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are hunger, thirst, lust, passions for sensual pleasure, wealth, power or fame, of the benevolent kind are pity, condolence, congratulation etc., as often as they become violent and turbulent commotions of the soul. These all arise on their natural occasions, where no reference is made by the mind to its greatest happiness, or to that of others. Moral philos. p. 12. There are two calm natural determinations of the will to be particularly considered on this occasion. First an invariable constant impulse toward one's own perfection and happiness of the highest kind. The other determination alleged is toward the universal happiness of others. Ibid. p. 9. 10. Quum datum non sit bonis omnibus copiose frui.... inter se comparanda 'sunt igitur ea bona, quae diversis hominum sensibus commendantur.... quae Institut. comp. p. 31. The supreme happiness must consist in the most constant enjoyment of the more intense and durable pleasures with as much of the lower gratifications as consists with the full enjoyment of the higher. Moral philos. p. 100. The calm self-love, or the determination of each individual toward his own happiness, is a motion of the will without any uneasy sensation attending it. The motive is some good apprehended in an object or event. Prospects of the pleasures or powers attending opulence are the motives to desire.... and never the uneasy feelings attending the desire itself. It would be absurd to say, that the joy in the suecess was the motive to the desire. We should have no joy in the success, nor could we have had any desire unless the prospect of some other good had been the motive. Ibid. p. 41. 42. Were there no other ultimate determination or desire in the human soul than that of each one toward his own happiness, then calm self-love would be the sole leading principle. This is a favourite tenet of a great many authors and pleases by its simplicity. — Ibid. p. 38. 39.

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truly disinterested in the strictest sense, and not directly subordinated to self-love. Ibid. p. 49. Some plead, that our most generous affections are subordinate to private interest by means of sympathy. We rejoice in seeing others happy.... and in like manner we have pain or sorrow from their misery. — To obtain this pleasure therefore and to avoid this pain, we have from self-love, say they, an inward desire of their happiness.... Where it (sympathy) operates alone, it is uniformly proportioned to the distress or suffering.... without regard to other circumstances....; we may have a weaker good-will to a person unknown, but how much stronger is the affection of gratitude, the love with esteem toward a worthy character...! Ibid. p. 47. Hos autem animi nostri motus benignos sive tranquillos sive perturbatos neque antecedente voluntatis imperio excitari, neque nostram aliquam utilitatem aut voluptatem ultimo spectare, inveniet quisquis in animum suum descenderit. Synops. met. p. 75.

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3. As there is found in the human mind, when it recollects itself a calm general determination toward personal happiness...., so we may find a like principle of a generous kind. We shall find these two grand determinations one toward our own greatest happiness, the other toward the greatest general good, each independent on the other; But here arises a new perplexity in this complex structure where these two principles seem to draw different ways. Must the generous determination and all its particular affections yield to the selfish one.... or must the selfish yield to the generous....? The solution of these difficulties must be found by considering fully the moral faculty.... Moral philos. p. 50. 51. 52. The pleasure in our sensible perceptions of any kind gives us our first idea of natural good or happiness, and then all objects which are apt to excite this pleasure are call'd immediately good. Those objects which may procure others im

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mediately pleasant are call'd advantageous, and we pursue both kinds from a view of interest or selflove. An inquiry p. 113. That the perceptions of moral good and evil, are perfectly different from those of natural good or advantage, every one must convince himself by reflecting upon the different manner in which he finds himself affected when these objects occur to him. Ibid. p. 117. In our sentiments of actions which affect our selves, there is indeed a mixture of the ideas of natural and moral good, which require some attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the actions which affect other persons only we may observe the moral ideas unmixed with those of natural good or evil. Ibid. p. 120. Suppose we reap the same advantage from two men, one of whom serves us from delight in our happiness and love towards us, the other from views of self-interest or by constraint: both are in this case equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite different sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other perceptions of moral actions, than those of advantage, and that power of receiving these perceptions may be call'd a moral sense, since the definition agrees to it, viz. a determination of the mind, to receive any idea from the presence of an object which occurs to us independent on our will. Ibid. p. 119. Innatum esse homini hunc sensum, testimonio omnium gentium et seculorum.... satis confirmatur. Instit. compend. p. 16. When we call this determination a sense or instinct, we are not supposing it of that low kind dependent on bodily organs, such as even the brutes have. In other animal-kinds each one has instincts.... can we suppose mankind void of such principles? Moral phil. p. 48. This moral discernment is not peculiar to persons of a fine education and much reflection. The rudest of mankind shew such notions. Ibid. p. 25. Many suspect that no such senses can be

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natural, because there 'are such different and opposite notions of morality among different nations..... Men's palates differ as much, but who thence denies a sense of tasting to be natural. Ibid. p. 89. As some others of our immediate perceptive powers are capable of culture and improvement, so is this moral sense.... as we improve and correct a low taste for harmony by enurging the ear to finer compositions,.... so we improve our moral taste by presenting larger systems to our mind, and more extensive affections to them.... No need here of reference to an higher power of perception or to reason. Ibid. p. 60. 'Tis our reason, which presents a false notion to the moral faculty. The fault or error is in the opinion or understanding and not in the moral sense, what it approves is truly good. Ibid. p. 91. But as the selfish principles are very strong. capacity by reasoning of arriving to the knowledge of a governing mind presiding in this world.... are of the highest consequence and necessity.... to corroborate our moral sense. Ibid. p. 78. It is enough to observe that many have high notions of honour, faith, generosity, justice, who have scarce any opinions on the Deity. An inquiry etc. p. 128. Some moralists who will rather twist self-love in a thousand shapes, than allow any other principle of approbation may tell us:.... that we may approve such actions from the opinion of their tending ultimately to our own advantage. Self interest will make us only esteem men according to the good they do to our selves, and not give us high ideas of public good, but in proportion to our share of it. - Ibid. p. 125. This sense cannot be overbalanced by interest. This sense, like our other senses, tho counter-acted from motives of external advantage, which are stronger than it, ceases not to operate, but has strength enough to make us uneasy and dissatisfied with our selves. Ibid. 130. 198. We are not to imagine that this moral sense more than the Beilagen.

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other senses supposes any innate ideas, knowledge or practical proposition: we main by it only a determination. of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions, when they occur to our observation antecedent to any opinions of advantage or loss to redound to our selves from them, even as we are pleas'd with a regular form or an harmonious composition, without having any knowledge of mathematicks, or seeing any advantage in that form, or composition different from the immediate pleasure. Ibid. p. 135.

4. Every action which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to flow from some affection toward rational agents. Ibid. p. 136. 'tis plain that the primary objects of this (moral) faculty are the affections of the will, and that the several affections which are approved, tho' in very different degrees, yet all agree in one general character, of tendency to the happiness of others.... Moral philos. p. 62. That disposition therefore, which is most excellent, and naturally gains the highest moral approbation, is the calm stable universal good-will to all, or the most extensive benevolence. Ibid. p. 69. The last and only remaining objection against what has been said, is this: that virtue perhaps is pursued because of the concomitant pleasure. To which we may answer.... by observing that this plainly supposes a sense of virtue antecedent to ideas of advantage, upon which this advantage is founded. An inquiry etc. p. 152. The actions which flow solely from self-love and yet evidence no want of benevolence, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral sense, and neither raise the. love or hatred of the observer. Ibid. p. 172. Having remov'd the false springs of virtuous actions let us next establish the true one, viz. some determination of our nature to study the good of others, or some instinct, antecedent to all reason from interest, which influences us to the love of others, even as the

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