Intelligence.-Secession of Rev. S. C. Fripp from the Established Church. 63 recover, adding, "He is a God of mercy and of truth, and when I think of his power and wisdom and goodness, I am enabled to say, Not my will, but thine be doue.'" He blessed God for the consolation and hope afforded by the Scriptures; he said he had founded his faith and hope upon them alone, and that if he had erred in his belief, he felt assured he should be forgiven. He declared his belief in the unity of God; in the divine mission of Jesus; and in the final salvation of all mankind. He said that God was a Being of mercy and forgiveness, and would not that any of his creatures should perish everlastingly; but that sinners would be purified and rendered fit for happiness by sufferings proportioned to their guilt. He endeavoured to console his sorrowing family by saying, he was only falling asleep for a little period, that their separation from him would not be final, that he felt assured they should all meet again in a better world, and finally resigned his spirit into the hands of Him who gave it, without a struggle or a sigh. R. C. 1822. Jan. 18th, at Hackney, ANNE, the wife of G. T. GoodBEHERE, Esq., nephew of the late Alderman Goodbehere. Her death occurred in the following manner: On the preceding afternoon being alone in the parlour, and engaged in stirring the fire, a current of air attracted a light shawl, which she wore on her shoulders, through the bars of the grate, and the flames rapidly communicating with her muslin dress, she was so dreadfully burned before she could alarm the servants of the family, that she survived the accident only about ten hours. Mrs. Goodbehere was in her 39th year; she was an exemplary wife, a tender mother, a sincere and affectionate friend. She has left six young children, (the eldest under nine years of age,) who are, consequently, spared the calamity of estimatiug their irreparable loss. Her less fortunate relations and friends who feel and deeply deplore it, can only derive consolation from the conviction that the “ways of God to man," though mysterious, are ever merciful, and they, therefore, with humble resignation, "bow in silence and adore" the inscrutable designs of his "eternal providence." The remains of this amiable lady, whose fate is much lamented in her neighbourhood, were interred on Monday the 28th inst., in a family vault in the Burial Ground belonging to the Unitarian Church, Hackney. INTELLIGENCE. Secession of Rev. S. C. Fripp from On the 13th of January, after the morn the Established Church. WE are informed, that on Sunday evening, January the 6th, the Rev. S. C. FRIPP, of Bristol, late a Clergyman of the Established Church, delivered, in Lewin's Mead, to a very crowded congregation, a Discourse on the leading doctrines of Unitarianism, explicitly avowing his adoption of them and consequent secession from the Church. It is well known to several of our readers, that Mr. Fripp has long been engaged in religious inquiry; and that, during the greater part of the time, he has avoided officiating as a clergyman. Above two years ago, he declined making application for a living which is in the gift of the Bristol Corporation, (and which, it is understoood, he had good reason to expect, through the influence of a near relative who is a respectable member of it,) lest he should thus be biassed in his search after truth; and then assigned to that gentleman the state of his mind in reference to the doctrines of the Church of England, as the reason of his declining to make the proposed application. ing service, a Meeting of the Lewin's Mead Congregation was held, at which the Rev. John Rowe was called to the chair; and the Rev. Dr. Carpenter proposed the following resolution, which was seconded by Richard Bright, Esq. and carried unanimously: "That this Meeting have great satisfaction in the result of the Rev. S. C. Fripp's examination into the important points at issue between the Unitarian and the Trinitarian; and cordially congratulate him on his open, firm and temperate arowal of those sentiments to which he has been led by a deliberate and (they doubt not) serious and earnest inquiry after Religious Truth: That they respect the conscientious motives which have induced him, as a consequence of his relinquishing the Trinitarian Doctrines of the Church of England, to secede from its Communion and Worship, and to give up his prospect of preferment in it; and they trust that Providence will open a door of usefulness and comfort for him in the Ministry among the Unitarian Dissenters : And, that they beg him to accept their respectful thanks for his able and excellent Discourse delivered in this place last Lord's-day evening; and, believing that the extensive diffusion of it through the press would promote the great cause of Christian Truth and Charity, they earnestly solicit him to publish it, as speedily as his convenience will allow." On the motion of William Towgood, Esq., seconded by Arthur Palmer, Esq., it was then resolved unanimously, that the Chairman be requested to address a letter to Mr. Fripp, in the name of the Meeting, expressive of the sentiments of the foregoing Resolution. We have given these details, because they will be interesting to many of our readers, and they will enable them to know correctly what they would probably learn inaccurately from common rumour. It is understood that Mr. Fripp had, previously to the Meeting, come to the determination to publish the Discourse, with a Letter to a Friend, entering more particularly into his own train of in quiry, and the grounds of his present opinions; and we expect that our readers will find an Advertisement of the publication on the cover of this Number. Unitarian Chaplain to American Congress. THE following article, which has been copied from the American into the English papers, has excited great attention. A silly writer in the Public Ledger has exclaimed against the Americans, as if by this act they had renounced Christiauity. Bigotry may be expected to kick and fling before it retires from the stage. Baltimore, Dec. 11. The Rev. JARED SPARKS, Unitarian Minister, of Baltimore, was yesterday elected a Chaplain to Congress on the part of the House of Representatives. We are happy to learn, that a gentleman of tried and tested talents, of unquestionable learning and ability, and a pure and irreproachable character and life, has thus received a testimonial of the estimation in which he is held by the immediate Representatives of the people, in the most important elective body emanating from them.-Mercantile Advertiser. THE Quarterly Meeting of the Presbyterian Associated Ministers of Manchester and its vicinity took place in the Cross-Street Chapel, Manchester, on Thursday, 27th of December. The Rev. J. J. Tayler, of Manchester, introduced the service; the Rev. B. R. Davis, of Chowbent, preached from 1 Tim. i. 11. After service the ministers and a few lay THE Quarterly Meeting of Unitarian Ministers in South Wales, was held at Llan-dy-fan, Carmarthenshire, on the 27th of December last. The introductory service was conducted by J. James, of GelliOnnen; and Mr. D. John, of St. Clears, preached from 1 John ii. 1, 2. After, service, an open conference took place in the meeting-house, Mr. J. Griffiths, the minister of the place, in the chair; when J. James, of Gelli-Onnen, proposed the subject for discussion, How far is reason to be used in matters of religion? And all that spoke agreed, that religion and reason begin and end together. The same subject is to be resumed, together with the nature and effects of zeal, at the next meeting, which is to be held at Blaen-y-gwrach, Glamorganshire, on the 11th of April next, whereat J. James of Gelii-Onnen, was requested to preach. There were present about 16 preachers, and the audience was numerous and attentive. There was also service as usual in the evening preceding, when Mr. E. Lewis, a student in his last year at the Carmarthen College, introduced, and Mr. John Jones, of Bridgend, and Mr. Wm. Williams, of Blaen-y-gwrach, preached; the former from Isaiah xxxv. 8, and the latter from Acts xi. 18. January 16, 1822. J. JAMES. THE REV. THOMAS FINCH, of Harlow, has in the press, Elements of Self Knowledge; or, a Familiar Introduction to Moral Philosophy, in one volume, 12mo. principally adapted to Young Persons entering into active life. Shortly will be published, in 2 vols. 8vo. a Selection from the Sermons of the late Rev. W. HAWKES, of Manchester. THE Monthly Repository. No. CXCIV.] FEBRUARY, 1822. [Vol. XVII. Mr. Cogan's Examination of Mr. Hume's Objection to the Argument for the Being of God. SIR, ONE NE of the most plausible objections to the arguments for the being of a God is that which is suggested by Mr. Hume, namely, that we have no experience in the origin of worlds, and therefore cannot safely conclude, because ships, cities, &c. are made by human art, that the universe must have had an intelligent Author. This objection I propose to consider. The universe exhibits in innumera ble instances an adaptation of means to ends, or what, for the sake of brevity, I shall sometimes call contrivance, not meaning thereby to assume the matter in dispute. And this adaptation of means to ends seems to be as truly prospective as any thing which we call contrivance in the works of art. The eye appears to have been as manifestly formed for seeing, as the telescope for assisting the vision of the eye. The universe, then, is justly comprehended in the general description of works which indicate a fitness of means to ends; and if I may not, in the case of the universe, call this fitness intentional, I must maintain that it is strictly analogous to the effects of intention in the works of art. As far as relates to the appearance of design, the works of art have no advantage over the works of nature. The question, then, is, why I should not apply to the latter the reasoning which I apply without hesitation, and, as it seems, without error to the former. Is it not reasonable to maintain, as a universal truth, that such an adaptation of means to ends as was never known to be fortuitous must be referred to an intelligent Author? But I have had no experience in the origin of worlds. This is true; nor is this experience needed. I have seen, in cases innumerable, the connexion between intellect in a designing cause, and the marks of contrivance in the works which intellect has effected; and unless the human mind must be denied the privilege of reasoning from the We clearest analogies, I may safely infer that this connexion must be universal. Contrivance is contrivance, wherever it be found; and the connexion between cause and effect is not more certain than the connexion between an effect which indicates contrivance, and an intelligent or designing cause. gain our knowledge of both these connexions in precisely the same manner, or rather they are virtually the same, the latter being only a specific modification of the former. But Mr. Hume says, that all that we can pretend to know concerning the connexion of cause and effect is constant conjunetion. That conjuction is all that we perceive is true; and a more harmless truth was never made known to the world For until some disciple of Mr. Hume shall assign a better reason for constant conjunction than that the things thus conjoined are necessarily connected, the human mind will go on to reason from effect to cause, as it did before Mr. Hume's discovery saw the light. Could Mr. Hume's observation disjoin what we see to be conjoined, it would do something; but the fact remains exactly as it was, and where we see that an effect is, there we cannot help concluding that a cause has been. And this is sufficient for all purposes of reasoning. And if any one shall choose to believe that cause and effect are always conjoined but never connected; for example, that, though a ball, when struck by a cricket-bat, is invariably put in motion, yet, for any necessity that operates, it might invariably remain at rest; he may, indeed, enjoy the satisfaction of not thinking with the vulgar, but assuredly he will not have the credit of thinking with the wise. But Mr. Hume farther observes, that " all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects is founded on a certain instinct of our nature, and may be fallacious and deceitful." If this proposition is intended merely to intimate a possibility that the reasoning in question may be fal lacious, it amounts to no more than this, that this reasoning does not rise to absolute or mathematical demonstration. But if it is intended to imply that all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects probably is fallacious, it may be satisfactorily replied, that it does not follow because a thing possibly may be, that, therefore, it probably is. Moreover, if the observation were to be thus interpreted, it would imply, that the contrary conclusions to those which mankind have hitherto drawn from the relation of cause and effect would be more likely to be just; an extravagance to which no soberminded man can assent for a moment. In innumerable instances we rest with as much confidence upon reasonings drawn from this source as upon the evidence of the senses or upon mathematical proof. And this, however it comes to pass, we cannot help doing. But to spend another moment upon Mr. Hume's proposition: were the reasoning from the relation of causes and effects founded upon instinct, this, I conceive, would be a presumption that it would not be fallacious. It is, however, founded on no such thing. It is founded on experience, on which Mr. Hume can place sufficient dependence when it suits his purpose. And the same experience which has taught us to believe that every effect must have a cause, has also taught us to look for a designing cause where there is an indication of contrivance in the effect. And hence we infer thus much with sufficient certainty, that if the universe is an effect at all, it must be referred to an intelligent cause. But, it seems, our experience does not reach far enough to justify the conclusion, that the universe, because it exhibits an adaptation of means to ends, must have had an intelligent Author. We want the only experience which the case demands, an experience in the origin of worlds. Were this principle carried to its full extent, it would follow, that when I see a work of art, which is altogether new to me, I must not confidently conclude that it had a maker. I know, indeed, that men exist, and though all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious, I think I know that the human intellect is adequate to the production of those effects which we call the works of art. But as my experi ence cannot reach to a novel case, unless I may venture to call in the axiom, that similar effects must be referred to similar causes, I must draw my conclusion with diffidence and hesitation. But, as Mr. Hume observes, I have no experience of the origin of worlds. And if I had, what would be its precise value? "All reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful." But the argument from experience, which Mr. Hume says is wanting, would rest upon the presumption, that similar effects proceed from similar causes, in which presumption Mr. Hume ought to have maintained that in all cases there may be no force. Indeed, if all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful, were a world constructed before my eyes, the possibility of doubt, as to its origin, would not be precluded! In opposition, however, to these extravagancies of scepticism, I maintain that experience affords a sufficiently certain ground of reasoning, and I farther maintain, that the experience which we have had of the connexion between contrivance and a contriver, abundantly justifies the conclusion, that the universe must have had a designing cause. To reject this conclusion is to set aside, without necessity,* one of the strong * I said without necessity, because no difficulty attending the hypothesis of Theism can possibly be greater than the difficulty of conceiving that such an adaptation of means to ends, as is equivalent to contrivance, should exist without the Indeed, no operation of intelligence. human mind than those of contrivance ideas are more closely associated in the and a contriver. In contemplating the works of art, as connected with intelligence, we not only recognize the general relation of cause and effect, but are, moreover, led to acknowledge that the work effected corresponds to an archetype in the mind of the artist. And hence we seem satisfactorily to infer, that every thing which indicates contrivance answers to a certain model which previously existed in the mind of some intelligent agent. And shall the works of nature, with all their various and exquisite adaptation of means to ends, be regarded as answering to no model, as corresponding to no archetype? There is one point of difference, it is true, between the works of nature and the works of art, which is, Argument for the Being of God. est associations of the human mind, and to reason upon a principle, if a principle it can be called, which would subvert the foundation of all reasoning. If similar effects are not to be referred to similar causes, all ratiocination is at an end. It is in vain to urge that there is a difference between the works of nature and the works of art. As far as respects the adaptation of means to ends, and on this alone the argument rests, there is no difference, except that this adaptation, in the former, is far more curious and exquisite than in the latter. Were any one still to say that the experience of which I have been speaking is no certain guide in a case to which it does not itself extend, I should think it sufficient to reply, that it is the only guide which we have, and that it is absurd to relinquish this guide in order to wander in a field of vain conjecture, without a ray of probability to direct us. One thing we know, which is, that intellect can adjust means to ends, and produce effects which indicate contrivance; but that any thing else can produce these effects, we not only do not know, but have not even the slightest reason to believe. But men sometimes argue as if it were the perfection of human wisdom to follow the weaker probability instead of the stronger, or to set probability altogether at defiance, because it falls short of strict and mathematical demonstration.* that the latter are put together by the application of mechanical powers, whereas the former are many of them evidently produced by the action of certain laws, which are called the laws of nature. But this circumstance of difference by no -means counterbalances the circumstances of resemblance, and, therefore, does not avail to set aside the analogy. And what are the laws of nature but a certain mode of operation? Does the law in any case design and anticipate the effect? It may not be altogether foreign to the argument to observe farther, that the laws of nature, together with all real existences, must be, in themselves considered, the objects of knowledge. And yet from the hypothesis of the Atheist, it will follow that no being exists by whom these laws are understood. * If any one should say that probability is not a reasonable ground of confidence, I should only desire him to carry this 67 From the view which has been now taken of Mr. Hume's objection to the being of a God, it appears that the reasoning which ascribes the universe to an intelligent Author, rests upon precisely the same foundation as that which attributes what is denominated an effect to that which is denominated a cause. Contrivance is the thing to be accounted for, and that reasoning, founded on experience, which has led us to conceive that every effect must have a cause, has led us to demand an intelligent cause for every effect which indicates such an adaptation of means to ends, as could not, in our apprehension, be the result of chance or accident. And against this reasoning I do not see what can be urged, except that it does not amount to such a demonstration as would exclude all possibility of doubt. If the argument does not amount to the highest probability, I do not know what probability is. And Mr. Hume's reasonings only shew that this probability is not absolute and incontrovertible proof. That this may appear more clearly, I will deduce from Mr. Hume's observations the only conclusions which would be formidable to the hypothesis of Theism, and leave the reader to judge whether these conclusions are legitimate. Between cause and effect we perceive only conjunction; therefore the probability is, that cause and effect are not connected! All our reasonings from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious; therefore the probability is, that they are fallacious! We have no experience in the origin of worlds; therefore it is probable that the universe, which shews throughout an adaptation of means to ends, is not the work of an intelligent Author! principle as far as it will go, and to act upon it. I need not point out what consequences would follow. But shall that evidence, upon which mankind do not scruple to act in ordinary concerns, be considered as unsatisfactory only in concerns of the highest importance? The practice of demanding absolute demonstration where it is not to be had, and where it is not needed, has done much mischief. It has given rise to an unreasonable scepticism on the one hand, and to an absurd appeal to common sense ou the other. |