time, on the continent of Italy, and forcibly to withstand the political interference of the popes in the affairs of other states.

Azzo of Este, Marquis of Ferrara, died, leaving a brother and a natural son, the latter of whom had attempted to murder his father, and had actually wounded him; but, as his mother was a native of Venice, the Republic, in spite of the opposition of the Ferrarese, recognised his claim to the marquisate, and his right to dispose of it, to the total exclusion of the lawful heir; after which they purchased it of him for an annuity of a thousand ducats, to be paid him during his life, and immediately sent an army to occupy the territory. Clement V., insisting upon that feudal supremacy over Ferrara which his predecessors had ever laid claim to,-incited by that hatred to the Republic which he had inherited from them,—and eager to seize the opportunity of extending his temporal dominions, lent a favourable ear to the entreaties of the Ferrarese and of the rightful heir; insomuch. that he not only deputed apostolical nuncios to receive their oaths of allegiance, but threatened the Venetians with the visitation of those canonical penalties which the Church had denounced against usurpers. The Venetians, disregarding these threats, were immediately assailed with a papal bull, which denounced them as despoilers of St. Peter's patrimony, and infamous, even to the fourth generation; deprived them of their mercantile property in foreign ports, of the right of property at home, and of the power of testamentary disposition; declared their goods and possessions the lawful prey of the first taker; themselves slaves in every region of the globe; and proclaimed that God would look with an approving eye upon every act of hostility, cruelty, and perfidy which should tend to blot themselves and their posterity from the memory of mankind. Such decrees were then believed to proceed from the immediate inspiration of God; and, sanctifying rapine, readily found executioners.

It is recorded, that a Venetian ambassador crawled on his hands and feet to the foot of the papal throne,-patiently endured the epithet of “soulless dog," with which he was regaled by the consistory, and, by dint of much entreaty, at length obtained absolution for the Republic; + which, however, be it remarked, she did not apply for until Ferrara had been wrested from her hands by a murderous insurrection of the inhabitants.

At this period begins the reign of the council of ten, which, in its origin, was nothing more than a committee of the council of forty, specially ap pointed, for the limited period of two months, to proceed judicially against those who were implicated in the conspiracy of Bajamonte Tiepolo, and to explore its secret ramifications. (A. D. 1310.) Afterwards, its powers were extended for a farther period of two months; then for the successive periods of one, five, and ten years; and ultimately, it was established in perpetuity, with ample authority to make, alter, and repeal the regulations which were to govern its procedure and its judgments. (A. D. 1335). It had hardly received this extension of its powers, when it carried them into decisive effect, for the purpose of suppressing the last fruitless attempt on the domination of the hereditary aristocracy. The attempt to which we advert is the celebrated conspiracy of the Doge Faliar, whom they had placed in the ducal throne at the advanced age of eighty, to obviate the probability of such an incident; and to deter his successors from similar enterprises,

The bull which we have here abbreviated is quoted by many historians; and is to be found in the original, in the Collection of Papal Bulls,-Vol. iii. page 118-120. Rome, 1741. Foscarini, Litteratura Venegiani, lib. iii.

had studiously degraded by an insult which, in every age, must be insufferable, and, in that, could only be expiated in the blood of the offenders. After his execution, the president of the council of ten appeared at a window of the ducal palace, holding a sword in one hand, and displaying the trunkless head of the old man in the other, and proclaimed to the assembled multitude that the traitor had but paid the penalty justly due to his crime. (A. D. 1355.)

Henceforward, the body of the nobles acted in strict unison, without perceiving that their power was gradually arrogated by a narrow oligarchy, which, with all possible dilligence, proceeded at the same time to abridge the authority of the Doge, to hold him up to the people as a fit object of jealousy, and to make him responsible for every error of the government. Falier was held unworthy of that sepulture in the church of St. Mark with which his predecessors had always been honoured; and the privilege itself was thenceforward abolished, to the prejudice of those who should succeed him. The law which forbade the Doges to take wives not natives of Venice was extended to their sons, who were also excluded from every place in the magistracy, and were requited for these incapacities by the empty title of Cavalieri del Doge. So long as he lived, the family arms were displayed upon the ducal palace, but might not be affixed, like those of other patricians, upon the family mansion. A fine was imposed upon any who should address him, by writing or orally, in any other style than that of Messer Doge. Every one employed about his person, of whatever rank he might be, was excluded even from the lowest office connected directly or indirectly with the goverment. (A. D. 1400.)

These restraints, however severe they may appear, were still not strict enough in the eyes of the aristocracy. Whilst the naval and military force of the Republic was no longer placed at the disposition of the Doge, every war in which she engaged was ascribed to him as its author. By this subtle policy the popular indignation was drawn down upon him by a doubtful or unsuccessful issue. Nor can it be inferred from this description, that this miserable throne was only filled by vain-glorious aspirants, since no one, when elected, could refuse to accept the office, nor, having accepted, could resign it. Another change went hand in hand with the degradation of the ducal authority; for the people were deprived, even in appearance, of that power of confirming the appointment of the Doge, of which they had been despoiled in substance at the election of Pietro Gradenigo, about a century before this period. On that occasion the nobility ventured, for the first time, to announce to the people, without waiting for the appropriate reply,"The Doge is elected-if you approve him." But, during the period to which we have just adverted, the nomination of Francisco Foscari was proclaimed to the people in this more concise and less respectful formula,"The Doge is elected." (A.D. 1423.)

Nor did the encroachments of the oligarchy stop here. The despotism of the last-named Doge sufficiently evinces that it afterwards assumed the power of making, as well as of unmaking, the head of the state; though it so shrouded its usurpations under cover of the State Inquisition, which was established on this very occasion, that Venice, to appearance, remained under the government of a large and liberal aristocracy.

We have now arrived at the end of the ten first centuries of the Venetian history, and at the commencement of that constitution which, owing to the impenetrable secrecy wherewith it veiled its conduct, was preserved from

any violent shock during nearly four centuries more, and only ended with the destruction of the state itself.

To examine and illustrate this intricate and interesting subject would lead us beyond the limits which are assigned to writers in periodical works. Probably, in a future article, we shall somewhat at large the structure and policy of the oligarchical State Inquisition,-a body which, though it checked or stifled the internal prosperity of the Republic, yet saved her from the causes of dissolution wherewith she was beset externally; skilfully concealed the progress of her decay, and covered her intrinsic weakness, down to the hour of her agony, with a specious and imposing appearance of strength and dignity.*

ON THE CHARACTER AND EXECUTION OF CHARLES THE FIRST, AND ON THE MEASURES OF THE LONG PARLIAMENT.

The early measures of the Long Parliament, Mr. Hallam in general approves; but he considers the proceedings which took place after the recess in the summer of 1641 as mischievous and violent. He thinks, that from that time the demands of the Houses were not warranted by any imminent danger to the Constitution; and that in the war which ensued they were clearly the aggressors. As this is one of the most interesting questions in our history, we will venture to state, at some length, the reasons which have led us to form an opinion on it contrary to that of a writer whose judgment we so highly respect.

We will premise, that we think worse of King Charles the First than even Mr. Hallan appears to do. The fixed hatred of liberty, which was the principle of all his public conduct; the unscrupulousness with which he adopted any means which might enable him to attain his ends; the readiness with which he gave promises; the impudence with which he broke them; the cruel indifference with which he threw away his useless or damaged tools, rendered him-at least till his character was fully exposed, and his power shaken to its foundations-a more dangerous enemy to the constitution than a man of far greater talents and resolution might have been. Such princes may still be seen-the scandals of the southern thrones of Europeprinces false alike to the accomplices who have served them, and to the opponents who have spared them-princes who, in the hour of danger, concede every thing, swear every thing-hold out their cheeks to every smiter— give up to punishment every minister of their tyranny, and await with meek and smiling implacability the blessed day of perjury and proscription.

We will pass by the instances of oppression and falsehood which disgraced the early years of the reign of Charles. We will leave out of the question the whole history of his third Parliament-the price which he exacted for assenting to the petition of right-the perfidy with which he violated his engagements-the death of Eliot-the barbarous punishments inflicted by the Star-Chamber-the ship-money, and all the measures, now universally

* It is stated in the life of the late Ugo Foscolo, published in the Annual Obituary, that he was the writer of this Essay. An article on the History of the Subversion of Venice, from anothor pen, appeared in an early number of the Edin. Review.-See Vol. xii. page 379.

+ Hallam's Constitutional History of England.-Vol. xlviii. page 120. September, 1828.

condemned, which disgraced his administration from 1630 to 1640. We will admit, that it might be the duty of the Parliament, after punishing the most guilty of his creatures-after abolishing the inquisitorial tribunals, which had been the instruments of his tyranny-after reversing the unjust sentences of his victims, to pause in its course. The concessions which had been made were great-the evils of civil war obvious-the advantages even of victory doubtful. The former errors of the king might be imputed to youth-to the pressure of circumstances-to the influence of evil counselto the undefined state of the law. We firmly believe, that if, even at this eleventh hour, Charles had acted fairly towards his people, if he had even acted fairly towards his own partisans, the House of Commons would have given him a fair chance of retrieving the public confidence. Such was the opinion of Clarendon. He distinctly states, that the fury of opposition had abated-that a re-action had begun to take place-that the majority of those who had taken part against the king were desirous of an honourable and complete reconciliation; and that the more violent, or, as it soon appeared, the more judicious members of the party were fast declining in credit. The remonstrance had been carried with great difficulty. The uncompromising antagonists of the court, such as Cromwell, had begun to talk of selling their estates and leaving England. The event soon showed, that they were the only men who really understood how much inhumanity and fraud lay hid under the constitutional language and gracious demeanour of the King.

The attempt to seize the five members was undoubtedly the real cause of the war. From that moment, the loyal confidence with which most of the popular party were beginning to regard the King, was turned into hatred and incurable suspicion. From that moment, the Parliament was compelled to surround itself with defensive arms-from that moment the city assumed the appearance of a garrison-from that moment it was, that, in the phrase of Clarendon, the carriage of Hampden became fiercer-that he drew the sword, and threw away the scabbard. For, from that moment, it must have been evident to every impartial observer, that in the midst of professions, oaths, and smiles, the tyrant was constantly looking forward to an absolute sway and to a bloody revenge.

The advocates of Charles have very dexterously contrived to conceal from their readers the real nature of this transaction. By making concessions apparently candid and ample, they elude the great accusation. They allow that the measure was weak, and even frantic-an absurd caprice of Lord Digby, absurdly adopted by the King. And thus they save their client from the full penalty of his trangression, by entering a plea of guilty to the minor offence. To us his conduct appears at this day, as at the time it appeared to the Parliament and the city. We think it by no means so foolish as it pleases his friends to represent it, and far more wicked.

In the first place, the transaction was illegal from beginning to end. The impeachment was illegal. The process was illegal. The service was illegal. If Charles wished to prosecute the five members for treason, a bill against them should have been sent to a grand jury. That a commoner cannot be tried for high treason by the Lords at the suit of the Crown is part of the very alphabet of our law. That no man can be arrested by a message or a verbal summons of the King, with or without a warrant from a responsible magistrate, is equally clear. This was an established maxim of our jurisprudence in the time of Edward the Fourth. "A subject," said Chief Justice Markham to that prince, "may arrest for treason: the

king cannot; for if the arrest be illegal, the party has no remedy against the king."

The time at which Charles took this step also deserves consideration. We have already said, that the ardour which the Parliament had displayed at the time of its first meeting had considerably abated; that the leading opponents of the court were desponding, and that their followers were in general inclined to milder and more temperate measures than those which had hitherto been pursued. In every country, and in none more than in England, there is a disposition to take the part of those who are unmercifully run down, and who seem destitute of all means of defence. Every man who has observed the ebb and flow of public feeling in our own time, will easily recall examples to illustrate this remark. An English statesman ought to pay assiduous worship to Nemesis-to be most apprehensive of ruin when he is at the height of power and popularity, and to dread his enemy most, when most completely prostrated. The fate of the Coalition Ministry in 1784 is perhaps the strongest instance in our history of the operation of this principle. A few weeks turned the ablest and most extended ministry that ever existed into a feeble opposition, and raised a king, who was talking of retiring to Hanover, to a height of power which none of his predecessors had enjoyed since the Revolution. A crisis of this description was evidently approaching in 1942. At such a crisis, a prince of a really honest and generous nature, who had erred, who had seen his error, who had regretted the lost affections of his people, who rejoiced in the dawning hope of regaining them, would be peculiarly careful to take no step which could give occasion of offence, even to the unreasonable. On the other hand, a tyrant, whose whole life was a lie, who hated the constitution the more because he had been compelled to feign respect for it, to whom his honour and the love of his people were as nothing, would select such a crisis for some appalling violation of law, for some stroke which might remove the chiefs of an opposition, and intimidate the herd. This, Charles attempted. He missed his blow;-but so narrowly that it would have been mere madness in those at whom it was aimed to trust him again.

It deserves to be remarked, that the King had, a short time before, promised the most respectable Royalists in the House of Commons, Falkland, Colepepper, and Hyde, that he would take no measure in which that House was concerned, without consulting them. On this occasion he did not consult them. His conduct astonished them more than any other members of the Assembly. Clarendon says that they were deeply hurt by this want of confidence, and the more hurt, because, if they had been consulted they would have done their utmost to dissuade Charles from so improper a proceeding. Did it never occur to Clarendon-will it not at least occur to men less partial-that there was good reason for this? When the danger to the throne seemed imminent, the King was ready to put himself for a time into the hands of those who, though they had disapproved of his past conduct, thought that the remedies had now become worse than the distempers. But we believe, that in heart he regarded both the parties in the Parliament with feelings of aversion, which differed only in the degree of their intensity; and that the awful warning which he proposed to give by immolating the principal supporters of the remonstrance, was partly intended for the instruction of those who had concurred in censuring the ship-money, and in abolishing the Star-Chamber.

The Commons informed the King that their members should be forth