rights. The Polish peasantry, moroever, have never been in the same condition with the Russian. Long before they were free by law, the progress of manners, and the interests of their lords, had rendered their bondage extremely gentle, and they were not, even by law, liable to be separated from the soil. That this body of people have suffered severely by the changes that immediately affected the landholders, as well as by the proceedings of the foreign troops, we have already seen. That they have felt and acted for their country, is equally true; although unquestionably it is among the higher orders that we are to look for the greatest force of national spirit. It is easy to say that these are but a handful, and that the Polish people are a few great lords with some millions of slaves. The answer is, that the fact is otherwise. A distant view of any institution is deceitful;—we should see how they work in practice, before we decide on their effects. We shall give the reader a riddle by way of proving this. What country is that, in which the judges being most grave, virtuous, and learned, they are not allowed to decide on the greater number of judicial questions without the assistance of some ignorant tradesmen, chosen at random, whose characters are wholly unknown,-where there are appeals from a judge to himself,where the court of ultimate appeal is composed of hereditary judges, not one in fifty of whom pretend to know any thing of the law,-where a man is not allowed the assistance of professional lawyers when he is accused of the heavier offences, but only in the extreme cases of the lightest and the heaviest of all?-Not only is this our own country, but the description given refers to by far the most perfect of its institutions. When viewed more nearly, the Polish peasantry are not found to be, in point of practical effect, materially different from those of other countries; and the higher classes are not a handful of nobles, but a vast multitude of persons in every state of employment, rank, and fortune, practically speaking. This class comprises all the landholders, amounting to perhaps 100,000 families; all those, far more numerous, who have the name and privileges of nobility, without any property in land, and who may be in employment; and all those who are nominally peasants, but on different titles possessed of land,-and those settled in towns as tradesmen and artificers. Substantially, then, this is a nation constituted as others are; and the feelings which we have described pervade them as they would others, if they had the same character and sufferings to excite them.

Again look to the fact. The men raised by the Allies in Poland can never be trusted, except perhaps in their wars with each other; for they immediately desert. It is believed that, at the present moment, there are not one hundred Poles in all the combined armies. The ranks of any power at war with the three courts are constantly filled with them, Since 1794, France has never been without multitudes of them. But since 1807, when she held out hopes of restoration, they have been almost equal to the whole of her foreign levies together. In 1812, they are reckoned at 100,000, under the most gallant and unfortunate of men.

The Emperor Alexander, with his usual regard for the happiness of his people, published an ukase, about ten years ago, abolishing villenage in gross. But the law is almost inoperative: for the masters sell the peasants as before, only they do it under the name of hiring. Thus this be neficent measure has only varied the style in the public advertisements; and instead of announcing so many men or women. with such and such qualifications, for sale, the papers are filled with notices of men fit for such work, or women of such an age and description (sometimes with ebild' to be let. The same price as formerly is paid, and the property substantially changed. In Res sian Poland, the peasants are as before the 3d of May.

"How many thousands of this devoted people have bled in the cause of French ambition in every part of the world! How often have the hearts of impartial men been wrung by the unnatural sight of Poles assisting in the subjugation of nations free and high-spirited like themselves!-IIIfated Poniatowski! through all his illustrious course, ever most unfortunate when his cause was purest: happy only in closing it when there was no alternative but dishonour, and life must have been alike miserable in victory or defeat! Devoted from his earliest years to his country; seeking her enemies in every field; astonishing the veteran companions of Pulawski and Zaremba, by his romantic valour; the delight of the young, and the gay, whom he outshone in court and camp; the likeness of a king for dignity of presence, of an ancient cavalier for his high-bred gallantry; zealous in friendship, to which he would sacrifice all but honour and love; an enthusiast for liberty, but unmindful that there were other tyrants beside Frederick and Catherine;-how melancholy to find him beguiled by the deceitful promises of one who never spoke of freedom but with the design to enslave! What a lesson to princes, when they view the very flower of their subjects, the men best fitted to adorn and fortify their thrones, driven into exile, and submitting to those they should have fought against, after proving to the conviction of the coldest heart, that wealth, honours, life itself, were indifferent to them without liberty! A superficial thinker only can severely blame such errors. In the antagonists of those whom he thought his country's worst enemies, this gallant chief could only see her friends. But surely it needs no argument to prove that the system, which at any moment gives France the disposal of an army of Poles, under leaders like Poniatowski, is little calculated to secure the tranquillity of those who occupy Poland."* P. 45-47.

How many of these have deserted? Even in unparalleled defeats, how constantly have they clung to France, because she still battled with Russia! Saxons, Bavarians, Dutch, Rhinlanders, Prussians, and Italians-all have by thousands deserted her standards, quivering with fearful disasters ;-of the Poles not one! And yet Bonaparte deceived their hopes, and had at best promised but little to gain them over. He was hampered with his alliances each time he went into Poland, and probably not very willing to begin the work of restoration.

But the facts speak still more loudly, when we look at the actual state of the country during these changes. No sooner had Prussia lost the battle of Jena, than the Poles compelled the Prussian troops to evacuate the Prussian provinces, as rapidly as the French left Holland after the battle of Leipsig. The partial prospects of restoration then held out by Bonaparte (who was in alliance with Austria, and perhaps unwilling to break with Russia beyond all chance of reconciliation), were sufficient to call forth incredible exertions. In a few days, whole regiments were raised by a few individuals-some brought battalions-or only companies-and all poured in their wealth of every kind. Nothing probably contributed more than the ferment in Poland to keep Austria quiet at that moment; and it certainly enabled the enemy to maintain himself during the winter, after severe losses, and in the following campaign to dictate a peace upon the Niemen. In the next war, 1809, the Poles made similar efforts, and their army over-ran Austrian Poland with ease, meeting in these provinces only friends wherever they came, Bonaparte was now in alliance with Russia, and could promise little to the Poles; but they felt grateful for the shadow of independence given to.

*The death of this illustrious chief is affectingly described in a most interesting tract upon the Battles of Leipsic, which we will not cite, because it might prevent our readers from purchasing it, and contributing to the relief of the distressed Leipsigers, for whose benefit it is sold. Suffice it to say, that he fell as he had lived, in the display of prodigious courage, and overwhelmed with affliction. A solemn dirge has been performed for him, with a splendid ceremonial, in the metropolitan church of Warsaw, though now occupied by the Russians. In fact the common license of abuse has been spared by all parties, even by the profligate part of the English press, upon this occasion, and not a word has ever been whispered against him by the Allies; a plain indication that, confident as they are, and well may be, in their cause against France, they feel what a weak part it has towards Poland. "Scelus tu illud vocas, Tubero? cur? isto enim nomine illa adhuc causa caruit. Alii errorem appellant: alii timorem: qui durius spem, cupiditatem, odium, pertiuaciam: qui gravissime temeritatem: scelus, præter te, adhuc nemo. De illis loquor, qui occiderunt. Fuerint cupidi, fueriut irati, fuerint pertinaces: sceleris vero crimine, furoris, parricidii, liceat Cn. Pompeio mortuo, liccat multis aliis carere."-Pro Ligario.

the duchy of Warsaw; and by the peace of Vienna he added half of Gallicia to that state. In 1812 new offers were held out; but the Austrian alliance controlled them; nevertheless, the people still hoped, and they surpassed their former exertions. He obtained nearly twelve millions sterling within a few months, including the ordinary revenue, from the duchy alone; and his ranks were filled from all parts of Poland. It is not to be questioned, that if he had fairly offered the restoration of the country, with its own laws, instead of the Code Napoleon, and had waited for six months in order to avail himself of its entire co-operation, a very different result would have attended his advance upon Russia. That Poland was for ever gone from her, no one can doubt.

Now, the question is, whether all this may not be once more tried, with fuller effect, and according to the lessons taught by experience? Is it hazarding too much to assert, that as long as the dreadful state of things continues, which we have above endeavoured to describe, France, or whoever is at war with the three partitioning powers, has a steady ally in the heart of their dominions? It is wise in them to neglect the lesson which they as well as she have learnt, that no appeal to Poland has ever been made in vain? What inference can be drawn from this lesson, except that they should in wisdom now listen to the appeal in her behalf? If they restore her independence, they at once raise an impregnable bulwark against France in all time coming, and get rid of the greatest weakness in their own posi– tion; they take a vast weight out of their enemy's scale, and transfer it to their own.

An objection will be started against this expectation, which may immediately be remedied. The Poles, it will be said, have shown a rooted aversion to the Allied powers, particularly the Russians, and a preference to the French. Now this has been entirely owing to the circumstances. There is no natural antipathy between Russians and Poles; on the contrary, they have every thing to unite them; a common origin, a language almost the same, and manners not dissimilar. Accordingly, in ordinary circumstances they live together; and it is only where Russian soldiers occupy their country, that the mutual hatred begins to show itself. If the Poles are really as ardent in their wish of restoration, as every fact proves them to be, the removal of foreign troops, and the grant of independence, will both remove all cause of hatred, and change the aversion now felt into gratitude; for it will come with all the grace of a free gift. This, too, is the moment, when France, having for the third time deceived them, they will be the more reclaimed from their connexion with her, by obtaining from their neighbours the blessing of a separate existence.

There are other arrangements, however, short of absolute independence -all of which would confer the most substantial benefits upon Poland, and contribute in the same proportion to the advantage and security of the Allies. A separate state may be formed, under a constitution as nearly as possible resembling that of the 3d of May, but annexed to Russia, as Hungary is to Austria. The objection to this undoubtedly is, that Prussia and Austria would suffer by it, and Russia alone gain; and this of itself ought to weigh against it, and make Russia, on an enlarged view of her interest, and in order to keep her two neighbours for ever separate from French connexions, prefer the entire independence of Poland. It may be remarked, however, that such a plan would not increase the preponderance of Russia, more than she might at any time augment it herself; for if she engages in a

war with her neighbours, she may easily, to use the common expression of the continental politicians, "Leur faire sauter la Pologne." Another plan, much less beneficial in every view, but still far preferable to the duration of the present arrangement, would be to incorporate all Poland at once with Russia. The numerous evils arising from the division of the country would be greatly alleviated; and the Poles would be secured against that calamity which they now have most reason to dread-the increase of those sufferings, by new changes and new partitions.

It was not possible for us to avoid noticing these intermediate arrangements; because it is difficult to carry on this discussion, without a reference to the Poles themselves, as well as the interests of their masters; and nothing is more clear, than that there are degrees between the opposite extremes of complete restoration and new partitions-the choice of which is a matter infinitely important to the happiness of the people. We have too long devoted our humble efforts in this Journal to the best interests of humanity, and are too sincerely happy in the reflection, that they may not have been unavailing, to leave such considerations out of view. We belong not to the number of those, who can feel no indignation at injustice, unless committed by our enemies; nor pity for public misfortunes, unless suffered by Africans, or Spaniards. But the interests of the Polish people are, however important, only a subordinate part of the present question. The restoration of European independence is the object of every statesman's anxious hopes; the revival of sound and consistent principle alone can effect it; and this cannot be thought possible, by any reflecting mind, without the complete re-establishment of Poland as an independent state.

NECESSITY AND EXPEDIENCY OF PEACE WITH AMERICA.*

Without entertaining any extravagant ideas of that portion of human wisdom which is employed in governing the world, or making any romantic estimate of the justice and prudence of cabinets and public assemblies, we did think it improbable that a war, which both parties had entered upon with reluctance, should, by any management, be protracted for more than a year after all the objects for which it had been gone into had ceased to exist, and after both parties appeared to be convinced that no beneficial results could be expected from its continuance. Nor can we yet believe that the infatuation which has already cost so much brave blood can be indulged much longer; -and while the uncertainty of the result seems to impose it upon us as a duty to call the attention of the country to the true character and inevitable consequences of the hostilities in which we are so unfortunately engaged, we go to the task with a fond and sanguine expectation, that what we have to say may lose the greater part of its interest even before it comes into the hands of our readers, and be recorded rather as a momento against future errors, than a protestation and appeal

Letters from Canada, written during a Residence there in the Years 1806, 1807, and 1808; showing the present State of Canada, its Productions. Trade, Commercial Importance, and Political Relations; exhibiting also the Commercial Importance of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Cape Breton, &c. By Hugh Gray. London, 1814.

The Right and Practice of Impressment, as concerning Great Britain and America considered. London, 1814. Vol. xxiv. p. 243. November, 1814.

against an existing enormity. On the strength of this anticipation, we shall confine our remarks to as small a space as possible.

We are no admirers of the Americans and no advocates for the policy they have pursued in the great crisis of European affairs. We think their government has all along shown a manifest partiality to France, even after France became a great monument of despotism at home, and oppression; abroad-that in wisdom and in justice they ought to have declared war against that power, and not against us, if they found it impossible to maintain the position of neutrality; and that, at all events, they should have withdrawn that declaration of war the moment that, by rescinding our Orders in Council, we had redressed the most urgent of their grievances, and given a substantial pledge of our disposition to redress the rest. With these sentiments and settled impressions, however, we are far from thinking that the Americans are a detestable people; or that we ought to pursue hostilities against them to our own injury and disgrace, for the mere gratification of our resentment. There are-we once hoped that by this time we might have used another tense-there are circumstances in the history of the two countries that prevent them from judging fairly of each other— and from which, if we suffer unjustly on the one hand, we may depend on it they suffer at least as much on the other. It is impossible even to lay the foundation for a candid or impartial view of the present unhappy differences, without casting a glance back to their original source of alienation.

The war of the revolution, or of emancipation, as it is called in America, -the violent rupture of the ties which had previously bound the two countries so closely together,―necessarily left a certain degree of soreness upon both sides. At first sight it may appear that this should have been greatest on the part of England, and that we have a better apology than our opponents for the rancorous feelings which have been fostered too long by the less generous part of both nations. The truth, however, is otherwise; -for though those who are worsted in a contest generally retain the bitterest animosity, and the successful can best afford to be generous, yet in this particular instance the general rule was reversed, by two circumstances equally obvious and conclusive. In the first place, the war was carried on in America, and not in England,—and was not always carried on, we regret to say, in a spirit of magnanimous hostility; and, in the second place, that war which, even while it lasted, was little more than a tale of interest to the greater part of our population, and has since been effaced from our recollection by the still greater and more momentous contentions in which we have been involved, was the first and the last adventure of the insurgent colonies in the great game of battles. The leaders in that war were the founders of their being as a nation; and the events of it the steps by which they rose to independence. With them, therefore, it has always possessed an importance, and been connected with a weight of public feeling to which there was nothing parallel in this country; and while the remembrance of disasters and defeats sustained on the other side of the Atlantic, and never really felt but through the medium of taxes or gazettes, was likely to be speedily obliterated from our unviolated and opulent land, a very different impression might naturally be expected to survive the contest in that country, which had been the theatre of so many sanguinary scenes-whose fields and cities still bore the marks of devastation and rapine-whose whole population had been exposed to the horrors of rancorous hostility-whose national