“In the past, the Soviet Union was always waiting for us in the center of the arena, armed and dangerous. Today, the arena is temporarily empty. But around the perimeter is a series of doors, and behind each door is a potential adversary. ... We don't know which door or combination of doors will fly open next. But we do know that we must have adequate military forces ready to face whatever emerges." Yet in an era of falling defense budgets and limited procurement, I think it is probably inevitable that our defense industries will also shrink and change in character. But we can't let them erode too drastically. Otherwise, we won't be able to reconstitute forces should we ever need to down the road. Finally, now that the Cold War is over, we concluded that it is in our national interest to make careful reductions in military spending. Our nation's economic health is an important element of our overall national security and prosperity. We insist, however, that our future security not be jeopardized by a "slash-and-burn" approach to today's budget reductions. After World War I and World War II, we dismantled our armed forces without regard for any future military needs. Both times we regretted those decisions, and we paid in blood for our mistakes. We should make prudent cuts to our defense budget. But those cuts should be guided by a realistic assessment of our continuing security needs, not by a shortsighted eagerness to use defense as a cash cow to pay for other programs. ships, and Air Force fighter wings We're also cutting back on What we will have left in the future is a much smaller military force. That force - we call it the base force — is a new structure based on a new strategy. It is primarily tailored for contingency operations, such as Just Cause in Panama and the war in Persian Gulf. The base force will adequately protect our future security interests, provided we make our cuts wisely. But a smaller force is necessarily less robust, with a smaller margin for error. Therefore, the forces we do retain must be razor-sharp and combat-ready. To ensure this will be the case, we intend to protect two things in our future defense budgets. to create false savings by cutting things like operations and maintenance accounts, since these are also absolutely vital to a combatready force. Secondly, we need to protect our technological superiority. Many of the weapons that served us so well in the gulf are already obsolete. To preserve technological superiority for our future forces, we need to protect — and even improve upon our research and development. Otherwise, we may someday send American servicemen and women into combat where their weapons and systems are overmatched by those of our enemies. I can imagine few things more shameful. We can meet our future requirements with smaller forces. But we need those forces to be tough and ready. We need them to be filled with warriors whose training and dedication are second to none. And we need them to be technologically superior. We've had enough of hollow forces in this country. From now on, we must win the first battle whenever we go to war — and win the war as swiftly and decisively as possible. Keeping the Razor Sharp As a result of these conclusions, almost a year ago we outlined a new, forward-looking strategy as the basis for our fiscal year '92 budget submission. That strategy suggested a smaller structure for our armed forces — one that would save money, but which would still leave us with the forces we need to protect our interests. Our plan cuts defense spending and reduces the size of our armed forces by 25 percent over the next few years, and it is already well under way. Right now, the number of men and women who proudly wear the American uniform is at its lowest level since the beginning of the Korean War - and that number will fall even further. In all, we intend to cut a half million people from our active forces — roughly the total number that participated in Desert Storm. The Army will be reduced by six active and four reserve divisions, the Navy will retire more than 100 Personnel and Technology First, we need to protect the quality of our personnel in uniform. The superior quality of our warriors assured our victory in Desert Storm. We need to make sure this will still be the case in the future. The people in our armed forces need to be well-trained, well-led and wellcared-for- no matter how small our total force structure becomes in the years ahead. And we can't try Elite But Cooperative Now I'd like to suggest to you some implications of all this, with particular reference to special operations. First, even in an era of declining budgets and force structure cuts, special operations remains a vital military capability. They have a unique capacity for unilateral action unavailable elsewhere. They can also meld closely with our “Special operations forces remain a vital military capability. They have a unique capacity for unilateral action unavailable elsewhere. They can also meld closely with our other forces to create a formidable fighting team. If anything, this capability will be even more valuable in the future." ian relief operations in northern Iraq and southern Turkey. other forces to create a formidable fighting team. If anything, this capability will be even more valuable in the future. For example, as we saw in Desert Storm, we will continue to be sensitive to collateral damage in future conflicts. Special operations forces help us to detect and target enemy assets in a selective fashion, either on their own or in conjunction with other elements of our armed forces. Let me add a cautionary word here: Our special operations forces are elite forces, and rightly so, but eliteness sometimes brings with it a sense of aloofness — a sense of being separate from the general military community. This is a mistake we must guard against. Fortunately, thanks to some superb leadership, our special operations forces have set a very high standard for interservice cooperation. They have also set the example for operational adaptability. Just consider the variety of some of our special operations activities in the Persian Gulf: training indigenous troops, conducting long-range reconnaissance and targeting missions, waging psychological warfare and supporting humanitar Diverse Demands The second implication I would suggest to you is this: that with smaller forces overall, future military actions will be more than ever joint operations involving all elements of our armed forces. Gen. Powell likes to characterize our military capabilities as being tools in his toolbox. The toolbox will be smaller in the years to come, and there will be fewer tools in it. We'll have to adapt each tool to more than one use, and each tool will have to fit together with others to ensure we can get the job done. Finally, I think the challenges for all our military forces — special operations forces included -- will grow more diverse in the years to come. One thing the Cold War did for us was give us a clear focus. We knew who our principal adversary was and could make our plans accordingly. Now, we must broaden our focus. I think the impact of this for special operations forces will be similar to that for the intelligence community. There will be a more diverse demand for such things as language skills and area specialties. Unfortunately, however, I doubt there will be any increase in funding or force structure to accommodate these needs. The special operations community — like all other parts of our armed forces — will have to find ways to cover more ground with less resources in many respects. We are facing profound changes in the international arena. We have adjusted our military strategy and force structure to match these changes. Despite many favorable trends, the future still holds challenges and uncertainties for us, and for these, we will continue to need superb military forces. But this is also an exciting time. For over 50 years, our strategy and force structure have been locked in the iron grip of the EastWest conflict. Now we are free of that grip. In the next several years, we will have extraordinary opportunities to shape our armed forces and build a future in which our children and grandchildren can live in much greater peace and security than we have ever known ourselves. There's an ancient Chinese curse that says, "May you live in interesting times." Well, we certainly live in interesting times. And I'm confident we will change that curse into a blessing. Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you this morning. Published for internal information use by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission. live and work there. In short, American security remains indivisible from European political, economic and military stability. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, the scope and pace of change in the European political landscape continues its unprecedented acceleration. Clearly, the most significant, recent change has been the political transformation of the Soviet Union. The overwhelming military threat to Europe posed by the Soviets is gone. In the place of the former Soviet Union, we have 12 independent states, some with nuclear weapons, all striving to solve their massive political and economic problems. Even with help from other nations, the potential for unrest is very high. The disappearance of the Soviet threat has not brought assurance of peace and stability to Europe. Other disturbing forces have moved to the forefront. Regional tensions remain and in some cases have emerged into open conflict as in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasus. Ethnocentrism has been an historical reason for many conflicts on the Continent; new freedoms unleased by the removal of totalitarian governments have allowed a resurgence of old grievances. Despite the good efforts of the U.S. in the peace talks under way between Israel and its neighbors, the fundamental issues remain unresolved. In the past decade, the trend of fundamentalism has been on the rise. Drug trafficking, a worldwide problem, has increased through Africa, partially as a result of increased surveillance and interceptions in South and Central America. The world in general and Europe in particular is undergoing a period of profound change: a transition from the known and quantifiable to the uncertain and unpredictable. The events of the last three years could not have been predicted in early 1989. What lies ahead in 1995 is difficult to accurately assess. Threats to U.S. interests remain, but they are less clear and more diversified. Our understanding of the new situation is not based on a slogan, but on a thought process. The U.S. security requirement has taken a new, broader dimension. We must be able to deal with an unexpected crisis or war. Our new National Military Strategy has been formulated with these factors in mind. In previous testimonies this year, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined four foundations for U.S. security strategy: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. From my perspective as the commander in chief of the U.S. European Command, the key to our strategy is the forward presence of American military forces. We have had and continue to have a vital interest in European peace, stability and prosperity. In the first half of this century, conflicts and instability in Europe caused us to send hundreds of thousands of American troops to fight in two bloody wars in order to restore peace. Economically, we have been a significant trading partner with European countries and now enjoy a growing and sizable trade surplus with Europe of some $17 billion in 1991. Much of our culture and heritage comes from Europe, and almost 1.7 million U.S. civilians Explosive Situation After the First World War, we developed an isolationist attitude and turned our backs on Europe. In doing so, we left behind an unstable and potentially explosive situation. The lack of any cohesive structure or forum to resolve national disputes, coupled with intense political and economic nationalism, eventually led to war. Despite our reluctance, we came back to restore peace and protect our interests, but at a staggering cost in American lives and resources. The end of World War II left the same potential for further instability. The military power and growing ambitions of the Soviet Union as it began to dominate Eastern Europe influenced us to remain and caused the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Our presence for over 40 years helped prevent further Soviet expansion and fostered an environment for Western European nations to grow and prosper together. This U.S. commitment manifested by forward presence has paid off. The second half of this century has seen peace and stability. The difference between the wars of the first half of this century and the peace of the second half can be attributed in great degree to one significant factor - the commitment of the United States, as indicated by the continuous presence of American military forces in Europe. 1 "We now need to view NATO from a new and broader perspective. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even Russia have asked to join NATO. These countries recognized that NATO offers the best way to satisfy their security requirements and is the only alternative to renationalized defense structures." Now we are in a similar situation after another war. The Cold War is over, and our former adversaries now look on us as friends and helpers as they face difficult times. Although much has changed, the world remains too small, our economy too global and our resources too limited to withdraw from Europe to “Fortress America." History clearly shows that our military presence has a stabilizing effect on Europe while benefiting our own security. Our allies also recognize this fact. At the Rome Summit last November, they agreed that the “presence of North American conventional and U.S. nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparately linked to that of North America." For over 43 years, our involvement in NATO has been the mainstay of the alliance. NATO is the most successful security organization in history. North Atlantic solidarity and collective defense brought the Cold War to a successful conclusion. We now need to view NATO from a new and broader perspective. While Western Europeans come to terms with the security implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Europeans are looking for new structures in which to anchor their security. NATO has the experience, infrastructure and mechanisms to adapt successfully to the changing security environment. Over the past two years, at meetings in London, Copenhagen and Rome, the alliance developed and approved a new strategic concept to meet these new challenges. The concept proposes smaller forces, increased mobility, measured readiness levels, multina tional forces, force generation, military-to-military contacts with former adversaries and an emphasis on crisis management. NATO, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, provides a forum for Eastern European democracies and the countries of the former Soviet Union to address their security concerns. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even Russia have asked to join NATO. These countries recognized that NATO offers the best way to satisfy their security requirements and is the only alternative to renationalized defense structures. In addition to increased dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries, the alliance has been active on other fronts. Forces of NATO nations have been used at least eight times by as many as six different organizations over the past 20 months. In the gulf war, NATO AWACS (airborne warning and control system) and portions of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Air) were sent to Turkey, while other NATO forces were used to secure Mediterranean lines of communication. Naval forces from NATO countries were employed under control of the Western European Union. Yugoslavia as observers and will send additional troops as peacekeepers. NATO assets and infrastructure are being used in Operation Provide Hope today. In each of these instances, the response included NATO assigned or earmarked forces, manned, equipped and trained by NATO nations under various command arrangements to accomplish the mission. America's leadership role in NATO is based on the presence of our military forces in Europe; the ability of the U.S. to influence events in Europe is derived from our visible and continuing commitment to the alliance. In order to meet U.S. security requirements in the European theater, we have developed a European base force, taking into account the new security environment and constrained fiscal resources. We have taken care not to go too far too fast as a hedge against an uncertain future. In addition to its military capabilities, the European base force demonstrates to our allies that we are willing to remain involved as a leader in European security decisions. The forces remaining in FY 1995 will consist of: A significantly smaller, but credible theater nuclear deterrent; O A capable Army corps, which provides the smallest unit capable of operational warfare, the lowest level at which optimum air-ground interface is achieved (and) a contribution to NATO multinational forces; Three to four Air Force fighter wings, including one in the Southern Region; these wings provide sufficient forces for airspace superiority and air support to ground forces, support for Mediterranean operations (and) our contribution to NATO air defense; O A carrier battle group in the Mediterranean Sea that provides maritime superiority, power projection (and) sea control; Ó An amphibious ready group with its embarked Marines that provides contingency operations throughout the theater. In addition to these forces, the base force has sufficient intelligence, communications, air defense and logistics, including associated infrastructure, to support Coalition Responses Forces from 15 NATO countries participated in the Desert Storm coalition. NATO nations under another coalition responded to the plight of the Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort. Patriot missiles from NATO countries were sent to Israel. Some NATO assigned forces were used to evacuate foreign citizens from Zaire; some NATO members, under United Nations auspices, have sent forces to "(The European base force), totaling approximately 150,000 men and women, is less than half the size of our forces just two years ago. We have tailored this significantly smaller force to demonstrate our commitment to NATO, ensure regional stability stability ... and maintain the infrastructure ... for reinforcement or operations elsewhere." the arrival of reinforcing units from the U.S. or to support deployment for out-of-area operations. This force, totaling approximately 150,000 men and women (92,200 Army, 44,800 Air Force and 13,000 Navy) is less than half the size of our forces just two years ago. We have tailored this significantly smaller force to demonstrate our commitment to NATO, ensure regional stability, provide a hedge against uncertainty and maintain the infrastructure and logistical support for reinforcement or operations elsewhere. It will be able to counter any emerging threats to our theater interests and gives the U.S. a combat capability for contingency use in support of U.S. strategic objectives elsewhere. Versatile and capable of responding to all levels of conflict, this force package is designed to take advantage of the capabilities of each service and complement those of our NATO allies. To maintain this substantially smaller European force, the required numbers of people, equipment, installations and dollars are considerably less than our Cold War commitment. In order to meet the challenges that we will face in the next few years, we have identified several key areas where our resources should be concentrated. We have taken our experience of the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm, tempered it with a recognition of the scarce availability of resources and developed a list of priorities that we feel are needed to fully implement our drawdown plan while retaining a credible combat force in Europe. and their families and increased the costs of repairing and maintaining the facilities. Our second priority is the readiness and training of our existing forces. The wide range of missions that our future force may have to execute requires us to have combat-ready units. We continue to refine what I call the "right mix" of training activities. This mix includes the use of computer simulations, live and command post exercises, and combined arms and joint service operations. Integrating these different methods allows us to accomplish important and essential training at less cost and with fewer resources. The key to quality and realism in training is the Warrior Preparation Center. As a joint facility, it permits us to conduct operational training through realistic computer simulation, thus reducing the requirement for large-scale live exercises. My third priority is the maintenance of our investment in U.S. infrastructure in Europe. As we leave, consolidate, relocate units and close down installations, the need for maintenance accounts and O&M will continue. There are some military construction projects that will need to be completed on bases that we will retain. Our request this year is modest: only five projects totaling $43 million. These projects at Grafenwoehr, Hohenfels, Rhein-Main (all three, Germany) and Souda Bay (Crete) are needed to maintain quality of life and environmental standards on those installations. With the cancellation of the Crotone (Italy) infrastructure project, NATO is exploring a number of alternatives in an effort to determine a suitable location for the U.S. aircraft that meet U.S. and host nation constraints. We expect to begin reviewing these options in April, and NATO plans to readdress this issue in the next Defense Planning Committee meeting this spring. The NATO infrastructure program has been thoroughly examined by host and user nations to ensure that only valid requirements are funded. The DoD budget request for $221.2 million in NATO infrastructure funds in FY 1993 is the minimum level for restoration of existing NATO facilities, nuclear surety projects and recoupment of prefinanced projects. Strategic mobility is my fourth resource priority. Our forces must remain capable and responsive, particularly as we reduce our forward presence. The ability to introduce combat forces into any region will remain a strategic priority in the years to come. Operations in Southwest Asia demonstrated that the first part of the mobility equation is to have basing and overflight rights with friendly nations. Our ability to deploy to many areas of the globe depends on our allies. For the rest of the equation, we need sufficient airlift and sealift forces combined with both land- and sea-based prepositioned equipment to project U.S. power. The combination of supportive allies, strategic lift and pre-positioned equipment allowed us to assemble decisive combat power necessary for the mission to succeed. The uncertain future will require us to maintain this same degree of strategic flexibility. My fifth priority is selective modernization. Operational commanders need systems which provide the best available mix of Community Care The most important resource requirement of the U.S. European Command continues to be the need to take care of our people, who deserve a decent place to live and work, a community that provides for their basic needs and reasonable health care. Last year, congressionally directed reductions in real property maintenance accounts, European base operations, O&M (operations and maintenance) and foreign national hires reduced our ability to execute our mission and to provide for our people. These cuts lowered support to our troops |