p. proposition may justly be inferred from the other. I know in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning I disire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions. is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension. Ibid. 35. 37. From causes, which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems evident, that if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first and upon one instance, as after even so long a course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Ibid. p. 39. But there is nothing in a number of instances different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar, except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event to expect its usual attendant. Sect. VII. p. 80. There is some principle, which determines him (man) to form such a conclusion. This principle is custom or habit. Sect. IV. p. 48. There are no ideas which occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion. External objects as they appear to the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary connexion; let us see whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own mind. This idea (of power) is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by will both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul. But the means by which this is effected, the energy by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation, of this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry. Sect. VII. p. 67. 69. 70. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. We only learn by experience the frequent conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like connexion between them.The connexion, which we feel in the mind, the customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Ibid. p.71.75.80. Though it be to obvious to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together, I do not find, that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association, a subject however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely resemblance, contiguity in time or place and cause and effect. Sect. III. p. 24. Does it happen in all these relations, that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain? This seems to be the case with that belief, which arises from the relation of cause and effect. And if the case be the same with the other relations or principles of association, this may be established as a general law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind. Sect. V. p. 55. 4. Though our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages, yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. Having found in many instances that any two of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold have always been conjoined together, if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold and to believe that such a quality does exist and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. Sect. V. p 49. 50. The difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. — Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it, and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling. — Ibid. p. 52. 53. Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively forcible firme steady conception, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? Here then is a kind of preestablished harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas.... Custom is that principle by which this correspondance has been effected, so necessary to the subsistence of our species.... Those who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes have here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration. Ibid. p. 53. 59. Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience, as leave no room for doubt or opposition. Sect. VI. p. 61. It is custom alone which engages animals from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one to conceive the other in that particular manner, which we denominate belief. No other explication can be given of this operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall under our notice and observation. Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so much surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much surpasses another. Has not the same custom the same influence on all? We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings: After which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended. As one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation, this will make a very great difference in their reasoning etc. Sect. IX. p. 114, et Not. H. P. 478. 5. All enquiries of men (which) regard only matter of fact and existence are evidently incapable of demonstration. It is only experience.... which is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge and is the source of all human action and behaviour. Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard, the former, as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography and astronomy. The sciences which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chymistry. Divinity or theology as it proves the existence of a Deity and the immortality of soul, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason so far as it is supported by experience but its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation. Sect. XII. p. 174. 175. When - 1 we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. ,If you saw for instance a half-finished building.... could you not infer from the effect that it was a work of design and contrivance? And could you not return again from this inferred cause to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude that the building would soon be finished....?" In works of human art and contrivance it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause and returning back from the cause etc. But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? Plainly this, that man is a being whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with.... The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe not comprehended under any species or genus from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can by analogy infer any attribute or quality in him. Sect. XI. p. 145. 152. 154. When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics for instance, let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. Ibid. p. 175. 6. Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty whether moral or natural is felt more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact to wit the general taste of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning |