opinions, among the intelligent, where the abstract consideration of the subject would seem scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true cause, I must think the fear of weakening the government too much in this case to be in a great measure unfounded, or at least that the danger is much less from that than the opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a nature may be abused by a state, but pealed to, three-fourths of which, in fact, form a power, whose decrees are the constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discontent. The utmost extent then of the power is, that a state acting in its sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may compel the government, created by that compact, to submit a question touching its infraction to the parties who created it; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, fatal project of giving to the general government the sole and final right of interpreting the Constitution, thereby reversing the whole system, making that instrument the creature of its will, instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its creation, and annihilating in fact the authority which imposed it, and from which the government itself derives its existence. That such would be the result, were the right in question vested in the legislative or executive branch of the government, is conceded by all. No one has been so hardy as to assert that Congress or the President ought to have the right, or to deny that, if vested finally and exclusively in either, the consequences which I have stated would not necessarily follow; but its advocates have been reconciled to the doctrine, on the supposition when I reflect that the states unanimously that there is one department of the general called the general government into existence government, which, from its peculiar organiwith all of its powers, which they freely sur-zation, affords an independent tribunal through rendered on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, safety, and prosperity required it; that they are bound together by a common origin, and the recollection of common suffering and common triumph in the great and splendid achievement of their independence; and the strongest feelings of our nature, and among them, the love of national power and distinction, are on the side of the Union; it does seem to me, that the fear which would strip the states of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere dependent corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peaceable protection of those interests which they reserved under their own peculiar guardianship when they created the general government, is unnatural and unreasonable. If those who voluntarily created the system, cannot be trusted to preserve it, what power can? So far from extreme danger, I hold that there never was a free state, in which this great conservative principle, indispensable in all, was ever so safely lodged. In others, when the co-estates, representing the dissimilar and conflicting interests of the com which the government may exercise the high authority which is the subject of consideration, with perfect safety to all. I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the judiciary department. I am fully sensible of its importance, and would maintain it to the fullest extent in its constitutional powers and independence; but it is impossible for me to believe that it was ever intended by the Constitution, that it should exercise the power in question, or that it is competent to do so, and, if it were, that it would be a safe depository of the power. Its powers are judicial and not political, and are expressly confined by the Constitution " to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under its authority;" and which I have high authority in asserting, excludes political questions, and comprehends those only where there are parties amenable to the process of the court.* Nor is its incompetency less clear, than its want of constitutional authority. There may be many and the most dangerous infractions on the part of Congress, munity, came into contact, the only alternative of which, it is conceded by all, the court, as a was compromise, submission, or force. Not judicial tribunal, cannot from its nature take It is an universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to protect, can I have already referred, has really, in my safely be confided only to those interested in opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speakprotecting, or their responsible agents-a ing in reference to this subject, it says, "It maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The danger in our system is, that the general government, which represents the interests of the whole, may encroach on the states, which represent the peculiar and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former. so in ours. Should the general government and a state come into conflict, we have a higher remedy; the power which called the general government into existence, which gave it of all its authority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be invoked. The states themselves may be ap cognisance. The tariff itself is a strong case in point; and the reason applies equally to all others, where Congress perverts power from an object intended to one not intended, a * I refer to the authority of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Jonathan Robbins. I have not been able to refer to the speech, and speak from memory. the most insidious and dangerous of all the infractions; and which may be extended to all of its powers, more especially to the taxing and appropriating. But supposing it competent to take cognisance of all infractions of every description, the insuperable objection still remains, that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the power in question. materially vary the case. Its highest possible effect would be to retard, and not finally to resist, the will of a dominant majority. But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it possible that reason could settle a question where the passions and interests of men are concerned, this point would have been long since settled for ever, by the state of Virginia. The report of her legislature, to which has been objected" (to the right of a state to interpose for the protection of her reserved rights), "that the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of the Constitution; on this subject it might be observed, first, that there may be instances of usurped powers which the forms of the Constitution could never draw within the control of the judicial department; secondly, that if the decision of the judiciary be raised above the sovereign parties to the Constitution, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the Constitution before the judiciary, must be equally authoritative and final with the decision of that department. But the proper answer to the objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates In examining this point, we ought not to forget that the government, through all of its departments, judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and responsible agents; and that the power which really controls ultimately all the movements, is not in the agents, but those who elect or appoint them. To understand then its real character, and what would be the action of the system in any supposable case, we must raise our view from the mere agents, to this high con- to those great and extraordinary cases, in trolling power which finally impels every movement of the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a majority, compounded of the majority of the states, taken as corporate bodies, and the majority of the people of the states estimated in federal numbers. These united constitute the real and final power, which impels and directs the movements of the general government. The majority of the states elect the majority of the Senate; of the people of the states, that of the House of Representatives; the two united, the President; and the President and a majority of the Senate appoint the judges, a majority of whom and a majority of the Senate and the House with the President, really exercise all of the powers of the government with the exception of the cases where the Constitution requires a greater number than a majority. The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this united majority, as the majority of Congress itself, or the President, is its legislative or executive representative; and to confide the power to the judiciary to determine finally and conclusively what powers are delegated, and what reserved, would be in reality to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and by whom they can be controlled in various ways; and, of course, to subject (against the fundamental principle of our system, and all sound political reasoning) the reserved powers of the states, with all of the local and peculiar interests they were intended to protect, to the which all of the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against infraction dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers not delegated, may not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the judicial department may also exercise or sanction dangerous powers, beyond the grant of the Constitution, and consequently that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as well as by another-by the judiciary, as well as by the executive or legislative." Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected, that if one of the parties has the right to judge of infractions of the Constitution, so has the other, and that consequently in cases of contested powers between a state and the general government, each would have a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when sovereign powers differ in the construction of treaties or compacts, and that of course it would come to be a mere question of force. The error is in the assumption that the general government is a party to the constitutional compact. The states, as has been shown, formed the compact, acting as sovereign and independent communities. The general government is but its creature; and though in reality a government with all the rights and authority which belong to any other government, within the will of the very majority against which the orb of its powers, it is, nevertheless, a governprotection was intended. Nor will the tenure ment emanating from a compact between by which the judges hold their office, however sovereigns, and partaking, in its nature and valuable the provision in many other respects, object, of the character of a joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the to the remotest generations; but, if not, our interests in which all are jointly concerned, splendid anticipations of the future will prove but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power than if it did not exist. To deny this would be to deny the most incontestible facts, and the clearest conclusions; while to acknowledge its truth, is to destroy utterly the objection that the appeal would be to force, in the case supposed. For if each party has a right to judge, then, under our system of government, the final cognisance of a question of contested power would be in the states, and not in the general government. It would be the duty of the latter, as in all similar cases of a contest between one or more of the principals and joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves. Such are the plain dictates of reason and analogy both. On no sound principle can the agents have a right to final cognisance, as against the principals, much less to use force against them, to maintain their construction of their powers. Such a right would be monstrous; and has never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases. a That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a contested power between the states and the general government, we have the authority not only of reason and analogy, but of the distinguished statesman already referred to. Mr. Jefferson, at a late period of his life, after long experience and mature reflection, says, but an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering, and the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the states, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice and violence, and force, must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten, that where the majority rules, the minority is the subject; and that if we should absurdly attribute to the former the exclusive right of construing the Constitution, there would be in fact between the sovereign and subject, under such a government, no constitution; or at least nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an instrument. How the states are to exercise this high power of interposition which constitutes so essential a portion of their reserved rights that it cannot be delegated without an entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system from a federal into a consolidated government, is a question that the states only are competent to determine. The arguments which prove that they possess the power, equally prove that they are, in the language of Jefferson, "the rightful judges of the mode and measure of redress." But the spirit of ernments, I do not think their relations are itself, forbids a recourse to it, except in cases correctly understood by foreigners. They sup- of dangerous infractions of the Constitution; pose the former subordinate to the latter. and then only in the last resort, when all reaThis is not the case. They are co-ordinate sonable hope of relief from the ordinary action departments of one simple and integral whole. of the government has failed; when, if the But you may ask if the two departments right to interpose did not exist, the alternative should claim each the same subject of power, would be submission and oppression on one where is the umpire to decide between them? side, or resistance by force on the other. That In cases of little urgency or importance, the our system should afford, in such extreme prudence of both parties will keep them aloof cases, an intermediate point between those from the questionable ground; but if it can dire alternatives, by which the government neither be avoided nor compromised, a con- may be brought to a pause, and thereby an vention of the states must be called to ascribe interval obtained to compromise differences, "With respect to our state and federal gov- forbearance, as well as the nature of the right or, if impracticable, be compelled to submit the question to a constitutional adjustment, through an appeal to the states themselves, is an evidence of its high wisdom; an element not, as is supposed by some, of weakness, but of strength; not of anarchy or revolution, but of peace and safety. Its general recognition would of itself, in a great measure, if not altogether, supersede the necessity of its exercise, by impressing on the movements of the government that moderation and justice so essential to harmony and peace, in a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests as ours; and would, if controversy should come, turn the resentment of the aggrieved from the system to those who had abused its powers (a point all important), and cause them to seek redress, not in revolution or overthrow, but in reformation. It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute where the alternative would the doubtful power to that department which they may think best." - It is thus that our Constitution, by authorizing amendments, and by prescribing the authority and mode of making them, has by a simple contrivance, with its characteristic wisdom, provided a power which, in the last resort, supersedes effectually the necessity and even the pretext for force; a power to which none can fairly object; with which the interests of all are safe; which can definitely close all controversies in the only effectual mode, by freeing the compact of every defect and uncertainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It is impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to devise another mode which shall be safe and effectual, and at the same time consistent with what are the relations and acknowledged powers of the two great departments of our government. It gives a beauty and security peculiar to our system, which, if be force, tending to prevent, and if that fails, duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to correct peaceably the aberrations to which all political systems are liable, and which, if | formed the Union, and as such is a manifest permitted to accumulate, without correction, breach of faith, and a violation of the most must finally end in a general catastrophe. solemn obligations. On the 27th of Dec., 1837, Mr. Calhoun submitted to the Senate the following celebrated series of resolutions : 1. Resolved, That in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the states adopting the same, acted severally as free, independent, and sovereign states, and that each for itself, by its own voluntary assent, entered the Union with a view to its increased security against all dangers, domestic as well as foreign, and the more perfect and secure enjoyment of its advantages, natural, political, and social. (AS PROPOSED BY MR. CALHOUN.) 5. Resolved, That the intermeddling of any state, or states, or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this District, or in any of the territories, on the ground, or under the pretext, that it is immoral or sinful, or the passage of any act or measure of Congress with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack on the institutions of all the slaveholding states. (AS AMENDED ON MOTION OF MR. CLAY OF Kr.) 5. Resolved, That when the District of 2. Resolved, That in delegating a portion Columbia was ceded by the states of Virginia of their powers to be exercised by the federal and Maryland to the United States, domestic government, the states retained, severally, slavery existed in both of those states, includthe exclusive and sole right over their own ing the ceded territory; and that as it still domestic institutions and police, and are alone continues in both of them, it could not be responsible for them, and that any intermed- abolished within the District without a violadling of any one or more states, or a combination of their citizens, with the domestic institu- the cession, and in the acceptance of the terri tions and police of the others, on any ground, or under any pretext whatever, political, moral, or religious, with a view to their alteration or subversion, is an assumption of superiority not warranted by the Constitution, insulting to the states interfered with, tending to endanger their domestic peace and tranquillity, subversive to the objects for which the Constitution was formed, and, by necessary consequence, tending to weaken and destroy the Union itself. 3. Resolved, That this government was instituted and adopted by the several states of this Union, as a common agent, in order to carry into effect the power which they had delegated by the Constitution for their mutual security and prosperity, and that in fulfilment of this high and sacred trust, this government is bound so to exercise its powers as to give, as far as may be practicable, increased stability and security to the domestic institutions of the states that compose the Union, and that it is the solemn duty of the government to resist all attempts, by one portion of the Union, to use it as an instrument to attack the domestic institutions of another, or to weaken or destroy such institutions. 4. Resolved, That domestic slavery, as it exists in the Southern and Western states of tion of that good faith which was implied in tory, nor, unless compensation were made for the slaves, without a manifest infringement of an amendment of the Constitution of the United States; nor without exciting a degree of just alarm and apprehension in the states recognising slavery, far transcending, in mischievous tendency, any possible benefit which would be accomplished by the abolition. And, resolved, that any attempt of Congress to abolish slavery in any territory of the Uni ted States in which it exists, would create serious alarm and just apprehension in the states sustaining that domestic institution, would be a violation of good faith towards the inhabitants of such territory who have been permitted to settle with and hold slaves, because the people of such territory have not asked for the abolition of slavery therein, and because that, when any such territory shall be admitted into the union as a state, the people thereof will be entitled to decide that question for themselves. Mr. Morris of Ohio moved to strike out the words "moral and religious" in the first resolution, which motion was rejected by YEAS. Messrs. Bayard, Buchanan, Clayton, Davis, McKean, Morris, Prentiss, Robbins, Ruggles, Smith of Ind., Southard, Swift, Tipton, and Webster.-14. NAYS. Messrs. Allen, Black, Brown, Calhoun, Clay of Ala, Clay of Ky, Cuthbert, Fulton, Hubbard King, Knight, Young.-31. The first resolution was finally adopted by yeas and nays as follows: YEAS.-Messrs. Allen of O., Black of Miss., Brown of N. C., this Union, composes an important part of Buchanan of Pa., Calhoun of S. C., Clay of Ala., Clay of Ky., of Pa., Nicholas of La., Niles of Conn., Norvell of Mich., Pierce of N. H., Preston of S. C., Rives and Roane of Va., Robinson of III., Ruggles of Me., Sevier of Ark., Smith of Conn., Strange of N. C., Walker of Miss., White of Ind., Williams of Me., Wright of N. Y., and Young of Ill-31. NAYS. Messrs. Bayard of Del., Clayton of Del., Davis of Mass., Knight of R. I., Morris of O.. Prentiss of Vt., Robbing of R. I., Smith of Ind., Southard of N. J., Swift of Vt., Tip All the senators who voted for the first re- | preceding section; and said states are severally solution voted for the second, except Messrs. authorized to sell said land warrants, and apMcKean, Robinson and Ruggles. Messrs. ply the proceeds thereof to the support of Clayton and Spence, who did not vote for the first resolution, voted for the second. The negative vote on the second resolution was as follows: Messrs. Davis, Morris, Prentiss, Smith of Ind., Southard, Swift, Tipton, Wall, and Webster.-9. The vote on the adoption of the third resolution was as follows: YEAS.-Messrs. Allen, Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Ala., Cuthbert, Fulton, Hubbard, King, Linn, Lumpkin, Lyon, Merrick, Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Pierce, Preston, Rives, Roane, Kobinson, Sevier. Smith of Conn., Strange, Walker, White, Williams, Wright, and Young.-31. NAYS. Messrs. Bayard, Clayton, Davis, McKean, Morris, Prentiss, Ruggles, Smith of Ind., Swift, Tipton, and Webster. -11. The affirmative vote on the fourth resolution was the same as on the third, with the exception of Messrs. Linn and Merrick, who did not vote on this, and with the addition of Messrs. Bayard, Clay of Ky., Clayton, Crittenden, and Grundy. The negative vote was as follows: Messrs. McKean, Morris, Prentiss, Smith of Ind., and Swift.-5. The affirmative vote on the final adoption of the fifth resolution, as amended by Mr. Clay, was the same as that on the fourth resolution, with the addition of Messrs. Talmadge and Tipton. The negative vote was as follows:Messrs. Davis, Knight, McKean, Morris, Prentiss, Smith of Ind., Swift, and Webster.--8. The vote in favor of the last resolution drawn up by Clay, was the same as that in favor of the fifth, with the exception of Messrs. Clayton and Talmadge, and the addition of Mr. Merrick. NAYS. Messrs. Clayton, Davis, Knight, McKean, Prentiss, Robbins, Smith of Ind., Swift, and Webster.-9. California. schools, and in aid of the construction and completion of railroads or canals. Sec. 3. That said land warrants shall be for not less than eighty, nor more than one hundred and sixty acres each, and shall be valid in the hands of the purchasers and holders thereof, and may be located by any such owner or holder upon any of the surveyed public lands which shall be at the time for sale, and subject to private entry; and the title to the land so located under said warrants shall be perfected to the owners or holders thereof in the same manner as under other land warrants issued by the United States. The following amendment was reported by the Committee on Public Lands of the House of Representatives : A bill to confer equal benefits upon all the states from the public lands and the proceeds thereof. Be it enacted, &c., That, in order to equalize the benefits conferred upon the several states of this Union from the public lands and the proceeds thereof, the sum of fifteen millions of dollars, out of the treasury of the United States, shall be deposited with the states in which there are no public lands belonging to the United States, on the terms hereinafter specified, in proportion to the representation of said states in Congress, in case said states shall severally authorize their treasurers or other proper officer to receive the same on deposit on the terms aforesaid; and if any state shall refuse to receive its share, the amount shall be added to the sum to be deposited with the states agreeing to receive the same, in the proportion to their representation in Congress. Sec. 2. That said states receiving said deposit shall, by their several treasurers or other ADMISSION OF. See COMPROMISE MEASURES. proper officer duly authorized by them respec Carlisle John S., of Va. LAND DIVISION PROPOSITION OF. On the 14th of January, 1857, Mr. Carlisle of Va. introduced the following bill in the House of Representatives, to equalize the grants of land to the several states : tively, execute and deliver to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, certificates of deposit for the sums severally received, signed by said treasurers or other proper officers of said states respectively, and for the same, in such form as such secretary may prescribe, expressing the usual legal obligation by said states respectively to repay said do posit, and pledging the faith of said states respectively to the repayment of the amount by them respectively received at the time and in the manner prescribed in this act. Be it enacted, &c., That there be, and is hereby, granted to each of the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia, public lands at the rate of two hundred and fifty thousand acres for each Senator and Representative to which said states are respectively entitled. The said sum of fifteen millions of dollars to Sec. 3. That said secretary shall not call for said deposit from said states unless the amount of money in the treasury of the United States shall be reduced below five millions of dollars, and then only in such manner and for such amounts as Congress may by law direct. Sec. 2. That land warrants shall be issued to each of said states to the amount in all to which they are respectively entitled under the be paid out of the treasury of the United States, and deposited with said states, one half part thereof within one year after the |