concernment or regard to private good, which is inconsistent with the interest of the species or publick, this must in every respect be esteem'd an ill and vitious affection. And this is what we commonly call selfishness and disapprove so much, in whatever creature we happen to discover it. II. p. 22. 23. Thus the affection towards self-good may be a good affection, or an ill-one. II. p. 24. it follows that a creature really wanting in them.... may thus be esteem'd vitious and defective. "Tis thus that we say of a creature in a kind way of reproof, that he is too good.... — II. p. 90. By the freedom of our passions and low interests we are reconcil'd to the goodly order of the universe...... we harmonize with nature. II. p. 433. Whenever we arraign any passion as too strong or complain of any as too weak, we must speak with respect to a certain constitution or oeconomy of a particular creature or species. For if a passion leading to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual for being strong, if we may be assur'd that the strength of it will not be the occasion of any disturbance within, nor of any disproportion between itself and other affections, then consequently the passion however strong cannot be condemned as vitious. But if to have all passions in equal proportion with it, be what the constitution of the creature cannot bear.... then may those strong passions, tho' of the better kind, be call'd excessive. For being in inequal proportion to the others, and causing an ill ballance in the affection at large, they must.... incline the party to a wrong moral practice. II. p. 92. There is no creature.. who must not of necessity be ill in some degree by having any affection or aversion in a stronger degree than is sutable to his own private good, or that of the system to which he is joined. For in either case the affection is ill and vitious. II. p. 72. To have the natural kindly or generous affections strong and powerful towards the good of the publick, is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment, and to want them is certain misery and ill. To have the private or self-affections too strong or beyond their degree of subordinacy to the kindly and natural is also miserable, to have the unnatural affections is to be miserable in the highest degree. II. p. 98. There is no real good beside the enjoy ment of beauty. II. p. 422. Virtue is his (man's) natural good, and vice his misery and ill. III. p. 223. What else is it we all do in general than philoso phize? If philosophy be, as we take it, the study of happiness, must not every one in some manner or other either skilfully or unskilfully philosophize! II. p. 438. 4. Sense of right and wrong being as natural to us as natural affection itself, and being a first principle in our constitution and make, there is no speculative opinion, persuasion or belief, which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it. II. p. 44. Do you maintain then, that.... the notions and principles of fair just and honest with the rest of these ideas are innate? (Answ.) If you dislike the word innate, let us change it, if you will for instinct, and call instinct that which nature teaches exclusive of art, culture or discipline. II. p. 411. Mr. Locke joue miserablement sur le mot d'idée innée, et ce mot bien entendu signifie seulement une idée naturelle ou conforme notre naLa vertu suivant Locke n'a point d'autre mesure, d'autre loi ni d'autre règle que la mode et la coutume. De là vient que notre esprit n'a aucune idée du bien et du mal qui lui soit naturellement empreinte. L'expérience et notre catéchisme nous donnent l'idée du juste et de l'injuste. Il faut apparement qu'il y ait aussi un catéchisme pour les oiseaux qui leur apprenne à faire les nids et à voler quand ils ont des ailes. Lettres à un jeune homme etc. Deuvres Tom. III. p. 351. 352. If brutes therefore be ture. --- incapable of knowing and enjoying beauty as being brutes, and having sense only for their own share, it follows that neither can man by the same sense, or brutish part, conceive or enjoy beauty, but all the beauty and good he enjoys, is in a nobler way and by the help of what is noblest, his mind and reason. II. p. 425. A taste or judgment 'tis suppos'd can hardly come ready form'd with us into the world. (It) will not, as I imagine, by any person be taken for innate. A legitimate and juste taste. can neither be begotten, made, conceived or produc'd without the antecedent labours and pains of criticism. III. p. 164. 165. Labour and pains are requir'd, and time to cultivate a natural genius, ever so apt or forward. II. p. 401. The taste of beauty and the relish of what is decent just and amiable, perfects the character of the gentleman and the philosopher. III. p. 162. 'Tis no merely what we call principle, but a taste, which governs men. III. p. 177. Thus are the arts and virtues, mutually friends, and thus the science of virtuoso's and that of virtue itself become, in a manner, one and the same. 1. p. 338. VI. Belegstellen aus Hutcheson. *) Zu §. 9. 1. The intention of moral philosophy is, to direct men to that course of action, which tends ') Ich citire: An inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue etc. the second edition corrected and enlarg'd. Lond. 1726. 8vo. Synopsis metaphysicae, ontologiam et pneumatologiam complectens. Ed. III. auct. et emend. Glasguae 1749. 8vo. Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria etc. Rotterod. 1745. 8vo. A system of moral philosophy in three books, written by the most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection, as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature without any aids of supernatural revelation; these maxims or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature and the system or collection of them is called the law of nature. The most natural method in this science must be first to inquire into the several powers and dispositions of the species, whether perceptive or active, into its several natural dispositions...... Moral philos. Vol. I. p. 1. 2. - Animi partes.... ad duas reducuntur classes, quarum altera vires omnes cognoscendi continet, quae intellectus dicitur, altera vires appetendi, quae dicitur voluntas. Institut. compend p. 4. Appetitus homini est duplex: altero cum brutis animalibus communi, qui sensitivus dicitur, coeco quodam impetu fertur ad voluptatem, atque perturbato admodum animi motu impellitur,.... altero tranquillo et rationem in consilium advocante consectatur ea quae praestantiora judicantur...., qui rationalis dicitur aut xooxyr voluntas. Ex boni aut mali specie objecta cumque omnibus adjunctis pensitata, sponte sua existit haec appetitio aut fuga (desire and aversion Moral phil. p. 7.) — sine praevio voluntatis decreto aut imperio-(without any previous choice or command. Ibid.) Appetitionem et fugam proxime excipit plerumque deliberatio. Primam appetitionem aut aspernationem appellant scholastici velleitatem simplicem, agendi autem propositum, postquam omnia.... sunt pensitata, voluntatem efficacem. Synops. met. 66. 67. cf. Inst. comp. p. 28. Ab appetitione autem aut fuga tranquilla, quae circa bonum aut malum.... occu late F. H. etc. published etc. by his son Francis Hutcheson, M. D. Lond. 1655. 2 Vol. 4. Die Abhandlung über die Leidenschaften lag mir nur in der deutschen Uebersetzung vor. pantur,.... diversi longe sunt motus animi perturbati, qui voluntatis passiones et in appetitu sensitivo contineri dicuntur, ubi coeco quodam ast naturali impetu ad quaedam agenda impellimur aut cupienda. Saepe appetitiones purae sine motibus hisce perturbatis reperiuntur, saepe simul animum in contrarias partes distrahunt. Ibid. p. 71. 72. Quasdam animi passiones natura praecedit sensus molestus....; praecedit eas quas proprius appetitui sensitivo adscribunt scholastici. Ibid. p. 76. There are many particular passions and appetites which naturally arise on their proper occasions, each terminating ultimately on its own gratification, and attended with violent confused and uneasy sensations, which are apt to continue till the object or gratification is obtained. Moral philos. I. p. 11. To the will belong not only the bodily appetites and turbulent passions but the several calm affections of a nobler order. Moral philos. p. 13. 2. The acts of will may be again divided into two classes, according as one is pursuing good for himself and repelling the contrary, or pursuing good for others and repelling evils which threaten them. The former we call selfish, the later benevolent. Ibid. p. 8. Gratuitam esse aliquando hominum bonitatem, nullam sui utilitatem spectantium, ubi animo benigno alteri consulunt, satis constabit, si quisque se excusserit. Inst. compend. p. 10. If there be any benevolence at all, it must be disinterested, there is one objection against disinterested love which occurs from considering that nothing so effectually excites our love toward rational agents as their beneficence to us, whence we are led to imagine, that our love of persons as well irrational objects flows intirely from self-interest. If it be so, then we could indifferently love one character even to obtain the bounty of a third person. An inquiry etc. 140. 147. Of the turbulent passions and appetites some are selfish, some benevolent.... of the selfish |