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ference, and secured the support of a party whom the injustice of their own Government threw into the arms of foreign powers. Catharine, in a Declaration delivered at Warsaw, asserted, "that she did nothing but in virtue of the right of vicinage, acknowledged by all nations; and on another occasion she observed, "that justice and humanity were the sole rules of her conduct; and that her virtues alone had placed her on the throne." It is proper to add, that all the powerful neighbours of Poland then made declarations, which, when considered in contrast with their subsequent con-duct, are sufficient to teach mankind how far they may trust to the sincerity, faith, and honour of absolute monarchs. On the 24th of January, 1764, Frederic declared, that "he should constantly labour to defend the States of the Republic in their integrity" On the 16th of March, in the same year, Maria Theresa, a sovereign celebrated for piety and justice, assured the Polish Government of " her resolution to maintain the Republic in all her rights, prerogatives, and possessions." On the 23d of May, even Catharine herself, when Poland, for the first time, acknowledged her title of Empress of all the Russias, granted to the Republic A SOLEMN GUARANTEE OF ALL HER POSSESSIONS." Though the Poles were abandoned by their allies, and distracted by divisions, they made a gallant stand against the appointment of the discarded lover of a foreign princess to be their King. One party, at the head of which was the illustrious House of Czartorinski, by supporting the influence of Russia, and the election of Stanislaus, hoped to obtain the power of reforming the constitution, of abolishing the veto, and giving due strength to the Crown. The other, more generous, though less enlightened, spurned at foreign interference, and made the most vigorous efforts to assert independence, but were unhappily averse to reforms of the constitution, wedded to ancient abuses, and resolutely determined to exclude their fellow-citizens of different religions from equal privileges. The leaders of the latter party were the great General Branicki, a veteran of Roman dignity and intrepidity, and Prince Radzivil, a youth of almost regal revenue and dignity, who, by a singular combination of valour and generosity, with violence and wildness, exhibited a striking picture of a Sarmatian grandee. The events which passed in the interregnum, as they are related by Rulhieres, form one of the most interesting parts of modern history. The variety of character, the elevation. of mind, and the vigour of talent exhibited in the fatal struggle which then began, afford a memorable proof of the superiority of the worst aristocracy over the best administered absolute monarchy. In the contest among many masters of slaves, they check or excite each other, genius and valour are called forth, and many qualities are formed which approach to great virtues. But where there is only one master of slaves, he is neither animated by competitors, nor controlled by submission. The most turbulent aristocracy, with all its disorders and insecurity, must contain a certain number of men who respect themselves, and who have some scope for the free exercise of genius and virtue.

In spite of all the efforts of generous patriotism, a Diet, surrounded by a Russian army, were compelled to elect Stanislaus. The Princes Czartorinski expected to reign under the name of their nephew; they had carried through their reforms so dexterously as to be almost unobserved: but Catharine had too deep an interest in the anarchy of Poland not to watch over its preservation. She availed herself of the prejudices of the party

Rullieres. ii. 41.

+ Ibid. ii. 151.

Ferrand. I. et Pièces Justific.

most adverse to her, and obliged the Diet to abrogate the reforms. The Russian ambassadors were her viceroys in Poland; Keyserling, a crafty and smooth German jurist; Saldern, a desperate adventurer, banished from Holstein for forgery; and Repnin, a haughty and brutal Muscovite, were selected, perhaps from the variety of their character, to suit the fluctuating circumstances of the country; but all of them spoke in that tone of authority which has ever since continued to distinguish the Russian diplomacy. Prince Czartorinski was desirous not to be present in the Diet when his measures were repealed; but Repnin told him, that if he were not, his palaces should be burnt, and his estates laid waste. Czartorinski understood this system of Muscovite canvass, and submitted to the humiliation of proposing to abrogate those reformations which he thought essential to the existence of the Republic.

The Russian and Prussian ministers presented notes in favour of the Dissidents in September, 1764,* and afterwards urged the claims of that body more fully to the Diet of 1766, when they were seconded with honest intentions, though perhaps with a doubtful right of interference, by Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, as parties to the treaty of Oliva, or as guarantees of that important treaty, the foundation of the political system of the north of Europe. The Diet, influenced by the unnatural union of an intolerant spirit, with a generous indignation against foreign interference, rejected all these solicitations, though they were undoubtedly agreeable to the principle of the treaty of Oliva, and though some of them proceeded from powers who could not be suspected of unfriendly intentions. In 1767, the Dissidents were unhappily prevailed upon to enter into confederations for the recovery of their ancient rights, and thus to furnish a pretext for the armed interference of Russia. Forty thousand Russians entered Poland under pretence of protecting the Confederated Dissidents. In order to embroil the affairs of that distracted country still more irretrievably, Catharine now affected to espouse the cause of the Republicans who had resisted the election of Stanislaus. Prince Radzivil returned from his exile. A general confederation of malcontents was formed under his auspices at Radom, but surrounded by Russian troops, and subject to the orders of the brutal Repnin. That capricious barbarian used his power with such insolence as soon to provoke general resistance. He prepared for a subservient Diet by the utmost excesses of military violence at the elections, and by threats of banishment to Siberia held out to every one whose opposition he dreaded. The Diet, which met on the 4th October, 1767, showed strong symptoms of independence. The means adopted by Repnin to subdue the obstinacy of that Assembly are described by Rulhieres in one of the most striking passages of his eloquent work.†

The Diet were at length intimidated; and Repnin obtained their consent to a treaty with Russia, ‡ stipulating for the equal admission of all religious sects to civil offices, containing a reciprocal guarantee "of the integrity of the territories of both powers in the most solemn and sacred manner; confirming the constitution of Poland, especially the fatal law of unanimity, with a few alterations recently made by the Diet, and placing this "Constitution, with the Government, liberty, and rights of Poland, under the guarantee of her Imperial Majesty, who most solemnly promises to preserve the Republic for ever entire." Thus, under the pretence of religious liberty, Martens, iv. 582.

* Martens Recueil, i. 340.

Rulhieres, ii. 466, 470.

the disorder and feebleness of Poland were perpetuated, and the principle of guarantee once more applied to internal institutions, to the absolute and total destruction of all remains of independence. Frederic II., an accomplice in these crimes, describes their immediate effect with the truth and coolness of an unconcerned spectator. "So many acts of sovereignty, says he, "exercised by a foreign power on the territory of the republic, at length excited universal indignation;-the offensive measures were not softened by the arrogance of Prince Repnin;-enthusiasm seized the minds of all, and the grandees availed themselves of the fanaticism and of their followers and serfs, to throw off a yoke which had become insupportable." In this temper of the nation, the Diet rose on the 6th of March, 1768, and with it expired the confederation of Radom, which furnished the second example, within five years, of a Polish party so blind to experience as to become the dupes of Russia. A confederation was immediately formed at Bar in Podolia, for the preservation of religion and liberty, which, in a moment, spread over the whole kingdom. The Russian officers hesitated for a moment whether they could take a part in this intestine war. Repnin, by pronouncing the word Siberia, compelled those members of the Senate who were at Warsaw to claim the aid of Russia, notwithstanding the dissent of the Czartorinskis and their friends, who protested against that inglorious and ruinous determination. The events of the war between Russia, and the confederation which followed, it is not our province to relate. On the part of Russia, it presents a series of acts of treachery, falsehood, rapacity, and cruelty, not unworthy of Cæsar Borgia.. The resistance of the Poles, an undisciplined and almost unarmed people, betrayed by their King and Senate, in a country without fastnesses or fortifications, where the enemy had already established themselves at every important point, forms one of the most glorious, though the most unfortunate, of the struggles of mankind for their rights. The Council of the Confederation established themselves at Eperies, within the frontier of Hungary, with the connivance and secret favour of Austria. Some French officers, and aid in money from Versailles and Constantinople, added something to their strength and more to their credit. Repnin entered into a negociation with them, and proposed an armistice, till he could procure reinforcements. Old Pulauski, the first leader of the Confederation, objected. "There is no word," said he, "in the Russian language for honour." The event speedily showed that the word would have been altogether superfluous. Repnin, as soon as he was reinforced, laughed at the armistice, fell upon the Confederates, and laid waste the lands of all true Poles with fire and sword. The Cossacks brought to Repnin's house at Warsaw, Polish gentlemen tied to the tails of their horses, and dragged in this manner along the ground. ‡ A Russian Colonel, named Drewitz, seems to have surpassed all his comrades in ferocity. Not content with massacring the gentlemen to whom quarter had been given, he inflicted on them the punishments invented in Russia for slaves; sometimes tying them to trees as a mark for his soldiers to fire at; sometimes scorching certain parts of their skin, so as to represent the national dress of Poland; sometimes dispersing them over the provinces, after he had cut off their hands, arms, nose, or ears, as living examples of the punishment suffered by those who loved their country. S It is remarkable, that this ferocious. monster, then the hero of the Muscovite army, was deficient in the common Rulbieres, iii. 55.

Mem. de 1763 jusqu'à 1775. + See their Manifesto. Martens, i. 455. § Rulhieres, iii. 124. See also Annual Register, &c.

quality of military courage. Peter had not civilized the Russians. That was an undertaking beyond even his genius, and inconsistent with his ferocious character. He only armed a barbarous people with the arts of civilized war.

he,

But no valour could have enabled the Confederates of Bar to resist the power of Russia for four years, if they had not been seconded by certain important changes in the political system of Europe, which at first raised a powerful diversion in their favour, but at length proved the immediate cause of the dismemberment of Poland. These changes may be dated from the alliance of France with Austria in 1756, and still more from the peace of 1762. On the day on which the Duke de Choiseul signed the preliminaries of peace at Fontainebleau, he entered into a secret convention with Spain, by which it was agreed that the war should be renewed against England in eight years; a time which was thought sufficient to repair the exhausted strength of the two Bourbon monarchies.* The hostility of the French minister to England was at that time extreme. "If I were master," said we should act towards England as Spain did to the Moors. If we really adopted that system, England would, in thirty years, be reduced and destroyed." Soon after, however, his vigilance was directed to other quarters by projects which threatened to deprive France of her accustomed and due influence in the north and east of Europe. He was incensed at Catharine for not resuming the alliance with Austria, and the war which had been abruptly suspended by the caprice of her unfortunate husband; and she, on the other hand, soon after she was seated on the throne, had formed one of those vast and apparently chimerical plans to which absolute power and immense territory have familiarized the minds of Russian Sovereigns. She laboured to counteract the influence of France, which she considered as the chief obstacle to her ambition, on all the frontiers of. her empire, in Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, by the formation of a great alliance of the North, to consist of England, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland, Russia being of course the head of the league. ‡ Choiseul exerted himself in every quarter to defeat this project, or rather to be revenged on Catharine for attempts which were already defeated by their own extravagance and vastness. In Sweden, his plan for reducing the Russian influence was successfully resisted in 1768; but the Revolution accomplished by Gustavus III. in 1772, re-established the French ascendant in that kingdom. The Count de Vergennes, ambassador at Constantinople. opened the eyes of the Sultan on the ambitious projects of Catharine in Sweden, in Poland, and in the Crimea. The strongest assurances of powerful aid were held out by France, which, had Choiseul remained in power, would probably have been carried into effect. By all these means, Vergennes persuaded the Porte to declare war against Russia on the 30th of October, 1768. § The Confederates of Bar, who had established themselves

* Ferrand, i. 76. The failure of this perfidious project is to be ascribed to the decline of Choiseul's influence, which preceded his downfal. The affair of Falkland's Islands was a fragment of the design.

Despatch from M. de Choiseul to M. D'Ossun at Madrid. 5th April, 1762. Flassan. Dip. Franc. vi. 466. About thirty years afterwards, the French monarchy was destroyed.

Rulhieres, ii. 310. Ferrand, i. 75.

§ Flassan. Diplom. Française, vii. 83. Vergennes was immediately recalled, notwithstanding this success, for having lowered (déconsidérée) himself by marrying the daughter of a physician. He brought back with him the three millions (120,0007. sterling) which had been remitted to him to bribe the Divan,-a proof of their disinterestedness, and of his integrity. Catharine called him Mustapha's Prompter."

in the neighbourhood of the Turkish as well as of the Austrian provinces, now received open assistance from the Turks. The Russian arms were fully occupied in the Turkish war; a Russian fleet entered the Mediterranean; the agents of the Court of Petersburgh excited a revolt among the Greeks, whom they afterwards treacherously and cruelly abandoned to the vengeance of their Turkish tyrants. These events suspended the fate of Poland. French officers of distinguished merit and gallantry guided the valour of the undisciplined Confederates.* Austria seemed to countenance,

if not openly to support them. Supplies and reinforcements from France passed openly through Vienna into Poland; and Maria Theresa herself publicly declared, that there was no principle or honour in Poland but among the Confederates. But the Turkish war, which had raised up an important ally for the struggling Poles, was in the end destined to be the cause of their destruction.

At this period began the complicated intrigues which terminated in the first dismemberment of Poland. The facts on this subject have been variously represented; but we shall not examine the controversies to which they have given rise, contenting ourselves with a short statement of what the original papers published by M. Goertz seem to us to establish beyond the possibility of dispute. These papers, it is not a little remarkable, that M. Ferrand appears not to have known. They agree with the Memoirs of Prince Henry of Prussia-with the Introduction to the Letters of Viomenil -with the Memoirs of Dohm, and, in the main, with the Narrative of Frederic II., who, in his account of these events, shows a sort of frank effrontery, which, however dishonourable to his character as a man, is rather favourable to his testimony as a witness. He does not seem to think his immoralities worth concealing.

The events of war had brought the Russian armies into the neighbourhood of the Austrian dominions, and began to fill the Court of Vienna with apprehensions for the security of Hungary. Frederic had no desire that his ally should become stronger. Both the great Courts of Germany were averse to the extension of the Russian territories at the expense of Turkey. Frederic was restrained from opposing it forcibly by his treaty with Catharine who continued to be his sole ally. Kaunitz, who ruled the councils of Vienna, still adhered to the French alliance, and continued to feel great apprehensions of such a neighbour on the eastern frontier, as Russia. He seconded the French negociations at Constantinople; and even so late as the month of July 1771, entered into a secret treaty with Turkey, by which Austria bound herself to recover from Russia, by negociation or by force, all the conquests made by that power from the Porte. But there is reason to think, that Kaunitz, distrusting the power and the inclination of France under the feeble government of Louis XV., and still less disposed to rely on the councils of Versailles after the downfall of Choiseul in December 1770, though he did not wish to dissolve the alliance, was desirous of loosening its ties; and became gradually disposed to adopt any expedient against the danger of Russian aggrandizement, which might relieve him from the necessity of engaging in a war, in which his chief confidence must necessarily have rested on so weak a stay as the French government. Maria Theresa still entertained a rooted aversion against Frederic, whom she never forgave for robbing her of Silesia; and openly professed her abhorrence of the vices Rulhieres. Ferrand. Lettres de Viomenil, Paris, 1807. Mémoires de Dumourier. +. Mémoires de l'Abbé Georgel, 1.

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VOL. IV.

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