budget is still the chief consideration. Money is still the master-spirit that puts in motion the diplomatists of the Congress-the generals that march to the destruction of Spain, the disinterested Champions of the Faith, and the ministers who mount the tribune to deliver Homilies in the style of Atala. To make the revenue as large as possible, and to pocket as much of it as possible, is the universal principle of action. The French Ultras triumphed over Spain; and the first speech they made to their master was simply this, Sire, le clergé demande de l'argent ; et la fidelité vous prie de ne pas oublier que vous lui en avez promi.'

The Holy Alliance, then, must have money-and they must have much money. For this purpose taxes are necessary; and these taxes have, all over the Continent, at least, had the effect of diminishing the commercial intercourse with other nations. Since taxes have multiplied in France, for instance, the French Government has been obliged to impose importation duties on foreign articles, so heavy, as almost to amount to a prohibition. And thus, while the progress of political economy should convince nations that they are mutually interested in exchanging their commodities, and that all prohibitory laws must sooner or later be fatal to commerce; the wasteful expenditure of governments, and their ignorant exactions, place a barrier between the nations of Europe, and tend to render every kind of commercial intercourse impossible.

The most alarming consideration, however, of all, is, that the force which the Holy Alliance is enabled to wield, would seem to render its operation irresistible and eternal. According to the calculation of M. de Pradt, the governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have at least fifteen hundred thousand troops at their disposal; and if we add to this number about 300,000 which France can command, together with the supplies from the smaller States, which follow in the rear of the great-if we consider, that in none of the Continental States do there exist any institutions by which the action of this power can be controlled- that in all of them the governments direct arbitrarily the course of general education-and that the clergy uniformly co-operate with the government, and give the sanctions of religion to the maxims of despotism-we shall indeed be struck with terror at the colossal power which is thus arrayed on the side of tyranny, and the absolute helplessness of those who are its victims; and can hardly help fearing that Europe is destined to follow the example of Asia, and to become the prey of a few despots and their satellites.

We state these things, however, rather to show that we are aware of the dangers to which liberty is exposed, than to inspire any doubt of her ultimate triumph. The grounds of our confidence in her cause we have recently explained at some length, in our observations on the present policy and future fate of arbitrary governments; and we shall not now resume them. The sum is, that knowledge is indestructible, and that liberty is inseparable from knowledge; and that all the interests which support the cause of tyranny must gradually wear away, while those which point to freedom must increase in the progress of civilisation. The Holy Allies themselves have an instinctive and painful sense of this great truth; and have banded together accordingly, much more from a sense of their weakness than from the pride of their strength. What, indeed, is their alliance, but a contract of mutual assurance against great and imminent perils? * Address of the Chamber of Deputies.

† Vol. xxxix. p. 285, &c.

what else the true meaning of their atrocious engagements, when reduced to plain language? It is worth while to look a little at this, that we may the better feel both the enormity of their pretensions, and the impossibility of their permanent success. Had this celebrated contract; instead of being framed by a Jesuit, been drawn up in explicit terms by a notary, it must have run pretty much as follows:-"We, the parties hereto subscribing, legitimate sovereigns and absolute masters of our respective kingdoms, considering that the people of all countries have a diseased appetite for freedom, and are sometimes bold enough to revolt against the commands of their masters, and that in consequence of this evil propensity, it has happened more than once that certain kings have lost their crowns, and been deprived of their legitimate possessions; that the house of Tarquin, for example, was driven from Rome on certain frivolous pretences, thereby occasioning an anarchy of several centuries; and that, even after the restoration of legitimate order by the Cæsars, this spirit of insubordination still continued to manifest itself, to the great injury and damage of Nero, Otho, Vitellius, and sundry other lawful sovereigns. Considering also, that, in modern times, examples no less fatal have occurred; that the English have banished the house of Stuart, for no better reason, than that a prince of that family, in the exercise of his undoubted rights, proposed to compel his people to think as he did, and to give up to his disposal their persons and property; which treasonable conduct, on the part of the English, was aggravated by the circumstance, that the said prince, in the plenitude of his goodness, did admit that he was responsible to God for the exercise of his said legitimate power; that the house of Bourbon in the same manner fell a victim, more lately, to the spirit of rebellion, and might have forfeited for ever its legitimate authority, had it not been twice replaced on the throne by the bayonets of the allied armies. Considering, farther, that it has for some time past been treasonably published and proclaimed, that the people are not the absolute property of their sovereigns, but are masters of their property, their persons, their consciences, and their industry, with other false and sophistical maxims of the same nature, dangerous to the security of all good government; and that the subjects of certain states have carried their audacious pretensions so far, as to demand certain deeds, called Constitutions, with the view of circumscribing the power of their august sovereigns :We, the high contracting parties, have entered into a contract of mutual assurance against the insubordination of our subjects, to the effect, and of the tenour following; viz.

'Primo, We hereby guarantee to each other the full and entire exercise of absolute power over our respective subjects; and if any of the parties shall not, at present, be in the possession of such power, the others hereby bind themselves to assist him in obtaining it.

"Secundo, If it shall at any time happen that the people should show symptoms of revolt, either on account of their inability to pay taxes, or their refusal to conform to a religion which they believe to be false, or upon alleged invasion of their persons or property or any other vain and frivolous pretext of the same kind, we, the high contracting parties, mutually engage to employ the whole of our joint forces to reduce and bring back the said subjects to their obedience, and to re-establish their sovereign in the full exercise of his absolute and legitimate rights.

'Tertio, If for any of the reasons above mentioned, or any other reasons whatever, any people shall demand from their sovereign, under the

name of Constitution, any political organisation capable of limiting the powers of the king or his ministers, the high contracting parties engage to assist the prince so situated, to deliver him from all compulsion, and to furnish him with such a force as shall enable him to proscribe all malecontents, to confiscate their property, and to put to death all those with whom he may be dissastisfied, especially if they pretend to have assisted him in his distress, or to have received from him oaths and assurances of gratitude and friendship.

"Quarto, Each of the high contracting parties binds himself to the rest to maintain absolute power in its full vigour within his own dominions : and should any one or more of the said parties be prevailed on to limit his power by laws or constitutions, the others hereby engage, instantly to declare him enslaved; and, with or without his consent, to deliver him from bondage as soon as possible.

"Quinto, Each of the high contracting parties engages to support a sufficient army for the assistance of all kings in distress, who feel themselves trammelled in the exercise of their legitimate power, by the fetters of a Constitution."

Such in substance is the deed, which has received the name of the Holy Alliance, and which its authors have placed under the protection of the Holy Trinity! It amounts plainly to an unconditional engagement, on the part of the Continental Sovereigns, to assist each other against their subjects in every event, and whatever may have been the cause of revolt, since there is no tribunal to judge between the prince and the people. But is it possible that such a compact should be lasting? or that the result of a contest between nations and rulers should long be, doubtful? In their first exultation over the completed scheme, and, while still profiting by the reasonable union into which they were driven by their fears of Napoleon, their designs may appear practicable, and may even be attended with some success. But in the nature of things this combination cannot be permanent; and is even likely, we think, to precipitate those very changes which it was devised to prevent.

In addition to the discontents that spring naturally from oppression and misgovernment, it is plain that, by this system, there will be added in every country the still fiercer and more ungovernable discontent which arises from the impatience of foreign interference, and the intolerable indignity of being dragooned into slavery on their own soil, by strangers whom they detest and despise. Even the sovereigns who retain, along with their love of power, the least spark of that pride and national partiality which often attends it, must share in this feeling, and come at last to disdain being indebted for their authority to the arms and the insolence of strangers. It is obvious too, that though there is a fine appearance of cordiality among those new allies, in this their honey-moon of endearment, causes of disunion and quarrel will inevitably arise in no long time, from those very principles of unjust aggression and uncontrolled self-will, in which they now abet each other. And what then will be the condition of those unhappy princes, who, from an undue love of power, have thrown away the only safe or natural means of maintaining it? How many base compliances and painful sacrifices must they submit to, at the hands of those who can plausibly reproach them with having saved them from the merited resentment of their subjects? or with what hopes can they at last appeal to that injured people, whom they had not only of themselves oppressed, but subjected to that last

humiliation, of binding them in foreign shackles? Even while there is peace between the governments, there must be hostility between the nations,— and even between the native and the foreign troops, whose joint efforts are necessary to repress their discontent. This is already apparent in Spain, the first and the easiest experiment on which the Allies have ventured. If these things are done in the green leaf, what shall it be in the dry? Or, is it not obvious that tyrannical thrones, instead of being made more secure by this contrivance, will ultimately be exposed to a double measure of insecurity? In their natural state, the threat of foreign aggression tends to unite the rulers and the subjects, by their common feelings of national pride and antipathy. But now, the ruler is himself identified with the foreigners, and hated as their unnatural instigator against the honour and the rights of his people. Whenever their extraneous support is withdrawn, therefore, the government must fall; and, while the provocation to revolt is thus immeasurably increased, the sovereign is made absolutely dependent on the caprice and folly of an unprincipled ally.

It should never be forgotten either, that those armies, on which the whole system continually depends, are not-except perhaps in Russiamere tools or machines, that must necessarily obey the hand that moves them. They too are men, and in some measure citizens; and must share in the lights that are growing all over the world. Their very interchange must hasten his illumination. The soldiers of Russia must become less apt instruments of pure despotism for their services in France and Germany: and the more enlightened troops of these nations can scarcely return from a mission into more degraded regions, without being deeply impressed with the miseries and dangers of tyranny.

Accordingly, the holy Allies themselves are plainly distrustful of the sufficiency of that force, by the magnitude of which the friends of liberty are so much disconcerted. This proceeds no doubt from their consciousness, both of the terrible force their proceedings are neeessarily raising up to oppose it, and of the unsoundness of a great part of that which looks so formidable at a distance. Nothing indeed, we apprehend, is so fallacious as that appearance of stability by which those governments are now surrounded, or that air of contented submission which seems to hang over their subjects. They are all in truth rotten at the heart; and not to be relied on, even in those quarters in which their apparent strength is most imposing. They know this, too, well enough-and this is the key to their confederations and corruptions-their pitiful severities and contemptible alarms. M. de Pradt has disclosed something of this as to some of those powers-but he has said nothing of France-hitherto the most active and enterprising of the whole, and undoubtedly the most formidable for wealth, talent, and military genius. It is worth while, therefore, to consider a little in detail the true state of its present government, and the actual strength and security of that system, which seems, for the moment, to have triumphed over all opposition. In the course of this examination, we shall probably be able to explain the grounds on which we hold the Holy Alliance to be big with danger to its authors, more satisfactorily than by following out any farther the general observations in which we have hitherto been engaged.

Were we to judge of the inconstancy of the French nation from the variety of governments to which it has been subjected since the Revolution, it would be dificult to speak of it in terms of sufficient reprobation. At one time, the enthusiastic admirers and defenders of American liberty,—at an

other, the partisans of a constitutional monarchy;-sometimes idolising the brilliancy of a military despotism, sometimes recalling the dreams of chivalry, and regretting its ancient aristocracy,-it seemed to receive, with equal delight, the Monarchical constitution 1791,-the Directorial constitution of 1795, the Military constitution of 1800-and the Charter of 1814. On the return of Bonaparte from Elba, in the month of May, 1815, the Chamber of Representatives were Liberals to a man. When the Bourbons re-entered Paris, three months afterwards, they were all Aristocrats! At the elections of 1818 and 1819, none but Liberals were returned. In 1824 the deputies were all Ultras.

After this, it may appear a little extravagant to say, that we believe that there has always existed, and does now exist, in the great body of the French nation, a pretty firm and unalterable adherence to those principles and opinions which the growing intelligence of the last century had been long maturing; and which broke out, perhaps, under unfavourable circumstances, at the era of the Revolution. Yet such we believe to be the fact; and those who are best acquainted with the country, will be the readiest to agree with us. It is to be sure impossible, that in any nation there can exist an absolute unity of opinion. Every where there must be differences in fortune, in rank, in education, in religion, and, above all, in political opinion. If these differences exist even in the smallest societies, they must be peculiarly visible in a nation containing thirty millions of inhabitants, where the very languages of the different provinces are distinct, and the inhabitants of one can scarcely understand that of another. Every feeling, and every opinion which has been manifested during the last thirty-five years, continues, we believe, to exist pretty much to the same extent as ever in France; though the course of events has, at different times, brought different parties more prominently into view. The nation has always appeared to take a colour from the ruling party; but, under the name of the nation, these were, in reality, merely the adherents of the conquering party-the rest were compelled to be silent. Bonaparte, on his return from Elba, saw his palace surrounded by 10,000 or 12,000 men, who came there to join in his triumph, or to satisfy their curiosity. Three months afterwards the Bourbons were attended by a crowd of the same kind, ready to applaud their success, or anxious to see what sort of figure they made among the Allies who had brought them back from Ghent. But does this prove any inconsistency or fluctuation in national opinions? Not in the least. It shows only, that

in a city containing 600,000 or 700,000 inhabitants, there are some who are adherents of Bonaparte, some who are attached to the Bourbons, some who are amused by any spectacle, and some who are ready to sell their applauses to the highest bidder. But no one of these, we conceive, are entitled to stand for the nation.

In France, we should never forget that the state of the community has always been very different from that of England. When their Revolution took place, all popular institutions had long been swept away by the usurpations of the Crown. There were no municipal administrations-no popular elections-no kind of deliberative assembly-nothing but a few corporations, without unity or connexion, fit only to impose additional fetters on industry, and which the people were ready to abolish as soon as they had the power. This total want of political institutions produced a corresponding absence of all constitutional habits. The first assembly was therefore obliged to organise every thing-from the municipality of the