But such injunction of secrecy is of wider operation. It prohibits the disclosure of facts, knowledge of which is obtained from proceedings filed with the Commission. Would this prohibit the members and employes of the Commission from permitting persons interested or the public to inspect such proceedings or get copies thereof? Should the Secretary of the Commission refuse to furnish a copy of such proceedings to persons interested or to the public?

This is a penal statute, and is to be construed strictly. Permitting persons to inspect such proceedings or to furnish copies thereof to others would not be disclosing facts, knowledge of which was obtained from such proceedings. It would simply be furnishing the means of obtaining such knowledge as the members or employes of the Commission might have already obtained from the same. Besides, there could hardly be any public hearing without a disclosure of these proceedings. A public hearing necessarily involves a disclosure of the pleadings.

This statute does not prohibit the disclosure of proceedings filed with the Railroad Commission, but only the disclosure of facts, knowledge of which was obtained by the members or employes of the Commission from or through proceedings filed with the Commission.

I do not give any opinion on the validity of the provision.

While this is true, it might be well for the members and employes of the Commission not to disclose such proceedings except under direction of the Commission.

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 3d instant, File 6602, enclosing letter from Mr. Hiram Mullis, of the 2nd instant.

Passenger Rule No. 2 is the only rule promulgated by the Commission upon the subject referred to in the letter of Mr. Mullis. This rules provides that a all places where, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the requisite tickets

may be purchased, it shall be the duty of all persons to provide themselves there with before boarding trains as passengers; and if, at such a place, the person shall board a train, and has, for want of reasonable diligence on his part, failed to supply himself with the requisite ticket, the railroad company may collect for each mile that may be traveled by such person, without the requisite ticket, in addition to the maximum prescribed rate, one cent per mile additional in case of adults.

I return herein the letter of Mr. Mullis,

Yours truly,

JAMES K. HINES,

Attorney for Railroad Commission.

RIGHT OF RAILROAD TO REFUSE SHIPMENTS IN BAD ORDER.
OF SHIPPER TO PROVE GOOD ORDER WHEN GOODS WERE

OFFERED TO CARRIER.

RAILROAD COMMISSION OF GEORGIA,

OFFICE OF SPECIAL ATTORNEY TO COMMISSION,

DUTY

I have your letter of the 4th instant, enclosing letter from Spence Drug Company, in which you ask me to furnish you an opinion upon the matter referred to in this letter.

I do not think it necessary for a claimant to furnish proof that goods shipped were in good condition when delivered to the carrier. When a carrier receives goods and carries them over its lines, the prsumption of law is that they were received in good order.

Southern Railway Company vs. Waters & Co., 125 Georgia, 520.

This presumption can be rebutted.

I think the carrier can give a bill of lading for goods not in good shipping condition. In such a case, the carrier can refuse to receive such goods, but the carrier can waive this right, and receive goods in bad shape.

Yours truly,

JAMES K. HINES,

Attorney for Railroad Commission.

LIABILITY OF CARRIER WHERE GOODS ARE DESTROYED BY CYCLONE.

I have your letter of the 20th instant, enclosing letter from Messrs. Paullin & Vinson, in which they wish to know if you have made any ruling on the question whether a railroad company is liable for injury to goods, caused by cyclones. So far as I am informed, you have made no such ruling.

This is a question of law. No excuse avails a common carrier for the loss of goods, unless it was caused by the act of God or the public enemies of the State. Code, Sec. 2264.

Now what is the Act of God? By the Act of God is meant any accident produced by physical causes which are irresistable, such as lightning, storms, perils of the sea, earthquakes, inundations, sudden death or illness.

Fish vs. Chapman & Ross, 2 Ga., 349-357;

Wallace vs. Clayton, 42 Ga., 443;

Central Line of Boats vs. Lowe, 50 Ga.. 511.

The Act of God excludes all idea of human agency.

Fish vs. Chapman & Ross, 2 Ga., 357.

If by any care, prudence or foresight, the thing could have been guarded against, then it is not unavoidabe and is not the Act of God.

Central Line of Boats vs. Lowe, 50 Ga., 511.

It is

Under these authorities of our Supreme Court, a cyclone is the Act of God. No human foresight, care or prudence can prevent one. It is irresistable. the highest display of superhuman force and power.

A man may dig a pit, get in it, and escape its force and fury; but there is no escape for the railroad and its cars, which are in the line of its track.

In my opinion, the railroad company is not liable to these gentlemen for injury to their car of acid, which was struck and injured by the Cuthbert cyclone. I return herein the letter of Messrs. Paullin & Vinson.

JAMES K. HINES,

Attorney for Railroad Commission.

DISCRIMINATION. RIGHT OF SAVANNAH UNION STATION COMPANY TO DENY PRIVILEGES TO ONE BAGGAGE COMPANY WHICH IT

GENTLEMEN: File 7270. The Atlantic Postal Telegraph Cable Company vs. Savannah Union Station Company.

I have your letter of the 11th inst., in which you sent me the file in the above case, and wish my opinion upon the question whether you can compel the Savannah Union Station Company to rent to the Atlantic Postal Telegraph Cable Company, space in its depot at Savannah for the purpose of enabling this telegraph company to carry on its business in that place.

The Savannah Union Station Company owns and operates the Union Depot in Savannah and undertakes to furnish a place where the several railroads can discharge passengers and their baggage, and receive passengers and their baggage for transportation over these several lines of railways. Sub mode, this company is a carrier of passengers for hire. It owes to the public the duty of furnishing suitable facilities for receiving and discharging passengers and their baggage. It must furnish to all passengers alike and without discrimination these facilities. Its property is impressed with a public use to this extent alone. The public have no rights in this property, except to this extent. Its property is not a common for the use and enjoyment of all who may come along. This is the rule established by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the Railroad Commission of Georgia is bound by the law as expounded by our Supreme Court.

The dominion of a terminal company over its depot and its appurtenances is no less complete than that which every owner has over his own property.

Such a corporation may exclude whom it pleases, when they come to transact their own private business with passengers or third persons, and admit whom it pleases, when they come to transact such business.

Fluker vs. Ga. R. & Bk. Co., 81 Ga., 461.

In its character as a common carrier and relatively to its duties and obligations arising therefrom, the Savannah Union Station Company can not grant to any person, or persons, rights or privileges which it refuses to others, but must treat all alike. It must feed all its patrons out of the same spoon.

Kates vs. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Co., 107 Ga., 636.

As to matters involving no duty to the public, the Savannah Union Station Company, in the management and control of its property, may grant conces

sions to some which it denies to others. It can grant to a single corporation or individual the exclusive right to use space in its depot for the transmission of telegraphic information, if it affords to all passengers alike proper and suitable facilities for entering its depot to purchase tickets and take passage, and for checking of cars, and affords to them like facilities for leaving its depot and obtaining their baggage on presenting checks therefor.

Kates vs. Atlanta R. & C. Co., 107 Ga., 637;

Atlanta Terminal Co. vs. Am. Baggage Co., 125 Ga., 677;

Hart vs. Atlanta Terminal Company, et al., 128 Ga., 754.

It is private property between the carrier and those of the general public who have no occasion to use it for purposes of transportation.

Donovan vs. Penn. Co., 199 U. S., 279.

Hart vs. Atlanta Terminal Co., 128 Ga., 768.

Much can be said in favor of the Georgia rule. If this company can be compelled to furnish space in its depot for the Postal Telegraph Company, it could be compelled to furnish space for any other telegraph company. It could be compelled to rent space to the Telepost Company. It could be compelled to furnish a place for all the telegraph companies to do business in its depot. It is now customary to rent space for a restaurant in these terminal stations. If the principle contended for by the Postal Telegraph Company is correct, the Commission could compel the Savannah Union Station Company to rent space to all persons who wish to run a restaurant in its depot. It is usual to rent space for a cigar, soda water and news stand in these terminal stations. If the principle contended for by the Postal Telegraph Company is correct, the Commission could compel the Savannah Union Station Company to rent space for all persons who wish to conduct a cigar, soda water and news-stand. It is a common practice now for a terminal company to rent space in its depot for a barber shop. If the principle contended for is correct, the Savannah Union Station Company will have to rent to all applicants, spaces for barber shops. It is usual for these terminal companies to rent space to some express company for the conduct of its express business. If the principle contended for is correct, the Savannah Union Station Company would have to rent to all express companies who applied to it for space the right and privilege of conducting their respective businesses in its depot building.

In this way, this Company would have no space left for the conduct of its own business. To adopt the opposite of the Georgia rule would subject the public to a great deal more annoyance and inconvenience than to adhere to the rule established by the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States.

It is my opinion that the Railroad Commission of Georgia has not the authority to compel the Savannah Union Station Company to rent space in its depot at Savannah to the Postal Telegraph Company for the purpose of enabling the latter company to conduct its telegraph business in that depot.

JAMES K. HINES,

Attorney for Railroad Commission.