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can never possess, and to read of happiness he is not destined to enjoy." A writer who, though he conceals his name, is well known as a friend and correspondent of Burke, observes, "Learning is not only considered by some instructors to be better than house and land, but to be preferable to meat, clothing, and all such coarse enjoyments. If a child's mind is fed, it seems this is all the nourishment he requires. The energies of his spirit are to support the weakness of his flesh, and science is to check the progress of starvation! Then as to clothing, provided his intellect is well lined, no matter how thinly his body is covered.-Murtagh Shaughnessy's children are very naked! Poor things, they ought to be sent to school-They have nothing to eat! They should be taught to read without a moment's loss of time !— By writing, reading, and arithmetic, all the evils of life are to be cured, and all its wants supplied."*

But this is too miserable for mockery. Education is not a nostrum that is to cure every possible disease. We know that equal laws fairly administered, personal freedom, and more extended employment, are the first wants of Ireland. But it is no less true that even these remedies, did we possess a government sufficiently strong and virtuous to try them, would be incomplete without a wise, a comprehensive, and truly liberal system of Education †.

* Letter to the Right Hon. C. Grant, by Atharnie.

See another article, in which the State of Education in Ireland is discussed, vol. xxxvii. page 60.

APPENDIX.

ACCOUNT OF THE LATE DR. BROWN'S CONNEXION WITH.
THE EDINBURGH REVIEW.

Reference is made to the following Narrative in page 162. (Note.)

WHEN the Edinburgh Review commenced, the ideas of authorship being somewhat different from what they are at present, the papers were contributed without any pecuniary compensation. Some articles were writen by Dr. Brown, and bear the marks of his genius. He was the author of the leading article of the second number-a Review of the Philosophy of Kant; and I believe every one who has attended to the subject will allow that he has made it as intelligible as the nature of it admits. In reference to this subject I may here insert two extracts from the letters of Dr. Currie :-" I have heard that you are engaged in the Edinburgh Review, which makes a great impression here, and which certainly displays uncommon vigour and information. It struck me that the article on Kant must be from you. I received from it great pleasure and instruction. I could wish there was a little less severity in the Review; but I have scarcely now a right to speak, lest it should be imputed to personal feeling,- having observed that there is a little touch at myself, or rather, perhaps, poor Burns, in the last number." In another letter he thus writes:-" I assure you that the compliment I paid you on the review of Kant was perfectly sincere. I had been endeavouring to penetrate into his system with no great success. The demonstration you have given of the points in which it agrees and disagrees with Berkeley, has, I think, thrown light upon the whole. I shall trouble myself no more with transcendentalism: I consider it as a philosophical hallucination. We must rest after all, I believe, for the present, in the system of Dr. Reid; such, at least, is the inclination of my mind. Mr. Stewart's view of the life and writings of this sage has given me extraordinary pleasure.”

His connexion with the Review, however, was but of brief continuance. Some liberties that were taken with one of his papers, by the gentleman who had the superintendence of the publication of the third number, led to a misunderstanding, which terminated in his withdrawing his assistance from the work.

Many of Dr. Brown's friends regretted that any circumstance should have occurred to put an end to his connexion with the Review. To his immediate fame it certainly was in some degree injurious,—both because at that time there was no means by which a young man could so easily be brought into public notice as by writing in that work; and, more indirectly, because, without imputing any improper motive, his name has scarcely ever appeared in it with the approbation it deserves. In other respects, however, the circumstance was perhaps not to be regrested. There are minds to which the neglect of their contemporaries is not disadvantageous; and the facilities to immediate applause, enjoyed by a contributor to a popular periodical publication, are not always favourable to those habits that seem necessary for the production of a work of permanent fame. Though repeatedly and earnestly solicited to join again the Edinburgh Review, he constantly declined; and he was never afterwards connected with any individual in any literary work. Life of Brown, by Welsh, p. 79—81.

In a Note at Page 163, the Subject of the foregoing Remarks is again reverted to in the following Terms.

THOUGH the distinguished individual who at present conducts the Edinburgh Review* had the superintendence of the papers from the commencement, he was not nominated Editor till the publication of the fourth number; and the publication of the third number was, in his absence, intrusted to the care of a gentleman who has long been known as one of the most popular contributors to its pages. † It may be proper to add, that none of these eminent individuals allowed this unfortunate misunderstanding to lessen their sentiments of mutual regard, or to interfere with their habits of intimacy. Dr. Brown had prepared some materials for the fourth number, which were never used. In particular, he had written a very ingenious paper on the second volume of Miss Baillie's Plays. An able article, but in a very different spirit, upon the same work, appeared from another band. This he regretted no farther than as he was prevented from bearing testimony to the merits of an author of whose genius he entertained a very high idea. He used to take credit to himself for being one of the first in Edinburgh who appreciated her excellences; and he regretted that her works had not met with a more favourable reception. Upon the subject once being mentioned, I recollect he said, with a smile, "I really consider this to be one of the great heresies of the Edinburgh Review."

In stating that Dr. Brown's name has scarcely ever appeared in the Edinburgh Journal with the approbation it deserves, I must except the very flattering allusion to the first edition of his work "On Cause and Effect," to which reference is made in another part of this work. "The Paradise of Coquettes" also met with a very high eulogium; but without any idea that he was the author. Indeed, till after his death, his name was never mentioned either as a poet or philosopher. In a late number a pledge has been given, which it is anxiously hoped will be speedily redeemed.‡

ON THE UTILITY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

The Controversy to which the subjoined Observations refer is mentioned in a Note, page 163. THE philosophy of the mind, in order to have any chance of improving upon former advances, must share at least some degree of that estimation which the other sciences enjoy. But we are told by some persons, that when the pretensions of this boasted philosophy are sifted to the bottom, it will be found that it is incapable of making any substantial additions either to our knowledge or to our power. To counteract these depreciatory views is the main object of Mr. Stewart in his preliminary dissertation. He rightly judges that his favourite science has much at issue in such an investigation. The public seems already sufficiently disposed to neglect, if not to undervalue it; and if the idea should prevail, that it has nothing either new or useful to communicate, it is pretty clear that all remaining curiosity about the laws of the intellectual world would be extinguished, and all farther improvement of this great and interesting department of knowledge entirely abandoned. The occasion of this important discussion, which occupies the far greater part of the preliminary discourse, is stated by Mr. Stewart in the following passage :—

"When I first ventured to appear before the public as an author, I resolved that nothing should ever induce me to enter into any controversy in defence of my conclusions, but to leave them to stand or to fall by their own evidence. As this indifference, however, about the fate of my particular doctrines, arose from a deep-rooted conviction, both of the importance of my subject, and of the soundness of my plan, it was impossible for me to be insensible to such criticisms as were directed against either of these two fundamental assumptions. Some criticisms of this description I had, from the first, anticipated; and I would not have failed to obviate them in the introduction to my former work, if I had not been afraid to expose myself to the imputation of prolixity, by con

* Mr. Jeffrey is the gentleman here alluded to. He was the Editor of the Review at the period when these observations were written.

† Probably the Rev. Sidney Smith.

The article on Drs. Brown and Reid, republished in this volume, is the only one that has appeared since the foregoing observations were written by the Rev. D. Welsh.;

juring up objections for the purpose of refuting them. I longed, therefore, for an opportunity of being able to state these objections in the less suspicious words of another; and, still more, in the words of some writer whose talents might contribute to draw the public attention to an argument, in which I conceived the credit of my favourite studies to be so peculiarly interested. For such an opportunity I am indebted to a very able article in the Edinburgh Review, in replying to which I shall have occasion to obviate most of the objections which I had foreseen, as well as various others which, I must own, had never occurred to me."-Prel. Dissert. pp. 29, 30.

The article to which Mr. Stewart here particularly refers is the review of the excellent account which he some years ago published of the Life and Writings of Dr. Reid. In his survey of the scope and spirit of that great philosopher's writings, he insisted a good deal upon the general analogy between the inductive science of mind and the inductive science of matter; maintaining, that the same rules of philosophising were equally applicable, and equally promised advancement to both. In the article alluded to, it was on the other hand argued, that induction can only be applied to the study of the mind in the way of observation,—that observation without experiment never increases our power,—and that all that the observer of mind can do, is merely to classify and give names to phenomena perfectly notorious to all mankind. Mr. Stewart here largely controverts all those positions, and vindicates the claims of the philosophy of the mind to increase both our knowledge and our power, in terms to which all must allow the praise of uncommon eloquence; but the vindication would, we think, have been more complete, had he illustrated with greater precision the nature and results of intellectual analysis, and developed more fully the relations which connect this science with the other branches of our knowledge. His reply, however, is, upon the whole, powerful and conclusive; and as it necessarily calls upon us to advert to the arguments of his antagonist, we think it right once for all to state, that we greatly admire the acuteness and fertility of thought with which they are supported, and regret that such rare talents for metaphysical speculation should be employed to underrate the importance of metaphysical science.

The position which this writer so confidently maintains, "that the metaphysical enquirer can disclose nothing of which all his pupils were not previously aware," appears to us, we must say, to be nothing less than absurd; and has led the critic into inconsistencies which all his ingenuity has not been able to veil. The epithets of "important" and "valuable," so liberally bestowed upon the speculations of Mr. Stewart, would come very well from a writer who admitted the usefulness of met‹physical enquiry; but we profess ourselves unable to discover how they can be made to tally with an argument intended to prove that all ideas of metaphysical utility are visionary, and that mankind would have lost nothing though the philosophy of the mind had never existed. Neither do we see how any one can talk of Locke as worthy of being ranked with Newton, who wishes to make us believe that this great metaphysician could only draw the attention of mankind to conclusions just about as notorious as these,-" that each of us has ten fingers and ten toes, and a certain number of teeth, distinguishable into masticators and incisors!" How, again, can any science be remarkable for "profundity," all the truths of which are said to be just as much known to the clown as to the philosopher? Or what can there be "to gratify and exalt a keen and aspiring curiosity," where discoveries are "obvious and easy to such humble judges of intellectual resource as horse-jockeys and bear dancers!" **

But, leaving these incongruities and witticisms, we proceed to remark, that the metaphysical disputes which obtain among mankind would be utterly unaccountable, were it true, as the Reviewer maintains, that all men have equal knowledge of all the operations of their minds. Without going back to those dark and unscientific ages, when

false metaphysics constituted

"The schoolman's glory and the churchman's boast,"

we would beg to be informed, how the most enlightened men come, at this day, to be divided in opinion regarding intellectual phenomena, as to which, upon this principle, every person knows all that it is possible to know? How could any opinion about the mind be shown to be erroneous, if the knowledge of the phenomena of mind is of the same kind in all? If we all know, absolutely, every thing that can be known about the laws which regulate our intellectual operations, how comes it that there is ever any he

sitation or any difference of opinion as to the question of the freedom of the will, for example, or, as to the principle upon which we approve and disapprove in matters of morality, or, as to the origin and character of our passions and affections? There could evidently be no difficulty or difference as to these or any other questions regarding our intellectual constitution, if all the connexions and laws of mental operation, -if the genesis of all our ideas and feelings were equally and perfectly known to every one. We may here observe, that the disputes and uncertainties to which we have alluded give no ground to the opinion which we often hear from the superficial, that there is nothing satisfactory in the science of the mind,-that all its principles are unsettled, -and that there is no hope of farther light. The uncertainties which still hang over some of its principles afford, indeed, a proof that we have something to discover, and, therefore, a proof that the Reviewer's assertion is wholly unfounded; but no proof whatever that we shall never attain to a state of greater knowledge and certainty. Many errors, by which the progress of this science was long impeded, have at length disappeared; and many points, long contested, have been finally settled by more enlightened enquiries. There is, therefore, every reason to conclude that, by persevering in the proper road of investigation, farther advances will yet be made, and the domain of uncertainty more and more narrowed. Si homines per tanta annorum spatia viam veram inveniendi et colendi scientias tenuissent, nec tamen uteriùs progredi potuissent, audax procul dubio et temeraria foret opinio, posse rem in ulterius progredi. Quòd si in via ipsa erratum sit, atque hominum opera, in iis consumpta, in quibus minimè oportebat ; sequitur ex eo, non in rebus ipsis difficultatem oriri, quæ potestatis nostræ non sunt ; sed intellectu humano, ejusque usu el applicationi; quæ res remedium et medicinam suscipit.

*

The great argument of the Reviewer is, that it is absurd to suppose mankind can have any thing new to learn about phenomena of which all have been conscious. We are all equally conscious of all our intellectual operations; and, therefore, to talk of discoveries, within the sphere of consciousness, is an abuse of words. It is upon this ground, he concludes, that the philosopher cannot tell even the clown any fact about his internal constitution of which he was not aware before. "We all arrive," says he, "at a perfect knowledge of our minds, as we do of our native parish, without study or exertion." What a striking contrast between this opinion and that of Mr. Hume!"To hope," say this penetrating writer, "that we shall arrive at the knowledge of the mind without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous." They, indeed, who have ventured to look closely into their minds, with a view to any disputed metaphysical principle, or who recollect what has been said by all the greatest philosophers of the peculiar difficulty attending the scrutiny of the intellectual phenomena, and the very opposite judgments which have been delivered in regard to them-such persons will be not a little startled, we should think, to be told that, after all, we have a perfect knowledge of our minds, and that too, independent of all study or exertion! We are not all interested to determine whether or not the word discovery, when used with strict propriety, can be applied to the conclusions of the metaphysician regarding the laws of mind. If the intellectual philosopher is not to be ranked as a discoverer, because all the facts with which his science is conversant have always existed in our consciousness, this is merely a matter of verbal criticism; and does not at all affect the proposition, that our knowledge of the laws to which these facts belong is capable of being substantially increased by metaphysical enquiry. It is true, that we are all equally conscious of all the intellectual functions; but it does not by any means follow, that our actual knowledge of them is equal and perfect. Were that the case, it would be impossible, as we have already shown, to account for the difficulties and contradictions of metaphysical science. Consciousness is merely that involuntary and momentary perception which the mind has of any present thought or feeling. Its fugttive intimations leave no traces whatever in the memory, and only become subservient to our knowledge of the laws which regulate the intellectual phenomena, in so far as they are made the objects of careful and continued reflection. It is owing to the great difficulty and complexity of this operation, and the fugitive and subtle nature of its objects,

Nov. Organ. lib. i. aph. 94.

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