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actions affections Andres angebornen Ansicht Atheisten Begriff beiden bestimmt Bewusstseyn blosse c'est cause Chapt Character Clarke complexen Ideen Condillac consequent daher David Hume Deismus Denken deswegen Diderot eben Ebendas eigentlich eignen Eindrücke einfachen Ideen Empfindung Empirismus endlich Erkenntniss ersten ętre Eudämonismus Existenz first Francis Hutcheson Gefühl Gegenstand Geist geistigen Geschichte Englands gewisse gibt Glückseligkeit good Gott Grund Handlung Hume Ibid idea ideas idées indem Inhärenz itzt Jahre John Locke knowledge Körper l'ame l'homme Leibnitz lich Locke mais Menschen mind moral muss n'est Natur natural Neigungen nothwendig Objecte passions perception Philosophie pleasure power Princip proposition qu'il Räsonnement reason reasoning Reflexion Religion richtig Samuel Clarke Satz schen Schrift Seele Selbstliebe sensation sense seyn Shaftesbury Sinn sinnlichen sowol Spinoza Standpunkt Subject Subsistenz Substanz Tastsinn Thätigkeit Theil Thieren things tion true truth understanding unsere Unterschied Verhältniss Vermögen Vernunft verschiednen Verstand viel Vorstellungen wahr Wahrheit Werk Wesen wirklich wissen wohl Worte
Página lxiv - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number'} No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Página 307 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper,* void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience...
Página lviii - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Página 307 - This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself, and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it and might properly enough be called internal sense.
Página 311 - But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The acts of the mind wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas...
Página 307 - And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation.
Página 299 - For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted.
Página lxiii - Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy. The sciences which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c.
Página lxii - Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment different from the loose reveries of the fancy.
Página 311 - It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular things: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a farther improvement in the use of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences: which advantageous use...